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ABSTRACT 
 
EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY AND TURKEY’S ENERGY ROLE: 
WILL THE ACCESSION PROCESS BE AFFECTED? 
Sever, Seda Duygu 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Ali Tekin 
 
May 2010 
 
Increasing concerns for energy security urge the European Union countries 
to develop common energy policies. In this respect, diversification of energy 
suppliers and transit routes emerges as the most feasible policy for the EU to 
address the problems arising out of its energy dependency. At this point, Turkey’s 
strategic geographical position offers an energy bridge which has the potential of 
linking the EU with diversified suppliers. This thesis, examines European efforts 
to create a common energy policy and Turkey’s role in European energy security 
strategies. Based on the views that Turkey’s energy bridge position will accelerate 
the accession process and will bring full membership, this study questions whether 
energy can really be a factor for Turkey’s membership. Taking into consideration 
the impact of the absorption capacity and negative European public support on the 
long candidacy of Turkey, in addition to the examination of relevant literature, the 
answer to this question is investigated through the analysis of European public 
opinion. Relying on official Turkish and EU documents, official statistics and 
annual Eurobarometer surveys, contrary to the expectations, the analysis reaches to 
the conclusion that for full membership, Turkey’s energy role for Europe is an 
important yet insufficient factor on its own. 
Key Words: Energy Security, Turkey and the European Union, European 
Public Opinion 
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ÖZET 
 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN ENERJİ POLİTİKASI VE TÜRKİYE’NİN ENERJİ 
ROLÜ: ÜYELİK SÜRECİ ETKİLENECEK Mİ? 
Sever, Seda Duygu 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ali Tekin 
 
May 2010 
 
Enerji güvenliğine dair artan endişeler, Avrupa Birliği ülkelerini ortak 
politikalar geliştirmeye yönlendirmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Avrupa Birliği’nin enerji 
bağımlılığından kaynaklı sorunlara dair uygulayabileceği en etkin politika ülke ve 
güzergah bağlamında enerji kaynaklarının çeşitlendirilmesidir. Bu noktada, 
Türkiye’nin stratejik coğrafi pozisyonu Avrupa Birliği’ni çeşitli üreticilere 
bağlayacak bir enerji köprüsü konumuna sahiptir. Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği’nin ortak 
bir enerji politikası oluşturma çabasını ve Türkiye’nin, Avrupa’nın enerji güvenliği 
stratejilerindeki rolünü incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin enerji köprüsü 
konumunun müzakere sürecini hızlandırıp tam üyelik getireceği görüşlerinden 
yola çıkarak, enerjinin gerçekten üyelik için bir faktör olup olmadığını 
sorgulamaktadır. Hazmetme kapasitesinin ve düşük Avrupa kamuoyu desteğinin, 
Türkiye’nin uzayan adaylık sürecindeki etkisi göz önünde bulundurularak bu 
sorunun cevabı literatürdeki kaynaklara ek olarak Avrupa kamuoyunun analiz 
edilmesi ile araştırılmıştır. Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği’nin resmi belgelerine, resmi 
istatistiklere ve yıllık Eurobarometre raporlarına dayanarak yapılan analiz, 
beklentilerin aksine, tam üyelik için, Türkiye’nin enerji konumunun önemli ancak 
tek başına yetersiz bir faktör olduğu sonucuna ulaşmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Enerji Güvenliği, Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği, Avrupa 
Kamuoyu 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 Since 1986, due to transition to a service oriented economy, the European 
Union’s demand for energy has been increasing with a rate of 1-2% a year, which 
means that EU is increasingly consuming more energy than it can produce. If the 
current trends continue without precautionary measures, in the next 20 to 30 years 
imported products will constitute 70% of the Union’s energy needs causing a 
worrying level of dependence in oil, gas and coal which could reach 90%, 70% 
and 100% respectively. This would leave all economic sectors from transport to 
industry susceptible to variations in international markets (European Commission, 
2000: 2, 12, 20). 
 Consequently, the European Union has to face several challenges with 
respect to its vulnerability arising due to its energy dependency1. Concerning the 
supply of energy, military and political conflicts in the producer regions, 
diplomatic confrontations with supplier states such as Iran and secure 
                                                
1
 This thesis, by using the term “energy dependency” specifically focuses on the European Union’s 
dependence on external oil and natural gas supplies. 
 2 
transportation as well as efficient investments in the production of oil and gas 
dominate the EU’s agenda. (Bahgat, 2006: 961). 
Member states are highly interconnected and operate in an interdependent 
energy market not only among themselves but also in international terms. 
Consequently, national approaches to the energy issue and unilateral energy policy 
decisions of one state to meet all the mentioned challenges, automatically affects 
the market functioning of other members. Therefore, uncoordinated national 
decisions concerning energy policy seems to increase the Union’s overall 
vulnerability in energy and a common approach to energy security emerges to be 
more advantageous for the EU (European Commission, 2000: 3, 10; Hoogeveen 
and Perlot, 2007: 503).  
 While the necessity to accomplish concrete achievements for unified 
energy policies was already present, the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict of 2006, 
refreshed the awareness among member states of the importance of supply security 
and it highlighted how Member State’s dependency on imports made them 
vulnerable to external events and to the decisions of non-EU Member States 
(Geden, et al., 2006: 14). This “wake up call” in 2006 revealed that, for the EU to 
be able to de-link itself from the drawbacks of its increasing energy dependence, it 
is an urgent and inevitable necessity to accomplish the creation of an active energy 
policy and to diversify its suppliers and transit routes.  
 The EU’s need for diversification to overcome the vulnerabilities of its 
energy dependency, positioned Turkey at the centre of attention of EU policy 
makers in the sphere of energy. Situated at the crossroads of energy producers in 
the Middle East, Central Asia and Caspian Region, Turkey’s geopolitical role 
represented a solution to ease the EU’s energy supply risks. In that respect, the 
 3 
image of Turkey as an “energy bridge” between a variety of producers and Europe 
attracted attention in the international arena (Nies, 2008: 85).  
 This thesis combines European Energy Policy and Turkey’s energy bridge 
position. The Fundamental aim of this study is not only to explain Turkey’s energy 
role in the context of European Energy Policies for achieving energy security but 
also to question whether this feature of Turkey can affect Turkey’s accession into 
the European Union. 
 This thesis starts with a focus on the essential elements of European Energy 
Policy. In this respect, chapter two clarifies what is European Energy Policy, based 
on its three fundamental objectives: sustainability, competitiveness and security of 
supply. Taking into consideration that rising energy dependency and recent gas 
disruptions increased concerns over energy security, the chapter continues with the 
definition of “energy security” in order to reveal the perspective of the EU which 
will be reflected on energy policies. In addition to the study of historical evolution 
of European Energy Policy, as an evaluation the chapter also concentrates on the 
reasons rendering the achievement of a common energy policy difficult for 
Europeans. In that section, as part of internal difficulties, the problems concerning 
European Energy Regulator and different preferences of member states are 
investigated. In order to clarify the complexities arising from the external factors a 
theoretical analysis is also included in this part as a way to interpret the EU energy 
policies floating between “market principles” and “geopolitics”.  
 As mentioned earlier, one of the objectives of this thesis is to study 
Turkey’s energy role as a transit country for the European Union. In that respect, 
the EU’s external energy policies to strengthen its supply security and its relations 
with the producers offer a significant context for the evaluation of the strategic 
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position of Turkey. Consequently, the third chapter focuses on the external 
dimension of European Energy Policy. Following the study of the EU’s external 
energy policy strategies, the chapter provides information about the EU’s oil and 
natural gas import patterns and its energy dependency with regards to producer 
states. The last sections of the chapter engage in the analysis of the EU’s dialogue, 
partnerships and agreements with major producers namely Norway, African 
producers, Middle Eastern producers, producers from the Caspian Region and 
Russia. 
 In the light of the general panorama about European Energy Policy and the 
European Union’s position vis-à-vis major oil and gas producers this study 
continues by concentrating on Turkey’s role of “energy corridor” for the European 
Union. Accordingly, the fourth chapter initially describes Turkey’s existing 
pipeline systems and its projects in the planning stages which will enhance 
Turkey’s position as an energy bridge. In this part, Nabucco is given a special 
emphasis since it is considered as the most significant route for the diversification 
of energy supplies to Europe. As the purpose is to evaluate Turkey’s significance 
for European Energy Policy, the chapter continues with the examination of the 
major factors which have a potential to affect the importance of Turkey’s role. In 
this context, hurdles arising from the energy suppliers in the Middle East and 
Caspian Region which will influence the amounts of oil and gas transported to 
Europe via Turkey are analyzed briefly. Moreover, the challenge coming from the 
LNG trade, the critical situation of the straits in oil transits and the “Russian 
factor” with its South Stream Project, are also considered. 
 The European Union’s increasing concerns about its energy dependency 
and its efforts for diversifying both its suppliers and transit routes offered an 
 5 
opportunity for Turkey’s geostrategic location to operate as a natural energy 
corridor. There is a general trend among the supporters of Turkish membership 
that this situation will start a new phase in Turkey’s accession process. Therefore, 
the last chapter questions this claim and focuses on the link between Turkey’s 
potential membership and European energy security.  
  The arguments pointing to the geopolitical importance of Turkey for the 
EU are significant for emphasizing Turkey’s advantages in the debates concerning 
its membership. Nevertheless, clear-cut statements of arguments cannot offer a 
complete analysis of whether energy will be a factor in Turkey’s accession process. 
Given that Turkey’s long candidacy period is highly associated with the Union’s 
absorption capacity being under the influence of European public opinion, this 
thesis argues that European public opinion on European energy dependency, 
Turkey’s energy role and its membership will provide grounds to assess whether 
“energy” will really be a factor. To this end, the last chapter continues with a 
public opinion analysis and it interprets Turkey’s potential membership. 
 All the information provided in this thesis rests on textual analysis of 
relevant literature, of official Turkish and EU documents and of official data 
extracted from Eurostat and Eurobarometer statistics. In line with the analysis 
conducted throughout the thesis the last chapter, the conclusion, puts forward 
concluding remarks and interpretations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY 
 
 
 
Energy is a fundamental factor in the construction of European Union 
project. The deep interaction and cooperation among the founding members of the 
Union crystallized around energy considerations. The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) Treaty and Euratom Treaty did not only establish the roots of 
European Community but also ensured regular supply of coal and coordination in 
nuclear energy. Nevertheless, despite energy’s importance in our daily lives, 
despite the fact that EU project “took off” with the integration in economic domain 
concerning coal and steel and despite potential beneficial effects of integration in 
terms of external energy policy and action against climate change, European 
Energy Policy displayed an unsuccessful example of integration (Pointvogl, 2009: 
5704). In developments following ECSC and EURATOM, member states 
remained reluctant in creating a common energy policy. To illustrate, Maastricht 
and Amsterdam Treaties did not include chapters on energy rather, energy issue 
was only mentioned (European Commission, 2000: 9). In the Treaty on European 
Union, “measures in the spheres of energy, civil protection and tourism” 
 7 
(European Commission, 1992:6) were cited all together and only Article 129b 
referred to energy infrastructures together with transport and telecommunication in 
the discussion of trans-European networks (European Commission, 1992: 25). 
 Nevertheless, the fact that the EU’s energy dependency has been increasing 
each year, and is projected to increase even more in the future, exposes EU 
economy and energy security to external dynamics in the world and renders energy 
a significant item on the agenda of European decision makers. Accordingly, the 
instabilities in the producer regions, hostile relations with major energy exporters 
and security as well as investment problems in the transit routes of oil and gas 
supplies are of major concerns for the EU. 
 The issue gets further complicated with the inclusion of worries about 
global warming, hazardous effects of certain energy types on health and 
environmental damages due to energy production, transportation and consumption, 
which overall require not only secure access to energy but also access to clean and 
efficient energy.  
Even though coordination of national policies of EU member states would 
be influential to deal with these challenges, EU level coordination and 
harmonization of energy policies are just initial steps for energy security. Self-
sufficiency in energy is not a feasible option for the EU in the near future, given 
the limited energy resources to meet the demand of its current standard of living 
and of its highly industrialized economy (Bahgat, 2006: 975). Hence, import 
dependency in energy is an undeniable reality of EU economy which the policy 
makers have to cope with. Although the Union has to deal with energy security 
through several policies such as diversification of energy mix and energy suppliers 
or encouragement of investments on renewable energy resources; internal, that is 
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EU level arrangements cannot be considered as enough for an efficient energy 
policy, unless they are combined with international efforts to change global energy 
trends in favor of environment friendly energy policies and unless they include 
other international actors as producers, energy-importers and international 
regulatory institutions. 
Accordingly, in addition to European demand of energy, the EU policy-
makers have to take into account increasing consumption and demand of higher 
amounts of energy in the world market, due to rapid increases in population 
combined with economic growth, especially in China and India, with the reason 
that, China’s and India’s increasing consumption urges the rivalry over access to 
scarce oil and gas reserves. It is expected that oil demand in China will increase by 
2.9 percent per year until 2030, as opposed to 0.3 annual increase of EU’s oil 
demand, which decreases the Union’s relative importance as a customer from the 
perspective of especially Middle Eastern oil producers (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 
2007: 494).  This also means that, the efficiency and success of energy policies of 
these developing countries in addressing energy supply emergencies or curbing 
their growing energy demand directly affect the interests of European Union 
(International Energy Agency, 2007: 159).  
 With these challenges on the background, until recently, climate change 
and energy efficiency had started to outweigh the agenda of internal and 
international efforts of the European Union concerning the creation of an energy 
policy. However, in 2006, the disruption of supplies coming from Russia, 
reminded the EU members of their vulnerability concerning supply security and 
revealed the urgent need to create an active European Energy Policy to answer the 
energy related challenges.  
 9 
Nonetheless the task is very difficult given that energy is a multifaceted 
issue with national, EU level, international requirements consisting of many 
chapters such as climate change, energy efficiency, investments in renewable 
sources, supply security, transparency in energy markets, diversification of energy 
mix and many others. Faced with such a complicated agenda, energy security 
stands as one of the most important issues to testify the strength and integrity of 
the European Union both internally and externally.  Therefore, the solutions and 
accomplishments of European Union in the arena of energy attract further interest. 
“What is European Energy Policy?”, “What is meant by “energy security”? “What 
are the EU’s current practices?” are all among the questions which require answers. 
  
 
2.1. What Is European Energy Policy? 
 
Although some of the policies are still up to the individual choices of each 
Member State in line with their national preferences, global interdependence 
requires energy policy to offer a European dimension. For the benefit of all 
European citizens, the “European Energy Policy needs to be ambitious, 
competitive and long term” (European Commission, 2006b: 17; European 
Commission, 2007:3). 
Accordingly, European Energy Policy is identified with the trinity of 
sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply. Major European documents 
constituting the milestones of European Energy policy, especially Green Paper of 
2006 and The Commission’s communication “An Energy Policy for Europe” of 
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2007, with concrete references base their policy recommendations on these three 
basic objectives. 
These three important objectives aim at “transforming Europe into a highly 
energy efficient and low CO2 energy economy” (European Commission, 2007: 5). 
What is special about this target is that the coherence between sustainability, 
competitiveness and security of supply is a necessity since individually none of 
them provide the needed solutions for a complete energy policy (European 
Commission, 2007: 5-6).  
Sustainability, the first element of European Energy Policy is directly 
linked to climate change. 80% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission in the Union is 
caused by energy related activities. With existing energy and transport policies, 
“EU CO2 emissions would increase by around 5% by 2030 and global emissions 
would rise by 55%” (European Commission, 2007: 3).  Being aware that current 
policies are not sustainable, EU targets itself the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions both within the Union and worldwide, near to a limit close to the pre-
industrial levels, with the intention of managing the increase of global temperature 
(European Commission, 2007:3). This imposes on EU the need of a twofold policy 
at the EU-level and international level. At the global level then, the European 
Energy Policy emerges as “leading” international efforts to stop climate change. 
At the European level, the development of renewable resources, the improvement 
of alternative transport fuels with low carbon and efforts to control energy demand 
by changing consumption habits constitute the basic policies to address 
sustainability (European Commission, 2006b: 17). 
The second element of European Energy Policy is competitiveness. The 
concentration of oil and gas reserves in a few countries and companies, in addition 
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to the volatile prices of the international energy markets with sudden price rises, 
highly affect the EU due to its increasing need to foreign energy resources. This 
situation entails a heavy economic burden with high risks on EU citizens. “If, for 
example, the oil price rose to 100$/barrel in 2030, the EU-27 energy total import 
bill would increase by around € 170 billion, an annual increase of €350 for every 
EU citizen” (European Commission, 2007: 4). 
For EU citizens to fully enjoy liberalization in energy, higher level of 
investments in the sector and an Internal Energy Market operating with fair and 
competitive prices are crucial factors. Therefore, European Energy Policy is the 
framework to offer right policies and necessary legislations to create the 
circumstances for total energy liberalization (European Commission, 2007: 4). 
Accordingly, competitiveness aims the opening of energy markets for the benefit 
of EU citizens in line with latest energy technologies and investments in clean 
energy production (European Commission, 2006b: 17). 
 In this context, however, European Energy Policy is a tool to act beyond 
market liberalization and by stimulating investment, it is also a social instrument to 
create jobs as well as economic growth and promote innovations especially in 
energy efficiency and in the development of renewable resources. To the end of 
being a global leader with a knowledge based economy, European Energy Policy 
is, then, just another means. It is important to note that with a turnover of €20 
billion and 300.000 employees, EU has already taken the leadership position in 
renewable technologies. This indicates that “competitiveness” by creating 
necessary atmosphere for investments also adds to the “sustainability” element of 
European Energy Policy, which in total gives the Union a privilege of leading the 
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world agenda in the fight against global warming. (European Commission, 2007: 
4).  
Last but not least, security of supply constitutes the last element of 
European Energy Policy. Although with sustainability and competitiveness, 
security of supply creates the trinity of the Union’s energy policy, it differs from 
the two in that concerns for energy security and continuity of oil and gas flows to 
Europe can be considered as fundamental reasons for the creation of a common 
policy, since permanent supply of energy resources is part of national security 
understanding of Member States in the modern world circumstances.  
Increasing dependency on imported hydrocarbons constitute a threat for the 
European Union, since the situation leaves the Union exposed to external 
dynamics outside its discretion power. In 2030, it is expected that reliance on 
imports of gas and oil will rise to 84% and 93% as opposed to 57% and 82% in 
2007, respectively. When such a level of dependency is combined with uncertainty 
about the willingness and capacity of oil and gas exporters to invest more and 
increase production to meet the increasing global demand, threat of supply 
disruptions emerge as one of the major challenges of the century (European 
Commission, 2007: 4).  
As a result, through highlighting security of supply, European Energy 
Policy confronts the Union’s increasing dependency on imported energy resources 
by offering an integrated approach to control and reduce rising demand and to 
diversify energy mix, sources as well as routes of supply of imported energy 
(European Commission, 2006b: 18). 
Even though in practice the three elements are inseparable and complete 
each other, security of supply requires further emphasis since EU’s relations with 
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energy producer countries evolve around permanence of oil and gas supplies. 
Concerns for supply security do not only shape the EU’s internal and external 
energy policies but also with their high relevance to the European Union and 
Turkey energy relationship, they require further understanding for a complete 
analysis. Therefore, the following part clarifies the concept of “energy security” 
with an emphasis on the EU’s perception, since its energy policies evolve around 
the intention of securing energy for living, functioning of the economy and 
development. 
 
 
2.2. What Is Energy Security?  
 
Energy is the irreplaceable part of almost every aspect of modern life from 
industry to transportation, heating and electricity, it is at the heart of human 
development and economic growth. As global energy system evolved and as 
perceptions about potential effects of supply disruptions improved, concerns about 
energy security have changed as well. While oil and over-dependence on oil 
imports dominated the agenda in 1970s and 1980s, today the security of natural 
gas supply and the credibility of international gas market have been added among 
the challenges to be addressed by energy policy makers (International Energy 
Agency, 2007: 161).  
These challenges complicated by the Union’s increasing import 
dependency in oil/gas and by the fact that most of the imports arrive from either 
unstable regions or incredible energy exporters, urge the EU to create a common, 
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integrated energy policy (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009: 4474). Nevertheless, 
Member States’ differing energy profiles and their diverging energy import 
dependencies, lead them to varied interpretations of energy security. Hence, the 
clarification of the concept of energy security is crucial for the creation of an 
efficient European energy policy. Protectionist and nationalist energy policies in 
Europe may prevail in the future, unless Member States unite their differing 
perceptions and preferences about energy security (Pointvogl, 2009: 5714).  
Not only interpretations of “energy security” but also views concerning the 
status of “energy security” diverge within the Union. While the Commission 
considers Common Foreign and Security Policy as the relevant policy level, states 
like France or Sweden argue that the safety of production, of supply routes and the 
redistribution of resources in the case of international energy crisis are more 
related to “defence” policies. (Pointvogl, 2009: 5709).  The reason for this is that 
traditionally, nation states are inclined to consider energy security as a matter of 
“high politics” requiring policies with high level of state intervention, unlike other 
sectors such as telecommunications. Combined with the growing concern about 
the negative manners of supplier states, this “high politics” nature of energy 
security lead national governments to argue that energy issues cannot be left 
simply to market forces, but requires a certain level of government intervention 
when necessary (Benford, 2006: 40). 
For energy security the major commonly agreed fact is that the purpose in 
securing energy is not maximizing energy self sufficiency, nor eliminating the 
dependence on external sources; rather the aim is to reduce the potential risks of 
this dependency (European Commission, 2000: 2). Consequently, EU energy 
policy targets secure energy with every aspect from uninterrupted supplies to clean 
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energy forms, environmental precautions and competitive market. However, in the 
literature and in many official EU documents, “energy security” is directly linked 
to “energy supply security”. In fact, in the overall EU strategy for energy security, 
“security of supply” constitutes only one part of the trinity of “sustainability, 
competitiveness and security of supply”. Nevertheless, the interchangeably usage 
of the two concepts shall not cause any confusion. The reason is that, as further 
study of EU energy policies in the following sections will indicate, policies 
addressing sustainability, competitiveness or security of supply, all at the end 
target more or less the same objective: the uninterrupted access to energy both now 
and in the future.  
Before mentioning the EU’s understanding of energy security, it would be 
appropriate to explore what the literature says. There are three major ways to study 
energy security: from the perspective of consumers (supply security), from the 
perspective of suppliers (demand security) and from the perspective of 
“insecurity” namely hurdles to energy security.  
From the consumer countries’ side, with the broadest definition, energy 
security refers to “adequate, affordable and reliable supplies of energy” 
(International Energy Agency, 2007: 160). While some (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 
2007) use the term “security of supply” for energy security, simply as “the access 
to and availability of energy at all times”, others such as Pointvogl (2009: 5706) 
define it in the following way: “uninterrupted, continuous and sufficient 
availability of all forms of energy a given entity requires”.  
With every definition, scholars accentuate a different aspect of energy 
security. Some take the physical availability of the energy as the basis and argue: 
“If security of supply is the assurance of the physical availability of oil during a 
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supply disruption, then a country can be said to have achieved this goal if it is 
always able to guarantee that a given quantity of oil is available with certainty to 
its domestic market, independently of possible market disturbances” (Lacasse and 
Plourde, 1995: 6). Others like Pointvogl (2009: 5707), make a reference to a 
country’s level of vulnerability to potential energy crisis or to possibility of supply 
disruptions. Accordingly, the country’s import dependency plays an important role 
concerning its security of supply in the case of long term effects of physical and 
political supply disruptions.   
Highlighting price factor with emphasis on “affordability” is another way 
to describe energy security. In this case, the concept is identified as “the 
availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable price” (International 
Energy Agency, 2001:3 quoted in Costantini et al, 2007: 210, Le Coq and Paltseva, 
2009: 4475). Barton, Redgwell, Ronne and Zillman also belong to this category 
with their definition arguing that energy security is “a condition in which a nation 
and all, or most, of its citizens and businesses have access to sufficient energy 
resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of 
major disruption of service” (2004:5 quoted in Bahgat, 2006: 965).  Such an 
approach to energy security embraces the welfare aspect of energy and highlights 
the necessity of accessing to commercial energy by every citizen including lower 
income groups (Costantini et al, 2007: 210).  
When it comes to the EU, The European Commission prefers an 
understanding of energy security embracing all different aspects mentioned above 
and with the Green Paper of 2006, identifies the security of energy supply as one 
of the three main objectives of European Energy Policy (European Commission, 
2006b: 18). In 1990, The Commission affirmed: 
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Security of supply means the ability to ensure that future essential 
energy needs can be met, both by means of adequate domestic 
resources worked under economically acceptable conditions or 
maintained as strategic reserves, and by calling upon accessible and 
stable external sources supplemented where appropriate, by strategic 
stocks (Arnott and Skinner, 2005: 23). 
 
 As the international context changed, the concern about climate change increased 
and environmental damages, due to production, transportation and usage of coal or 
oil, reached undeniable levels. The EU not only acknowledged new challenges but 
also assigned itself the role of leadership for effective solutions. Therefore, the 
EU’s strategy for energy evolved around the conceptualization of energy supply 
security as  
Ensuring, for the well-being of its citizens and the proper functioning 
of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability of energy 
products on the market, at a price which is affordable for all 
consumers (private and industrial), while respecting environmental 
concerns and looking towards sustainable development (European 
Commission, 2000: 2).  
  
Given that the EU is a major energy consumer its definition indicated the 
consumers’ perspective. Indeed, when energy security is studied, it is common to 
encounter a reflection of only supply security, from the point of view of the 
consumers, whether as energy importing countries or as state level consumers in 
the households and industry. Nevertheless, energy security considerations have 
serious implications for producers as well and unless demand security, too, is 
included to the observation the comments would be biased. Since the following 
chapters will explore the EU, the producers such as Russia and Turkey’s 
relationship in the context of energy, the identification of “demand security” as 
part of energy security is highly relevant especially for Russia being in the 
exporter side of the equation. 
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Environmental, physical and economic risks constitute severe damages to 
producer countries, as well and most of the time, contribute to their instability. The 
two oil crises in 1970s would illustrate the case. The crises highly affected 
Western economies. In the short term, the rise in oil prices led to economic growth 
and prosperity in producer countries which caused the crises; however, in the long 
run, disastrous results occurred. Due to the lack of producers’ credibility, 
consumer countries pursued diversification policies which resulted in an oil 
demand decrease between 1979 and 1983. When in 1988, the demand returned 
back to the level of 1979, alternative production areas were already included in the 
world market with new exploration efforts. As the new developments decreased 
the prices, Middle East OPEC countries unsuccessfully tried to direct their 
economy away from oil. Combined with high birth rates and unemployment the 
economic downturn produced still ongoing social and political instability. This 
proved that economic welfare of producing countries is not provided by high oil 
prices but by security of demand of their oil (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 492).  
Put differently, high oil prices damaged global economic prosperity and 
encouraged consumers to switch to other fuels. In that case, from the part of 
producers, high prices meant “killing the goose that lays the golden eggs” (Bahgat, 
2006: 965).  
Accordingly, in order to achieve energy security, continuous supply and 
continuous demands are highly important, which means both producers and 
consumers need each other. The “mutual dependency” in energy security 
constitutes the basis of the dialogue between producers and consumers in the 
international arena. For achieving an international energy security, this dialogue is 
necessary in overcoming current dangers, instabilities and deficiencies of the 
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system. What is challenging is that, rightful efforts of consumer countries to secure 
energy supply trough measures such as energy efficiency, usage of alternative 
energy sources and diversification of supply sources creates sensitivity among 
producers (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 498). Policies which may undermine 
security of demand for energy exporters threaten international progress towards a 
better energy market.  
Motivated by “supply concerns”, energy importing countries urge producer 
states to keep up with their energy security policies. For example, oil importers 
insist their energy exporting partners for investing in oil production capacity 
before world energy demand exceeds production. With their own “demand 
concerns”, energy exporters remain reluctant to join the request since they face the 
risk of investing in a production activity to meet an anticipated increase in world 
demand which may never materialize (Gault, 2007: 4). Given that major oil and 
gas importers such as EU engage in strategies to reduce their import dependency 
and strive to direct the consumption towards renewables and alternative energy 
sources, the reluctance of oil and gas producers make sense.  
At this point it is interesting to find out that the notion of “security 
dilemma” which is traditionally linked to military preparations is also relevant to 
the explanation of the tension between energy importers and energy exporters. 
“Security dilemma” was articulated in 1950s by John Herz, when he mentioned it 
as:  
A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look 
after their security needs, tend regardless of intention to lead to 
rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as 
defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening (Herz, 
1950: 157 quoted in Baylis, 2001: 257). 
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To be more precise, when countries increase their military capabilities, their 
counterparts remain uncertain whether the purpose is defensive “to enhance its 
security in an uncertain world” or offensive “to change the status quo to its 
advantage”. Therefore, in an environment of mistrust and uncertainty, one state’s 
intentions and efforts for more security means other’s increasing insecurity 
(Dunne and Schmidt, 2001: 153). When this dilemma is adapted to today’s energy 
circumstances, the efforts of EU to diversify its energy mix with renewable and 
nuclear energy sources, to diversify its suppliers with new trade partners and its 
efforts to activate new transit routes through the building of new pipelines may 
just target to decrease the Union’s vulnerability in energy and to increase its 
supply security. However, on the other side of the coin, these efforts may simply 
be interpreted as threat to demand security of energy exporters such as Russia. 
Accordingly, when developing energy security policies, it is crucial to 
combine security of supply and security of demand. Finding the middle between 
both consumers’ and producers’ expectations would create a more secure world 
energy market. Especially, for the case of upstream investment mutual trust can be 
achieved when EU or importing countries in general, share the cost of producers’ 
investments and ensure transparency, for the sake of reducing uncertainty, as well 
as advance notice of their energy security policies which may affect the demand 
and may change their import quantities (Gault, 2007:6).  
Last but not least, a third method to explain security of energy is to clarify 
the cases of its absence, namely, the features of disruptions and the nature of risks 
that would lead to situations under which one cannot talk about a secure energy, or 
differently put, situations under which one would answer the following question: 
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“Which conditions have to be avoided or which problems have to be solved in 
order to enjoy energy security?”  
Several facts can lead to energy security disruptions. Political decisions of 
suppliers not to offer gas or oil to their customers, international military conflicts 
or technical break downs may cause sudden disruptions. On the other hand under-
investment in production and transport activities may lead to longer term, slowly 
emerging disruptions (Correlje and Linde, 2006: 538). Consequently, first of all, it 
is appropriate to add a time dimension to the definition of the concept, by short 
term and long term perspectives since unanticipated disruptions or sudden rise in 
price would lead to short term dangers, while unavailability of necessary amount 
of energy in the future due to lack of investment would mean longer term security 
concerns (Costantini et al., 2007: 211). Short term and long term risks are 
interlinked in that under-investment leaves energy market more exposed to sudden 
disruptions and in turn, the frequency of sudden disruptions damages the sector’s 
credibility in supply security leading to the risk of under-investment (International 
Energy Agency, 2007: 161). 
 Moreover, it is worth mentioning different aspects of the risks being 
physical, economic, social and environmental. Physical disruptions which can be 
permanent or temporary occur due to exhausted energy sources or due to strikes, 
geopolitical crises and natural disasters which cease production. As temporary 
disruptions cause sudden effects on economy and consumers, they require energy 
policies which have to design responses to emergency case scenarios. Price 
fluctuations in the world energy market cause the second risk group, namely 
economic disruptions. A threat of a physical disruption of supply, as an example, 
may cause panic buying which in turn leads to a sharp rise in energy prices, 
 22 
affecting industrial and private consumers. With oil and gas accounting for 60% of 
its fuel consumption, European market is highly vulnerable to this threat. Thirdly, 
social risks may vary from simply increasing social demands, to social conflicts by 
triggering chaos in already unstable countries. The instability of energy supplies or 
sharp increases in prices is among the potential causes of social risks. And finally, 
environmental risks constitute the last category of hurdles to energy security. 
Accidents in the production or transportation of energy, nuclear catastrophes or 
polluting emissions can result in environmental damages which harm ecosystem 
and cause global warming (European Commission, 2000: 76-77).  
 For policy-makers it is important to identify these different types of 
disruptions. Although they are highly interlinked and can be both causes and 
effects of each others, their different characters require differing response-
mechanisms. For example, while long term supply security would require 
diversification of supply regions and routes, short term energy security can be 
achieved through emergency response mechanisms such as strategic stocks. 
Therefore, just like the need to define the concept of energy security, the 
identification of risks is important as well for the study of energy policy.  
There are several other factors which affect energy security. The 
dependency level of an importer state to a single supplier, the composition and 
diversification of energy imports, political situation within the supplier country, 
the protection of supply routes against conflicts which may occur with third parties 
“on the path” of energy transit and the ease of switching between suppliers all 
weakens or strengthens the energy security of a country (Le Coq and Paltseva, 
2009: 4475-4476). While developing its common energy policy, the EU has to 
consider all of these potential risks and has to address each and every one of them 
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if the purpose is decreasing vulnerability to external circumstances and increasing 
energy security. 
As mentioned earlier, different countries interpret energy security 
differently. While energy importers, because of their high dependence on oil and 
natural gas, focus more on the sufficient energy supply with reasonable price; 
exporters such as Russia concentrate on security of demand for the consistency of 
their export revenues (Geden et al, 2006: 9). Nevertheless, no matter how the 
concept is defined or no matter which interpretation is adopted, the existence of 
risks to supply security and global problems such as climate change is tangible and 
in need of urgent responses. The following parts will focus on the evolution EU’s 
efforts to create a coherent policy to address these problems.  
 
 
2.3. Evolution of European Energy Policy 
 
Due to the absence of a current common European Energy Policy, offering 
a clear cut chronological background for policies is not possible. Today, the 
European Energy Policy is just an accumulation of a complex net of proposals, 
initiatives, regulations and decisions of international communications. Although 
some specific dates and specific documents represent important milestones toward 
a common policy, the fact that at some point they all overlap in relation with 
sustainability, competitiveness and supply security pillars of European Energy 
Policy, renders the evolution of common energy policy a sui generis case, 
compared to other sectors such as agriculture which are subject to clear step-by-
step integration. In this respect, it is problematical to talk about a general evolution 
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of European Energy Policy. Rather, European Energy Policy is the result of 
separate developments in different but related issues of energy.  
 To clarify this point the figure below offered by Eurostat would be helpful. 
As the figure indicates, different policies originate in different time periods yet 
their purposes are inseparable from each other, targeting access to clean and 
sustainable energy with affordable prices in a competitive market, both now and in 
the future. Accordingly, market opening for competitiveness dates back to 1996. 
While the liberalization of energy market continues, and the process is not fully 
completed even today, in early 2000s directives on renewable energy sources and 
biofuels come into play, as well as Energy Efficiency Action Plans, to address 
sustainability and efficient consumption of energy to curb excess demand. 
Determined to be an active global player, the European Union carries on internal 
developments concerning energy policies hand in hand with decisions in the 
international arena. The EU’s close interest in international efforts to fight climate 
change, then, goes back to 1997 and Kyoto Negotiations offers groundwork for 
European Energy Policy which cannot be separated from climate change factor. 
  
Figure 1: Development of EU energy policies over time 
Source: Eurostat, 2009c: 3 
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 The figure is illustrative for a general overview of the evolution of 
European Energy Policy. However, it does not offer a complete picture since 
policies in line with security of energy supply are not mentioned. The necessity to 
refer to every aspect of the energy “trinity” of European Energy Policy and the fact 
that every policy evolves in and of itself, complicates the study of the development 
of the European Energy Policy. To overcome this difficulty, in the study of energy 
policies of European Union, clarifications concerning the background of specific 
policies on market, efficiency, solidarity or supply security will be included into 
the analysis in the following sections. Nonetheless some general remarks and 
important reference points about the history of European Energy Policy need to be 
highlighted, as they constitute a foundation for current policies. 
The roots of European Union originate in energy issues through ECSC and 
EURATOM. Nevertheless, in the evolution of the EU itself, policies concerning 
energy and energy security remained at the back plan. Left to national discretion of 
Member States, decisions and policies concerning energy security was initially 
excluded from the EU level integration of European countries. As the international 
setting changed, the Union’s energy policy started to develop and it followed an 
event-driven evolution. In other words, European Energy Policy initiated as a need 
to be capable of responding to international energy supply crises (Hoogeveen and 
Perlot, 2007: 486). 
 Major social and economic crises originating in producer regions, 
especially in the Middle East, shaped European Energy Policy as they intensified 
concerns for energy supply security. The Suez crisis in 1956, the Six Day war 
between Egypt and Israel in 1967, Arab oil embargo in 1973 and oil crisis 
following Iranian revolution in 1979, they all reminded Europeans of their 
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vulnerability to external crises and their need of uninterrupted availability of 
energy supplies. Although these specific occasions urged the EU to generate 
efforts concerning the decrease of import dependency, the initiatives achieved little 
success in the road towards a common policy (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 487). 
  Still, policy makers of both energy importer and exporter countries took 
the crises in the 1970s as a significant “reference point” in the history of energy 
trade. From the perspective of the EU, strengthened by the absence of cooperation 
and solidarity between the members, sudden oil price increases by OPEC countries 
in the 1970s jeopardized economic and political system of both EU and separate 
EU member states. This period installed two major concerns at the background of 
EU energy policy-making agenda for shaping policies especially about security of 
supply (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 488). 
 The first concern is related with the oil crisis of 1979 and originates in the 
fear that “political instability in producer countries and regional tensions will lead 
to a disruption in oil supply” (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 488). Accordingly, 
potential instabilities in producer countries or regions occurring due to domestic 
struggles for power became a factor which European policy-makers have to take 
into account while deciding on measures for securing energy supply (Hoogeveen 
and Perlot, 2007: 488). This fear of instability in producer countries, materialized 
as one of the challenges to be addressed in many European documents. Green 
Paper of 2006 is one of the most remarkable examples as it highlights that in the 
next 20 to 30 years EU’s energy needs “will be met by imported products, some 
from regions threatened by insecurity” (European Commission, 2006b: 3). 
 The roots of the second major concern for European policy makers go back 
to the 1973 oil crisis which led to the threat that exporter countries can 
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purposefully use oil and natural gas as a weapon in their foreign relations. 
Accordingly, EU and energy importing consumer countries in general, fear that 
governments, especially those of unstable countries, may threaten them with 
politically motivated supply disruptions and use their position as energy producing 
and exporting actors of the world energy market as a weapon to achieve their 
objectives in the international arena. In this respect, 1973 oil crisis highlighted the 
vulnerability of European states to Arab politics which could easily be attached to 
energy trade hence which would render EU’s import dependence open to abuses 
(Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 488-489).  
 The earliest energy policies of the Union as response to such crises which 
would potentially lead to supply disruptions came with emergency oil stocks. 
Starting in 1968, European Council issued Oil Stocks Directives to address the 
risks of temporary disruptions (European Commission, 2008:10). Acknowledging 
that difficulties, permanent or temporary, which have the potential of reducing the 
supply of imported oil products from the third countries would seriously disturb 
economic activity, and accepting also that establishment and maintenance of 
minimum stocks of most important petroleum products is a necessity to strengthen 
security of supply, on 20 December 1968, European Council imposed an 
obligation on Member States of the European Economic Community to maintain 
minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products (68/414/EEC). 
Accordingly, Member States were expected to adopt necessary laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions to preserve stocks of petroleum products to meet 
internal consumption for 65 days (European Council, 1968). Due to the increase in 
oil demand as well as growth in the imported oil supplies and due to the 
inconsistencies in the supply patterns from third countries, the directive was 
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followed by an amendment (72/425/EEC) in 1972 which required an increase in 
stocks to correspond 90 says (European Council, 1972). In 1973, as a response to 
oil crisis, International Energy Agency emerged at the global scene in order to 
coordinate measures in times of oil supply emergencies. Synchronizing its 
emergency policies with International Energy Agency (IEA), in 1973 and 1977, 
European Council launched two more directives (73/238/EEC and 77/706/EEC) on 
the same issue. The new directives asked for the establishment of a consultative 
body to coordinate measures among Member States, the restriction of consumption 
in times of shortages and the regulation of prices to prevent anomalous price 
increases (European Council, 1973; European Council, 1977).  
 In the following years, while the Union was busy with the deepening of 
integration and with the absorption of its new members, history witnessed another 
ground breaking event which influenced the evolution of European Energy Policy, 
just like everything else from international order to understanding of security: the 
end of Cold War. The end of Cold War represented also the end of ideological, 
political and economic divisions between eastern and western Europe. This 
introduced an opportunity to combine the interests of both sides and to cooperate 
in the energy sector. Russia’s and it neighbor’s rich hydrocarbon reserves were in 
need of investment for exploration, extraction and development of these resources. 
On the other hand, west European countries and private energy companies had 
both financial capacity to realize these investments and also the intention to 
diversify their energy sources by trading with new suppliers (Bahgat, 2006: 968). 
With the aim of encouraging economic growth and enhancing EU’s security of 
supply, as a response to the need to create a common foundation for energy 
collaboration in Eurasia, in June 1990, at the Dublin European Council, the Prime 
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Minister of the Netherlands proposed the establishment of cooperation with the 
Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries. Accordingly, in December 
1991, political decision for European Energy Charter was signed.  In order to 
guarantee legitimacy of investments, trade and transits concerning energy, in 1994, 
51 signatories of the Charter, together with the European Community and Euratom 
agreed on legally binding Energy Charter Treaty and on the Protocol on Energy 
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects, which entered into force in 1998 
(European Energy Charter, 2009).  
 The Energy Charter Treaty set out provisions about the proper functioning 
of free trade in energy materials in line with World Trade Organization rules, 
about the protection and promotion of investments, energy transit, energy 
efficiency and dispute settlement. In accordance with the provisions, signatories 
agreed on taking necessary steps to eliminate anti-competitive market distortions 
both in the trade of energy products and in the procedures concerning investments. 
Consequently, the promotion and creation of “stable, favorable and transparent 
conditions for foreign investors” and the application of “the most-favored nation 
principle” or offering national treatment for foreign investors became major 
requirements of the treaty (Europa, 2007: 2). With regard to the transit of energy 
products, parties agreed on the facilitation of “free transit without distinction made 
on the origin, destination or ownership” of energy materials, “without imposing 
delays, restrictions or unreasonable taxation” (Europa, 2007: 2). In addition to 
competition, free transit, taxation and transparency, the European Energy Charter 
also included conditions on environment and sovereignty in order to ensure that 
the Contracting Parties exercise sovereignty over their resources with the right to 
“choose the geographical areas in their territory to be made available for 
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exploration and exploitation” and also to ensure that efforts are made for the 
reduction of environmentally harmful effects of energy related activities and for 
the increase of energy efficiency (Europa, 2007: 2-3). 
 The increasing interdependence between energy importers and exporters 
required a multilateral framework in order to replace bilateral agreements, for the 
facilitation of international cooperation in the energy sector. For this reason, 
European Energy Charter did not only aim to increase security of energy supply 
through the development of the energy potential of central and Eastern European 
states, but it also aimed the strengthening of the rule of law on energy issues 
(Energy Charter, 2009). It is important to note that as of October 2009, 46 
signatories have ratified the Energy Charter Treaty, Turkey being one of them. 
Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Norway and Russia are parties which have signed but 
not ratified the treaty yet (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2009). As the European 
Union’s energy panorama changes and as the European Energy Policy evolves, 
what will be the implications of the non-ratification of the treaty especially by 
Russia remains as a question mark.  
 In the early 1990s, European Energy Charter emerged as an important 
milestone for the external efforts of European Energy Policy to ensure supply 
security. In the mean time, within the Union as well, efforts to synchronize 
national energy policies and develop a common internal European Energy Policy 
continued. The decade between 1990 and 2000 has been significant in that 
European Commission launched three Green Papers on energy which put forward 
the baselines for a common policy.  
 Starting with the first Green Paper in 1994, the European Union’s policy 
suggestions evolved around sustainability, security of supply and the need to 
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establish an internal market. With the Green Paper “For A European Union Energy 
Policy” [COM (94) 659], The Union put forward the necessity to increase its role 
in the energy sector. Based on the potential challenges that the Union would have 
to face in the coming years due to the deficiencies of import dependency, the 
Commission identified main objectives to pursue towards a common policy. The 
most outstanding feature of this Green paper was the emphasis on the necessity to 
harmonize national and community level energy policies in order to generate a 
common standing as a response to transnational energy challenges which endanger 
supply security, environmental protection and consumer’s access to energy. This 
also required cooperation between decision makers of energy policy and actors in 
the energy sector and called for the clear identification of the Community’s 
responsibilities concerning energy, with the consideration of environment, air 
pollution and climate change due to gas emissions being centrally important 
(Bulletin of the European Union, 1996). 
 After the adoption of the Green Paper for a European Union Energy Policy 
in 1995, in November 1996 the second Green Paper “Energy for the Future: 
Renewable Sources of Energy” [COM (96) 576] was launched. As the name 
suggested, this Green Paper introduced targets for the incorporation of renewable 
energy sources into the future Community strategy on energy and for the more 
widespread use of wind, solar energy, hydropower and biomass. Apart from the 
repetition of the need to strengthen cooperation among Member Countries, the 
paper differed form the previous one in that it moved one step further and offered 
concrete strategies in the specific issue of renewable resources. Accordingly, the 
Commission called for the mobilization of national and Community instruments 
for the development of these resources in order to increase the percentage of 
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renewable energy in the EU’s energy mix. Taking into account high exploitation 
costs of renewable energy, the Green Paper 1996 also recommended emphasizing 
the real competitiveness of renewable resources, through internalization of 
external costs of other energy sources, increased research and development 
activities and through awareness building schemes which would highlight the 
contribution of renewable energy to the Union’s targets about energy security, 
climate change, air pollution, employment and regional development (Bulletin of 
the European Union, 1997).  
 Green Papers represented important reference points in the evolution of 
European Energy Policy because with each of them, step by step, the Commission 
identified in a clearer way The Union’s deficiencies, necessities and targets 
concerning energy consumption, environment and import dependency in energy. 
In that respect, the following Green Paper in 2000, “Towards a European Strategy 
for the Security of Energy Supply” [COM (2000) 769] became not only one of the 
most significant Green Papers but also turned out to be among the major 
documents in the EU literature on energy.  
 Just like the previous ones, the Green Paper 2000 as well, mentioned 
environmental concerns and repeated the interdependence between the Member 
States which required a Community dimension in the strategies dealing with 
energy related challenges. Nevertheless, the specialty of this Green Paper came 
from its emphasis on the Union’s increasing import dependence. With this, the 
Commission declared that one of the main purposes of European Energy Policy 
should be to ensure the reduction of the Union’s vulnerability due to its 
dependence on external energy suppliers, rather than the unrealistic target of 
maximizing self sufficiency in energy and recommended the development of a 
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strategy for security of energy supply. The Green Paper Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply centrally focused on the security of 
supply. It offered a detailed study concerning EU’s energy mixture, current and 
future energy challenges in relation with supply security and it sketched out main 
principles for a long term European energy strategy which had to “rebalance its 
supply policy by clear action in favor of a demand policy” through taxation 
measures and energy saving policies (European Commission, 2000: 3). This Green 
Paper also had an awareness building effect in that for the quantification of the 
challenges concerning energy security, it included a forecast scenario which 
projected oil and gas consumptions, CO2 emissions and EU’s import dependence 
in the years 1998, 2010, 2020 and 2030. With the forecasts the Commission 
confirmed that energy import dependency would reach around 70% in 2030, 
unless the policies at the time the Paper was released were replaced by more 
efficient mechanisms of demand and supply dependence management (European 
Commission, 2000). 
 Five years later, the Commission released another Green Paper in 2005 
devoted to energy efficiency: “Green Paper on Energy Efficiency or Doing More 
with Less” [COM (2005) 265]. This Green Paper aimed to clarify deficiencies 
which prevented the Union from implementing “”cost-effective savings such as 
the “lack of appropriate incentives, lack of information and lack of available 
financing mechanisms” (European Commission, 2005: 5). The Commission 
suggested the establishment of energy efficiency Action Plan which would be a 
multi-level initiative combining national, regional, community and international 
levels. From buildings to tyres and clean vehicles, the paper examined several 
measures especially in industrial and transportation sectors, which could contribute 
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to energy efficiency. The paper was also significant in that it made suggestions to 
initiate international cooperation in energy efficiency and to integrate energy 
efficiency into the neighborhood and development policies (European Commission, 
2005). Energy savings and achievement of greater energy efficiency in the 
industry, transportation and household consumption have of course implications 
for the environment and for the Union’s efforts to reduce its import dependency.  
Nevertheless, this Green Paper, which offered concrete strategies for international 
cooperation in energy efficiency, once again indicated that the European Union’s 
desire to be an active global player which leads the international agenda, was valid 
not only in trade of energy products and environmental protection but also in every 
energy related subject matter which could lead to better practices. 
 Despite the lack of political consensus among Member States concerning 
the implementation of energy strategies, with successive Green Papers, the 
Commission had already started to depict how the European Energy Policy would 
look like and which elements it would include. However, in the meantime another 
important event intervened and accelerated the process toward a common energy 
strategy for the European Union. Although 1970s have been significant for 
European Member States to perceive their vulnerability to supply disruptions and 
installed basic fears in the energy literature which shape today’s security of supply 
policies, there is no doubt that the real wake up call which triggered faster 
evolution of European Energy Policy came in January of 2006 with Russia – 
Ukraine gas crisis. This event has not only been instrumental in shaping European 
Union’s current energy policies, but also became a critical point in EU-Russia 
relationship. 
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 As Ukraine was the transit country where most of the pipelines transferring 
natural gas imported from Russia to Western Europe were located, the crisis led to 
the concern that Europe would face energy shortages and vulnerabilities arising 
due to dependence on limited suppliers and transit routes, moved at the center of 
the Union’s agenda. The crisis refreshed memories of EU decision makers and 
public opinion and revitalized the fears dating back to 1970s, which originated in 
the possibility that major exporters could use oil and gas supplies as a political 
leverage. Although the Green Paper Towards a European Strategy of Energy 
Security was a warning regarding increasing import dependence, Member States 
underestimated the importance of community level actions and insisted on national 
regulations and on guarding their sovereignty over energy policies. Nonetheless, as 
the event implied, supply security consisted of a complex relationship between 
energy exporters, transit countries and European Union Members as importers 
which means that energy was not only a matter of economics but also was a part of 
foreign policy and national security strategies (Geden et al, 2006:9).  
 Following this “warning” in 2006, European efforts to strengthen energy 
security and its ability to stand with a common voice through common policies 
picked up the pace. In the wake of Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in January, in March 
2006 the Commission published another Green Paper “A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” [COM (2006) 105]. 
 It would not be wrong to argue that the Green Papers built one on the other 
and each represented important aspects of the common energy policy. While the 
first one in 1994 signaled the need for cooperation and common policy, Green 
Paper 1996 emphasized the potential contribution of renewable energy to future 
energy profile on Europe. In 2000 security of supply was highlighted and it was 
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followed by another Green Paper in 2005 which focused on energy efficiency. 
Currently being the final Green Paper on energy, unlike the previous ones which 
were usually inclined to address one specific dimension of energy, the Green Paper 
2006 combined all the efforts and put forward an energy strategy which balanced 
each of three dimensions of energy: sustainable development, competitiveness and 
security of supply.  
 With the last Green Paper, this “trinity” of energy policy became officially 
the main objectives of European Energy Policy. Throughout the paper the 
Commission identified six key areas which needed urgent cooperation and action: 
competitiveness and the creation of an internal market, diversification of energy 
mix, solidarity between member states, sustainable development as a response to 
climate change, innovation and technology for the increase of energy efficiency 
and diversity through renewable resources, and an integrated external policy. 
Moreover it proposed concrete measures addressing each of them (European 
Commission, 2006b). These six key areas constituted the skeleton of today’s 
European Energy Policy. 
 Once the Commission determined these key areas of European Energy 
Policy, in 10 January 2007 the “Communication from Commission to the 
European Council: An Energy Policy for Europe” [COM (2007) 1] was introduced. 
Similar to Green Paper 2006, the document presented sustainability, security of 
supply and competitiveness as the main challenges for the Union. Moreover, it 
also declared that Millennium Development Goals and economic growth as well as 
job creation in the context of Lisbon Strategy were among objectives of the EU 
which required ambitious, long term action plans (European Commission, 2007). 
Apart from all, “An Energy Policy for Europe” introduced “20/20 Package” which 
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aimed “reducing GHG emission by 20%, improving energy efficiency by 20%, 
achieving a 20% share of renewable energy and a 10% chare of biofuels” by 2020. 
This target definitely indicated “the role of the EU in leading the effort to create a 
climate-compatible energy system” (Eurostat, 2009c: 4). In addition to the 
ambitious targets that it put forth, what made the document significant in the 
evolution of European Energy policy is that the Commission offered a concrete 
action plan for the achievement of the objectives. Consequently, this Strategic 
Energy Review emerged as a proposal to the European Parliament, which designed 
the essence of European Energy Policy (European Commission, 2007:5).  
  Aware of the fact that the previous action plan introduced with “An 
Energy Policy for Europe” and the target concerning renewables and energy 
efficiency cover EU’s energy objectives only to a limited extend, the European 
Council of 15-16 October 2008 asked for a wider action plan to increase the 
Union’s energy security. In 13 November 2008, the Commission responded the 
Council’s request by Second Strategic Energy Review, “An EU Energy Security 
and Solidarity Action Plan” [COM (2008) 781]. This time, the Commission 
highlighted five main points and invited the Council and the Parliament to approve 
the measures proposed for each of them. The five points consisted of 
“infrastructure needs and the diversification of energy supplies, external energy 
relations, oil and gas stocks and crisis response mechanisms, energy efficiency, 
making the best use of the EU’s indigenous energy resources” (European 
Commission, 2008: 3). Different from previous reports this action plan gave a 
special emphasis on the infrastructure needs and diversification of both energy 
imported areas and transit routes. Especially in the conclusion part of this Second 
Strategic Energy Review measures belonging to this category were recommend as 
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the “first step” essential for the Union’s energy security. Accordingly the 
Commission identified the priorities including the realization of “Southern gas 
corridor, a diverse and adequate LNG supply for Europe, effective interconnection 
of the Baltic region, The Mediterranean Energy Ring, the need for adequate North-
South gas and electricity connections within Central and South- East Europe, and 
the North Sea Offshore Grid” (European Commission, 2008:3-17). 
 As the Second Strategic Energy Review also demonstrated, in the efforts 
and action plans which identify European Energy Policy, international energy 
linkages and international dimensions of climate-oriented strategies are frequently 
repeated. Especially after 2006, the external dimension of diversification for the 
sake of increasing supply security is highly emphasized. However, despite these 
international ambitious efforts, the internal integration of European Energy Policy 
displayed an unsuccessful performance. 
 For the European Union, energy remained among issue areas which 
function with subsidiary principle since member states highlight the national 
character of energy polices and since they still hold the responsibility to launch 
procedures concerning energy. When it comes to a “common” policy, major 
progress is achieved on the competitiveness element of European Energy Policy 
with chapters on competition rules, inserted within the Acquis Communautaire. 
Although European Commission displays concrete steps towards the creation of a 
common policy through its reports or Green Papers and although energy is 
included within the constitution of Europe, as the rejection of the constitution 
demonstrates, the reluctance of some Member States for further integration 
weakens the possibility of a common energy policy in the near future (Hoogeveen 
and Perlot, 2007: 487). The following section questions the reluctance of Member 
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States to integrate in energy policies and it tries to indicate which factors render a 
common European Energy Policy so difficult to achieve.  
 
2.4. What Makes The Achievement of European Energy Policy So Difficult? 
 
In 2000 the Commission’s Green Paper indicated that the EU has limited 
power to influence future world markets. The fact that the EU failed to create a 
coherent common energy policy reduces the Union’s bargaining power to face 
geopolitical and economic challenges (European Commission, 2000). Six years 
later another Green Paper affirmed: “The EU leads the world in demand 
management, in promoting new and renewable forms of energy, and in the 
development of low carbon technologies. If the EU backs up a new common 
policy with a common voice on energy questions, Europe can lead the global 
search for energy solutions” (European Commission, 2006b: 4). The difference 
between the two Green Papers and even this short period of six years indicate that 
EU is very ambitious in achieving a common voice and completing its energy 
security policy. 
However, for European policy-makers, the creation of European Energy 
Policy is a challenging task in that it includes multiple issues both internally and 
externally. Moreover, the involvement of different players complicates the 
decision-making process about the nature of policies, since views diverge: Should 
it be integrated, national or detached from state intervention? (Pointvogl, 2009: 
5705). How the responsibility of energy policies is to be divided between “EU-
level actors, governments, energy companies and consumers” also comes out as 
one of the fundamental challenges of EU energy policy (Benford, 2006: 45). 
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 It is interesting to observe that despite serious ambitious statements and 
despite the release of several directives, reviews and action plans, certain 
challenges render common European Energy Policy very difficult to achieve. For 
the internal dimension of EU’s energy policy, different preferences of member 
states and the uncertainty about the potential European regulatory body for energy 
issues restrain Member States in reaching agreements over energy policies. In the 
external dimension, the Union’s unclear strategy which contains both market 
norms and geopolitical considerations create inconsistency in policies, thus slow 
down the evolution of common external energy policy. This section will focus on 
these major factors which create deadlocks for further evolution of energy policies 
 
 
2.4.1. Different Preferences 
 
The European Union is undergoing a dual integration process. The internal 
deepening of integration containing a range of policies from market to agriculture 
goes hand in hand with enlargement and integration of new members to EU system. 
Member States’ different preferences speed up or slow down the process. The 
creation of common energy policy too is highly affected by these different 
preferences since the Member States have distinctive energy supply and 
consumption patterns in line with the demand of their industry and their citizens, 
and these patterns determine their support for common energy policies (Correlje 
and Linde, 2006: 532). In 2006, Barroso affirmed that “The Union has the required 
size (surface area and population) and required instruments (legislation, budget 
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etc.) but it lacks the political will to forge a common European energy policy” 
(quoted in Geden, et al., 2006: 11).  
The aim of European Energy Policy is to increase energy security and to 
offer feasible solutions to energy related problems. It is a fact that some Member 
States have acknowledged the efficiency of dealing with these problems at the EU 
level (Geden et al., 2006: 14). However, more than this, as the Green Papers 
emphasize, the European Energy Policy also targets the representation of the EU 
with a “single voice”. In energy forums, in relations with producer and transit 
countries or in international agreements concerning energy issues, speaking with a 
single voice is crucially important for the credibility of the Union (Andoura and 
Vegh, 2009:5).  In theory, in line with EU-level policies, Member States seem to 
approve the principle of speaking with single voice. Nevertheless, when it comes 
to concrete policy making in energy, members hesitate to transfer their sovereignty 
to EU level institutions (Geden et al., 2006: 2). As Benford (2006: 40) points out: 
“Member states still retain the final say over key decisions, such as national energy 
mixes and relations with supplier states”. 
Although the EU exercises serious efforts to represent a single voice in the 
international arena, “the European Commission is not the government of the EU 
and Brussels is not its capital” (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 502). In other words, 
even though in bilateral relations the Union stands as one participant for a total 
number of 27 members, it is not a “state”.  This fact leads to an inconsistency 
between theory and practice concerning policies. In theory The European Union 
represents a body which can enforce binding policies upon its members. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the experiences especially in the sphere of energy policy 
indicate that the policies, far from imposing an authority upon members, can 
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evolve as long as the Members want them to integrate and deepen only as far as 
the Members want them to go (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 503). 
This situation which renders the decisions over common energy policies so 
difficult to achieve can be explained by intergovernmental arguments. Moravcsik 
(1993: 485) argues that nation states tend to cooperate when coordination increase 
their control on the domestic policies and when coordination eliminates negative 
policy externalities which occur due to the costs of national policy of another 
government. Hence the coordination between governments aims at reducing the 
costs of non-cooperation. Nevertheless, it is not possible to state that nation states 
operate in a system where there is a harmony of interests. In some cases, even if 
agreements are mutually benefiting the parties, negotiations lead to conflicts 
arising out of differences in government preferences in terms of distribution of the 
benefits. In such bargains, liberal intergovernmentalism assumes that states make 
concessions and they settle the problem on the “lowest common denominator” 
which offers results closest to the national preference or to the status quo 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 487, 501). This also signals that cooperation or integration fails 
even at the decision making process when Member States observe that their 
individual interests will not be satisfied by the outcome (Rosamond, 2000).   
Another liberal intergovernmentalist argument which would explain the 
Members’ attitude in energy policy making is that international institutions 
ameliorate the international interaction of states as they are established with the 
purpose of reducing transaction costs, providing necessary information which will 
help states in the decision making, establishing necessary rules, monitoring 
against free riders and sanctioning non-complying parties, reducing uncertainty 
(Schimmelfennig, 2004: 78). National governments favor institutions also because 
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they strengthen their control over domestic groups and domestic opposition 
serving to the liberal intergovernmentalist concept of “two-level game” 
(Moravcsik, 1993: 507,515). The concept means that the bargain has two faces 
being domestic and international. Hence, power seeking elites form and support 
coalitions among interest groups at the domestic level, whereas at the 
international level, considering the requirements and meeting the demands of 
domestic groups, the same actors bargain for the purpose of enhancing their 
domestic position (Rosamond, 2000: 136). This can directly be linked to the 
relationship of Member States with the EU at one side and their national energy 
companies on the other side.  
 In the focus on Members’ different preferences which affect the 
development of a common European Energy Policy, “contribution to EU risk 
exposure” is an important factor. Member Countries’ contribution to the Union’s 
vulnerability due to import dependence differs in line with their import amounts. 
States with higher energy import rates are expected to represent higher shares of 
the overall risks that the Union has to cope with, because of being dependent on 
exported energy. Additionally the risks that larger EU countries undertake also are 
expected to threaten EU’s energy security more than smaller countries, in line with 
their level of energy consumption compared with the rest of the Union (Le Coq 
and Paltseva, 2009: 4475-4476).  
A recent study published in 2009 based its hypotheses on these 
assumptions and offered a classification of European countries reflecting their 
risks both for oil and gas imports. Accordingly for natural gas, countries like 
Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovakia emerge with high risk indexes since the gas they consume is not 
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produced, rather it is imported from “non EU/Norway suppliers” which are not 
diversified.  In the same index, due to their trade with better diversified gas 
suppliers, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia and Spain represent “medium-level” risk group and the remaining 
Member States such as the Netherlands and UK constitute countries facing lower 
risks since they benefit from indigenous production or European gas suppliers. 
However, when the study questions the countries’ contribution to EU’s exposure 
to the risks of import dependence, the picture changes and Germany, Italy and 
Spain appear as the biggest contributors due to their high gas consumptions 
compared with EU’s general consumption trends. Besides, with their high reliance 
on non-EU gas exporters Hungary and Slovakia also join the first three, despite 
being smaller countries (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009: 4479). 
The study creates the same indexes for oil as well and affirms that countries 
with highest risk exposure are Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia 
as they rely on non-diversified, risky suppliers such as Russia, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. This group of countries is followed by the medium level risk group which 
consists of Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Spain. Finally, the remaining 
members such as UK and Denmark which domestically produce oil refer to the 
lowest risk group (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009: 4479). 
As the study indicates, exposure to risk linked to external energy supply 
does not only differ across the Member States, but also across energy types. 
Different risk levels without doubt lead to different preferences among the 
Member States. Different ranking in risk indexes for oil and gas, oblige the 
European countries to expect different types of policies with regard to common 
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European Energy Policy, which would meet their particular individual interest. 
Hence an objective analysis of EU countries’ energy profiles is crucial, since their 
energy patterns would directly affect their position in energy policy making (Le 
Coq and Paltseva, 2009: 4480). 
 A common European Energy Policy would mean that Member States will 
have to share the risks of being vulnerable to external factors due to their 
dependence on oil and gas imports. Nevertheless, Members’ different degrees of 
risk-exposure also mean different amounts of contribution to the overall energy 
supply risks that the Union has to face. Accordingly, a common energy policy 
comes out with a different form of the classical problem of “free-riding”. 
Countries representing higher risks such as Germany, Italy and Spain in the case of 
natural gas, tend to benefit more from common energy security policies, at the 
expense of relatively less import dependent countries or at the expense of the 
Members whose suppliers are relatively more diversified. Following the fact that 
the situation decreases the motivation of some members to support common 
energy policy, the integration of energy policies remains unsuccessful and policies 
taking into account different energy patterns in order to compensate the 
disadvantaged members emerge as the most feasible solution to overcome this 
challenge which delays the integration in energy (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009: 
4481).  
 Nevertheless, the Member Countries’ different preferences do not only 
originate in different energy profiles and different levels of risk exposure. 
Different structures of energy markets and members’ different perceptions of 
“security risks” also determine the attitude towards a common policy. To illustrate, 
for many years some Member States, to increase their energy security, preferred to 
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diversify their energy suppliers away from Middle East and they engaged in 
energy agreements with Russia. On the contrary, for countries that became a 
member through the Eastern Enlargement, due to their historical backgrounds, 
being dependent on Russia represented a potential threat to their security and 
contradicted with their original motivation of de-linking themselves from Russia 
(Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 503). 
 With regards to market structures too, the case can be illustrated. For 
example while the electricity market in certain states such as UK and Netherlands 
is liberalized, in others the process is relatively slower. The experts point at France 
and Germany and interpret this “slow” performance in liberalization as an effort to 
create “national champions” in the sector of energy which would become 
“European champions” once the single energy market is achieved. The fact that 
some Member States still favor their national energy companies over European 
ones reminds liberal intergovernmentalist argument about “two level game” and 
additionally indicates that in strategically important issues such as energy, as a 
result of rational interest calculations, national interests outweigh the European 
ones (Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 503). 
 To sum up, nation states’ diverging interests and their reluctance to transfer 
“energy” from the agenda of national security to EU-level policy making outstand 
as important factors which should be addressed by negotiations where members’ 
mutual understanding and concessions are needed, if the target is to create the 
European Energy Policy.  
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2.4.2. European Energy Regulator 
 
Another difficulty that renders common European Energy Policy difficult 
to achieve is the puzzle of “regulatory body”. As the energy policies become more 
and more integrated, for the proper implementation of laws and procedures, the 
EU will be in need of a regulatory body for energy issues. Such an institution is of 
course subject to questions concerning the transfer of authority to EU level and it 
has implications for nation states which hesitate to deepen EU integration. 
Nevertheless, further than the dilemma over the transfer of sovereignty, the 
real question which contributes to the slowing down of the integration in energy 
issues is: “What kind of body would be both appropriate and feasible”? As regards 
to energy issues, the Commission outstands as an influential actor both in the 
development of European Energy Policy and in the implementation of related 
policies since with its Green Papers, Action Plans and reports, it represented a 
serious effort for the creation of common energy policy. In that respect the 
Commission does not only influence European energy market but also intervenes 
into “national energy sectors by applying single market instruments, such as 
technical harmonization and competition law” (Benford, 2006: 40). The 
Commission already possesses formal powers over the decisions affecting energy 
related implementations, which can be exemplified with “community competences 
on the development of infrastructure in EU regions, granting aid to developing 
energy infrastructure in such regions and a mandate to merge environmental 
policies with energy policies” (Benford, 2006: 39). Therefore, one option for EU is 
to increase the discretion of the Commission over energy matters. It is important to 
note that such a decision would be again subject to objections by Members 
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thinking that energy issues belong to national security considerations (Benford, 
2006: 39-41). 
Other than empowering the Commission, European energy regulator can 
also be achieved with the creation of a new actor. With the Green Paper 2006, the 
Commission suggested to launch discussions about the “adequacy of existing 
forms of collaboration” and about “the need for a European energy regulator 
which would have decision making powers for common rules and approaches” 
(Benford, 2006: 41). In that case, an independent regulator could be developed and 
be subject to the supervision of the Parliament and Member States or current 
national regulatory authorities could be united under a “European system of energy 
regulators”. However, the same concerns about the transfer of sovereignty over 
energy issues would persist and hinder members’ will for further development of 
European Energy Policy. Consequently, taking into account the Members’ 
reluctance, what Europe is trying to achieve is gradually increasing the 
“cooperation between the Commission and national regulators” through 
progressive modification of existing structures (Benford, 2006: 41). 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) and European Regulators’ 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) are perfect examples for the existing 
structures which can be further developed to overcome the problem of regulatory 
body. Both organizations are established with the objective of increasing 
cooperation between Europe’s independent, national energy regulators and both 
operate to facilitate “the creation of a single, competitive, efficient and sustainable 
internal market for gas and electricity in Europe”. CEER is voluntarily established 
in 2000 and today it consists of 29 members made up of Iceland’s, Norway’s and 
all the members’ energy regulators. CEER offers a “platform for cooperation, 
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information exchange and assistance” not only “between national energy 
regulators” but also “with the European Commission, in particular the Directorate 
General Transport and Energy (DG TREN), DG Competition and DG for 
Research”. Unlike voluntarily formed CEER, ERGEG is established by the 
Commission in 2003 as its official advisory body on energy issues (European 
Energy Regulators, 2009). 
The question of regulatory body seems to be close to solution in that there 
is already some efforts to bring together separate national energy regulators.  Still, 
until the completion of common European energy policy, EU policy makers will 
have to work on the invention of the most appropriate regulatory body, and the 
issue will remain on the agenda of nation states.   
 
 
2.4.3. Market vs. Geopolitics 
 
The third factor which renders the achievement of common policy is 
related with the external dimension of European Energy Policy. “Market” and 
“Geopolitics” are the two poles that the European Union’s external energy policy 
stays in between. The issue is vital for EU energy security since long term 
development of EU energy security policy highly depends on the roadmap to be 
decided.  
Relations with third countries constitute an important part of European 
Energy Policy since they assure the external dimension of energy security. In that 
respect the Union gives importance to international cooperation and partnerships 
in energy with the rest of the world, especially with important supplier and transit 
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countries. To this end, several agreements have been concluded with an effort to 
integrate energy issues into European foreign policy. Agreements with Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Egypt, the Energy Community South East 
Europe Treaty signed with Balkan states, developing partnership with Africa, and 
Black Sea and Caspian Sea energy initiative are among the examples of these 
efforts (Youngs, 2007b: 1).  
With its external energy policies, the tendency of EU is to “spread 
eastwards and southwards of internal European market rules” (Youngs, 2007b:1) 
and its means to this end are European Neighborhood Policy, Action Plans, 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Association Agreements. As the 
Green Paper 2006 indicates, “the EU has for some time been engaged in widening 
its energy market to include its neighbors and to bring them progressively closer to 
the EU’s internal market”.  Moreover, for the achievement of security of supply, 
the Union highlights the necessity of a “common regulatory space” for “common 
trade, transit and environment rules, market harmonization and integration” in 
energy issues (European Commission, 2006b: 16). 
The above mentioned panorama does not seem to be problematic on paper. 
However, different preferences of Member States do not only slow down the 
evolution of European Energy Policy’s internal dimension, but also hinder external 
policies. While some members support the spill over effect which, for the case of 
energy refers to the expansion of internal market to international level, others 
hesitate to link energy security with the norms of internal market. While within the 
Union certain states still partially support liberalization of energy markets, and 
while the internal market is still not fully unified as a consequence of the lack of 
support, how the EU can launch an external policy based on market rules is 
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debatable. Far from creating a common external energy policy, the Union even 
fails to respond as “a single entity” to “external energy shocks” due to “the 
absence of both pan-European market mechanisms and sufficient physical 
interconnections” (Youngs, 2007b: 6). 
Some Member States argue that for international dimension of energy 
security, instead of fully counting on liberalized free market, a more “government-
led, geopolitical approach” should be adopted by the Commission. These countries 
such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain do not reject free market rules however, 
indicate that “negotiated reciprocity in producer states” is a prerequisite for the 
proper functioning of liberalization efforts. When this is the case Member States 
resort to bilateral agreements and in order to maximize their national interests, 
some of them go as far as denying the transparency and information sharing 
principles with other members. Youngs argues that: “In private many member 
state diplomats opine that while they feel bound to go along with the EU’s market 
rhetoric, such an approach is in practice increasingly unrealistic, in light of a more 
difficult geopolitical context” (Youngs, 2007b: 7). 
However, European policy makers do not only indicate their willingness to 
create an “international energy market”, but also emphasize the significance of 
promoting shared rules and principles as well as transparent legal frameworks in 
producer and transit countries. This means that the market structure which the 
Union tries to promote is not only a means to trade oil and gas, but also a way to 
export and extend the Union’s energy related principles being political or 
economic. Accordingly, “the development of inter-connecting energy systems 
between different geographical areas, based on EU regulatory norms and the 
acquis” (Youngs, 2007b: 2) and the widening of the Energy Charter Treaty’s 
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sphere of influence are part of EU’s external energy policy. For a complete energy 
policy then, in the external dimension, the Energy Charter due to its requirements 
concerning “rule of law and the role of governments” is an important means 
especially with regards to FDIs in the sector of energy (Youngs, 2007b:2).  As the 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2006: 139-142) indicates, good 
governance, respect for human rights and other market norms aligned with the 
European ones, they all “improve conditions for EU investment in producer states”. 
In fact, in order to achieve energy security in terms of uninterrupted 
supplies with affordable prices and also in terms of environmentally safe 
production as well as transit of oil and gas, the European Union does not only rely 
on market powers, it also wants to extend to its periphery, its rules-based 
principles through “enhanced legal frameworks” controlling market regulations 
and safety, environment standards. Policy makers stress that an international 
energy regime with common rules and norms would also be helpful in controlling 
rising demand in countries like China and India and would secure to a certain 
extend future supplies as these countries would be included into the same system 
and they would acquire same energy policies, active demand management being a 
crucial one (Youngs, 2007b: 5).  
Consequently, today energy security requires more than simple supply 
diversification policies and market liberalization. Since energy market consists of a 
complex and global connection of several actors as producer, consumer or transit 
countries, “a wider approach is now required that takes into account the rapid 
evolution of the global energy trade, supply-chain vulnerabilities, terrorism, and 
the integration of major new economies into the world market” (Yergin, 2006: 70). 
States still consider energy security as a part of their responsibility and in many of 
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them oil and gas extraction as well as transit infrastructures are controlled by 
national governments through state companies. Therefore, “this wider approach” 
becomes heavily controlled by national interests and instead of market’s invisible 
hand, diplomatic negotiations determine the agenda (Geden et al, 2006: 10). 
Taking all of these facts into account, the Commission indicates that 
European dependence in external supplies can be managed through the 
development of an energy community in the periphery of Europe including 
neighbors and major energy partners. Scholars agree with this “regional” strategy 
since the Union’s integrated structure, the existence of a common currency, 
namely Euro, common interest in energy security and common concern for 
Russia’s non aligned policies offer EU a potential realize it. This refers to a “pan-
European geo-energy space” which stands for the voluntary integration of trade 
partners in energy, accepting common multilateral rules (Mane-Estrada, 2006: 
3780, 3781, 3785). 
It is clear that while the Union finds the expansion of its internal market 
rules as a feasible option, it cannot neglect that some Member States feel the need 
to override this unity and conclude bilateral agreements due to geopolitical 
conditions in certain regions which are crucial for energy extraction, yet which are 
not appropriate for market liberalization. This dilemma leads to an inconsistency 
in external energy policy. For a better understanding of the puzzle a theoretical 
analysis would be clearer.   
In the literature, two approaches outstand in the analysis of the EU’s 
external policy which floats between “market” and “geopolitics” while trying to 
create an international energy system: Markets and Institutions (M&I) and Regions 
and Empires (R&E). Both frameworks are based on the fact that consumer states 
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are reliant on oil and gas supplies of producer states. However, they evolve 
towards diverging directions in terms of “the extent to which states or markets are 
seen as the main device for coordinating industrial – and state- behavior with 
respect to supply and demand in the oil and gas sector” (CIEP, 2004: 85). M&I 
basically refers to the “continuation and intensification of internationalization of 
markets (globalization) and the continued co-operation in the international political 
and economic institutions” with multilateralism that is supposed to regulate 
international relations. Differently, R&E refers to “the break-up of the world in 
integrated political and economic blocks with satellite regions that compete for 
markets and resources with other blocks” (CIEP, 2004: 84). 
In Market and Institutions (M&I) international system and global markets 
are further “internationalized”, multilateral relations become further integrated and 
multilateral rules are strengthened. M&I approach follows the assumption that the 
globalization of markets and globalization of social, cultural and economic values 
continuously deepen. The approach puts forward an expectation that political and 
economic institutions at the international level cooperate with each other (Correlje 
and Linde, 2006: 533,535).  In that respect, “further liberalization of markets 
allows the international flow of goods, persons and capital to grow and these flows 
are coordinated by market forces, facilitated by strong economic institutions” such 
as WTO, OPEC, IMF, EU and NAFTA (CIEP, 2004: 95). M&I approach pointing 
at social, economic and cultural integration of countries evokes tenets of neo-
liberalism and the Joseph Nye’s arguments about international regimes (CIEP, 
2004: 84, 88). M&I offers a framework in which “ideology, religion, and political 
conflicts continue to occur at the international, the national or regional level, but 
effective international and regional institutions (UN, EU) manage to deal with 
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most of these conflicts” (CIEP, 2004: 95). This implies that, for this approach, the 
international institutions does not only facilitate and regulate market forces, but 
also intervene into cases of terrorism, international crimes as well as social and 
political unrest which endanger proper functioning of free market, cases of 
peacemaking or of development activities (CIEP, 2004: 95). 
The logic put forward with arguments related to “the Market” approach is 
that when oil or gas become commodities of international market, traded by 
international or national companies, with prices determined by supply and demand 
balance driven by solely economic considerations, than to some extend, the 
security of supply would be automatically achieved through the market’s own 
dynamics (CIEP, 2004: 86). For example, referring to the case of oil, Marcel and 
Mitchell indicate that: “The crucial requisite for energy security is to get the oil on 
the market and to prevent any disruptions to supply. In terms of the energy security 
of importing states, it is irrelevant who sells the oil and who buys it. Oil is a global 
commodity and the price is not set in Baghdad” (Marcel and Mitchell, 2003: 2). 
Within the Markets and Institutions framework, the external energy policy 
targets the creation of an energy market independent from arbitrary interventions 
of producer states. The idea is that competitive international energy market 
governed by international law can assure cooperation between exporter, importer 
and transit countries and can eventually bring global energy security. Energy 
Charter is one example for the efforts to achieve this multilateral framework. 
However, it should not be neglected that with M&I approach private energy 
companies acquire greater power in energy sector. Critics argue that this power 
serves to transform oil and gas extracting states into “shareholders” and transfers 
“the surplus from the producer states to the private companies of the sector” 
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(Mane-Estrada, 2006: 3776; Mommer, 2000: 23). This means that strategies, 
alliances, interests and missions of oil and gas companies will be crucially 
important for consumers. In other words The European Union’s dependence will 
shift towards international energy companies and its energy security strategy will 
be vulnerable to alliances, power struggles and competition between “the great 
European trans-nationals” such as TotalFinaElf, Royal Dutch/Shell and their rivals 
in Russia or USA (Mane-Estrada, 2006: 3776).  
The Markets and Institutions approach would help the Union to secure 
necessary oil and gas supply, since the strengthening of multilateral market 
structure would facilitate energy trade with major suppliers, especially with Russia, 
of course only if the approach is mutually adopted (Correlje and Linde, 2006: 535). 
In the international arena, reciprocity is not only relevant to bilateral 
agreements. For a system to work properly the “values” of the system have to be 
accepted on the basis of reciprocity. Hence, the acceptance of norm-based market 
governance by energy producing states is crucially important for Europe, if its 
external energy policy will evolve around market approach.  In terms of its 
identifying characteristics such as democracy, human rights or rule of law, EU has 
been trying to influence its worldwide partners and have been successful to some 
extend. Nevertheless, in terms of its energy policy which favors an environment 
open for free trade and free flow of foreign direct investments throughout the 
world, EU faces a resistance by producer countries to “import” its market-driven 
norms (Youngs, 2007b: 8).  
The case with Gulf Cooperation Council made up of Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates is one of the examples. The 
free trade area talks between Europe and GCC are far from conclusion since these 
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countries reject EU’s pressure for marked based norms. These countries argue that 
EU is “exporting its own model of regional integration”, which is initiated first by 
economic integration, “without recognizing that intra-regional dynamics are quite 
different within the GCC” (Youngs, 2007b: 9). GCC countries indicate their need 
in a “broader strategic partnership” rather than simple free trade agreements and 
they desire energy cooperation with EU, which could balance US’ influence over 
the region and over Arab-Israeli conflict. This means that in producer states where 
a geostrategic approach is clearly needed, the Union shows limited interest in 
political factors (Youngs, 2007b: 9).  
On the contrary to M&I approach which focuses on the advantages of 
economic interdependence and of international energy market, the EU also 
includes energy ministries where policy makers argue that decreasing external 
energy dependency is the only way to achieve energy security. This indicates that 
according to some member states, energy security is still perceived as “a state-led 
responsibility both within and beyond Europe”. These members argue that rather 
than relying on market mechanisms to fix the balance between demand and supply, 
the increase of production in supplier states seem to be a more plausible option for 
future energy security (Youngs, 2007b: 8).  
Consequently, when the expansion of EU’s internal energy market norms 
seems to be unsuccessful it is a fact that EU member states direct themselves 
immediately to bilateral agreements. Algeria is the case in point. When Algeria 
declared its unwillingness to accept market governance norms included in 
Neighborhood action plan, Spain asked from Algeria a preferential treatment and a 
bilateral energy partnership for being more advantageous than other European 
consumer states in terms of energy supplies. France also is another EU country 
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which has been relying on bilateral deals with Algeria. This indicates that some 
members “undermine both values based foreign policy and the European unity” for 
their own energy strategies. (Youngs, 2007a: 1 and 2007b: 9). The EU Members’ 
need in bilateral energy agreements for securing current and future supplies and 
the producers’ rejection of EU’s market norms and their declared need in deeper, 
more strategic energy cooperation indicate that European External Energy Policy 
cannot fully evolve around market principles and needs geopolitical dimensions to 
achieve the target of energy security. When geopolitics comes into the picture 
Regions and Empires approach also steps in. 
In Regions and Empires (R&E), as opposed to the “international 
integration”, the international system is divided up in different groups of countries 
which compete with each other to dominate the system and to guarantee the access 
and control of energy resources and international markets. The assumption of this 
approach is that “ideology, religion and political arguments” constitute socially, 
culturally and economically separated blocks of countries and regions. “Political 
and military strategy, bilateralism and regionalism divide the world up into 
competing US, EU, Russian and Asian spheres of influence”, with satellite 
countries (CIEP, 2004: 91; Correlje and Linde, 2006: 533, 536). In such a system 
security concerns dominate the countries’ agenda, economic integration in the 
international arena remains limited and since one cannot talk about a world market 
for oil and gas, agreements and treaties are concluded bilaterally, which further 
deepens the disparity between “regions” (CIEP, 2004: 91).  
R&E approach evokes tenet of “regionalism” and with its emphasis on 
world politics determined by power capabilities of states belonging to different 
blocks and competing with each other, it reminds Waltz’s neo-realism (CIEP, 2004: 
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84). In the energy version of the “neorealist state security centered competition for 
power” (CIEP, 2004:88) the power becomes directly linked to the access to oil and 
gas reserves. Given that proven oil and gas reserves are disproportionately located 
and concentrate in the Persian Gulf, Russia and the Caspian Sea, in future, major 
energy importers such as EU, Japan and the US will continue to rely on the same 
oil and gas sources. This will intensify the rivalry between different block of 
countries (Correlje and Linde, 2006: 533).  
For Regions and Empires framework, economic integration is required to 
be accompanied with a strong political integration of countries belonging to the 
same “block” which would refer to a complete harmonization of foreign and 
security policies. As the study of different preferences of Member States indicated, 
for the external dimension of European Energy Policy, the major handicap is the 
European Union’s inability to stand with a single voice. For energy policies, since 
the Union’s integration remain mainly in the economic domain, than it would be 
appropriate to state that the EU seems to be closer to Markets and Institutions 
approach (CIEP, 2004: 89). 
M&I approach requires mutual consent of countries which agree in 
operating with common rules of international market. However, in some countries 
especially in the Middle East dissatisfaction with the international economic and 
political order as well as rejection of integration with the world system are among 
outstanding features. In terms of energy supplies while some of these countries 
such as Iran and Iraq with their actual and potential reserves constitute important 
part of energy trade it is a significant fact that “war on terrorism” in that region 
highly constrains “the movement of goods, people and investments – or is causing 
a lack of trust, required to move – and inhibits the economic development and 
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integration of countries and regions into the world market” (CIEP, 2004: 90). 
When this regional instability is combined with these countries’ unwillingness to 
integrate with the world system, such countries remain simply as oil and gas 
suppliers (CIEP, 2004: 90).  
When market-based norms and the target of international free energy 
market as part of external energy policy is mentioned, EU is subject to critics 
arguing that its external energy security strategy is “apolitical”. Yet in its reports 
on external energy policy, the Commission indicates the need to combine 
cooperation in energy with EU’s other foreign policy objectives including non-
proliferation, promotion of human rights, and conflict resolution and prevention 
(Youngs, 2007b: 11). Nevertheless, in practice, Member States’ struggle to secure 
their own national interest in energy supplies overshadows these objectives. Javier 
Solana, in his speech at the EU Energy Conference in 2006 pointed to the fact that 
major oil and gas reserves are situated in “unstable and often undemocratic parts of 
the world” and highlighted that while coping with these regimes some countries 
would “put their energy needs above everything else” since “the scramble for 
energy risks becomes pretty unprincipled” (Solana, 2006: 1-2).  
The unprincipled external energy policy has its setbacks. The policy of 
“just keep buying the oil” only serves to guarantee short term supplies and it 
further endangers future energy security since it gives instable producer countries 
the impression that they could override international norms as long as they have 
the privilege of being a resource rich country that the “First World Countries” 
depend on. Consequently, investors complaining about corruption of producer 
states, democratically illegitimate producer countries blocking foreign investments 
to increase their popular support or producers which totally override human rights 
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simply add new challenges ahead Europe and also jeopardize current progress 
concerning investments flowing into producer states to increase oil and gas 
production capacity, with the reason that the absence of rule of law and “social 
inclusiveness” is not compatible with an investment friendly country (Youngs, 
2007a: 2). 
In the previous section on “energy security” it is already mentioned that 
supply security is highly dependent on quality and efficiency of extraction as well 
as transportation infrastructure, on the political motivations of producer countries 
which may use oil and gas as a leverage, on market dynamics which may lead to 
sudden price increases, and on economic and political instabilities and failures of 
producer states. This implies that the EU’s energy supply security cannot be 
separated from geopolitical dynamics in producer and transit regions. In other 
words, “the socio-economic and political context of the system of energy supply 
has an impact in the degree to which oil or gas can be made available in sufficient 
quantities and at affordable prices” (CIEP, 2004: 84). Accordingly, from terrorism 
to failed states or to economic and political disruptions which endanger oil and gas 
supply constitute “geopolitical risks” for the energy security of Europe (CIEP, 
2004: 84). Hence, to be an effective one, European energy policy’s external 
dimension requires the inclusion of policies not only trying to guide international 
energy markets but also addressing geopolitical factors. 
The Members’ diverging views over the internal market directly affect 
EU’s external energy strategy, some member states still doubt about the potential 
benefits of a common policy whereas others argue that efforts to secure energy 
supply should not undermine democracy and human rights. While a conclusion 
cannot be reach about whether the internal free market rules are to be expanded to 
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the international arena or whether energy policy should be included into the 
Union’s foreign policy with it political dimensions, Europe’s external policy 
remains limited with “apolitical, technical energy cooperation” or bilateral deals 
(Youngs, 2007b: 15).  
With the perspective of M&I approach, the Union “should create a climate 
that invites market participants to invest in efficient measures of security of supply, 
consistent with their economic interests”. On the other hand, with the perspective 
of Regions and Empires, increasing dependence on oil and gas imports would lead 
to polarization among “empires” and the issue of supply security would become 
more politicized causing national and EU level authorities to include energy 
security in the domain of foreign and security policy (Correlje and Linde, 
2006:537).  This would affect producer states position as well. To illustrate, with 
the implementation of M&I approach, EU market and Russian market would 
interact more, while with R&E, Russia would create its of sphere of influence 
(Correlje and Linde, 2006: 536) 
To sum up, it is possible to state that The EU’s external energy policy 
remains in between market and geopolitics. The need to incorporate geopolitical 
aspects by focusing on political governance of producer states cannot be denied as 
the examples mentioned above indicate. In the long term, “backing friendly 
autocrats”, just for the sake of supporting international market, does not promise 
the optimization of energy security (Youngs, 2007b: 15). Therefore, the European 
Union has to combine the two in order to overcome the dilemma between market 
and geopolitics, as both free market and politics are determinants of energy 
security. Thus, the best way for EU to complete its external energy policy is to 
 63 
determine a strategy “that extends market principles within the scope of strategic 
agreements that also work to further political modernization” (Youngs, 2007a: 3). 
To conclude, EU’ external policy belongs to none of the two approaches 
entirely. In Green Paper 2006 it does refer to the development of a pan-European 
Energy Community but, this community remains limited with market regulations, 
financing instruments, necessary infrastructures and networks and does not refer to 
concrete “blocks” as mentioned in the Regions and Empires approach. However, 
over-reliance on market principles either does not satisfy the members, since the 
exporting partners’ geopolitical conditions cannot be separated from hard security 
considerations and from political principles. As mentioned previously, this does 
not necessarily mean that the Union’s policy makers in energy issues have to 
decide on one of the approaches referring to the market or the geopolitics. Rather, 
the Union can only achieve a successful and credible external energy policy by 
inventing its sui generis roadmap. 
 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter focused on the fundamentals of European Energy Policy. It 
started by defining European Energy Policy on basis of three main objectives 
officially declared by the Commission: sustainability, competitiveness and security 
of supply. In line with the analysis of each objective, the inseparable and 
complementary nature of this “trinity” led the chapter to reach to the fact that 
supply security constituted the fundamental concern for the very reason to create a 
European level energy policy, due to the EU’s increasing dependency to imports 
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supplied from unstable regions. This analysis led to a detailed study of energy 
security with different perspectives from the side of both producers and consumers, 
with a special emphasis on European perspective to offer a clear understanding of 
what the European Energy Policy targets as “secure supplies” and which problems 
it has to avoid.  
Following the analysis of the concept of energy security, the chapter 
presented the historical evolution of European Energy Policy with internal and 
external developments, putting a special emphasis on European Energy Charter 
and official EU documents, namely the Green Papers and Strategic Energy 
Reviews. In this respect, this section concluded that each document added a new 
dimension to European Energy Policy by focusing on specific issues concerning 
renewable sources, import dependency, infrastructures or diversification policies 
with regards to suppliers and transit routes. Nevertheless, despite these serious 
efforts, some factors prevented the EU members to reach a common, synchronized 
European-level energy policy. Accordingly, the chapter continued with the study 
of factors which hindered the achievement of European Energy Policy. 
As a conclusion, this chapter reveals that on principle, European Energy 
Policy is identified with its basic objectives and with its internal and external 
policies needed for Europe to reach these targets. Nevertheless, in practice, the 
member states’ different preferences, changing patterns of energy demands and 
their diverging support for representing a “single voice” in the international arena 
for the issues concerning energy security directly affect the institutionalization of 
European level energy policies.  
Moreover, European Energy Policy cannot be isolated from actors other 
than the EU members, namely producer and transit countries, due to the Union’s 
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energy dependency. However, in most of the producer regions especially in the 
Middle East and Central Asia, political and economic instabilities prevent the EU 
to rely only on simple market principles based on liberalization, competitive prices 
and joint investments. This further complicates the task of the Union since at some 
point energy supply security deviates from simple supply-demand balance and 
acquires a political dimension. As a result, the external dimension of European 
Energy Policy offers new puzzles which require different solutions for different 
suppliers. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN ENERGY POLICY 
 
 
 
 European Energy Policy is a puzzle, with every piece being significant and 
meaningful. Just like a puzzle would be meaningless if one piece is missing, 
European Energy Policy as well would be incomplete if it neglected one aspect of 
energy issues. In that respect, from internal demand management to new 
technologies concerning renewable energy forms every single energy policy, being 
equally important, serves to the objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and 
security of supply. Moreover, their success depends on concrete achievements in 
each dimension of this trinity. One cannot talk about security of supply if current 
policies are not compatible with sustainability, since with inefficient consumption 
trends damaging the environment, reserves would be depleted and future supply 
security would be unachievable. Similarly, the absence of competitiveness factor 
would eliminate affordable access to energy, which would again hinder the 
efficiency of supply security efforts.  
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As these remarks indicate, internal and external energy policies cannot be 
separated from each other due to their complementary nature.  However, as 
regards to the scope of this research which is targeted to study the EU and Turkey 
relationship in the context of energy and to the implications of Turkey’s special 
position as an energy bridge on its membership, energy supply security and EU’s 
external efforts to this end, require special interest. As security of supply is 
previously studied, this chapter is specifically dedicated to external dimension of 
European Energy Policy. 
 High import dependency trends highlight that the Union is in urgent need 
for a common approach to external energy policy which would shape relations and 
partnerships of Europe with global energy actors being consumers, producers, 
transit countries or major companies (European Council, 2007: 19). As the energy 
issue is a multi-dimensional one touching upon a wide range of spheres from 
politics to economics and as the policies appeal to several actors, it is crucial for 
Europe to develop an external energy policy which is: 
coherent (backed up by all Union policies, the 
Member States and industry), strategic (fully 
recognizing the geo-political dimensions of energy-
related security issues) and focused (geared towards 
initiatives where Union-level action can have a clear 
impact in furthering its interests). It must also be 
consistent with the EU's broader foreign policy 
objectives such as conflict prevention and resolution, 
non-proliferation and promoting human rights 
(European Commission, 2006a: 3). 
Accordingly, the following sections examine what the Union puts forward as 
external energy policy with its Green Papers and Strategic Energy Reviews and 
they portray the EU’s relationship with its major energy partners for guaranteeing 
its energy supply security.  
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3.1. Europe’s External Energy Policies 
 
Global action on climate change, international trade, competitive 
international markets, political relations among countries, development efforts, 
they all include a reference point to energy and to the interdependent character of 
energy relations among countries. Therefore, the European Union in “its trade 
policy and agreements, its bilateral partnerships, cooperation and association 
agreements and political dialogues”, puts a great emphasis on energy issues 
(European Commission, 2008: 7).  
Moreover, concerning its ambitious goals about sustainability, renewable 
resources and fight against climate change the EU is aware that the efforts of its 27 
members have to be combined with the cooperation of other consumer states, 
developing countries or producer states in order to obtain effective outcomes. This 
cooperation is crucially important since in the future EU is projected to consume 
only “less than 10% of the world’s energy” and to “account for only 15% of new 
CO2 emissions”. Accordingly, the EU pursues the goal of creating an external 
energy policy based on “interdependence, cooperation and mutual trust” with its 
international partners and it targets to expand both the content and the 
geographical scope of its policies not only for its own energy security, but also for 
global supply security and sustainability (European Commission, 2007: 18). 
In fact, the external energy policy of Europe does not only refer to supply 
security and to relations with major producer and transit countries. The integration 
of energy policies other than supply security also dominates the agenda of EU with 
regards to political relations with global partners. Accordingly, “climate change, 
energy efficiency, renewable resources, development of new technologies” and 
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investment for clean and sustainable energy production are also constituents of 
EU’s external policy. In that respect, the EU encourages bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation and aims to widen its internal policy arrangements concerning 
especially CO2 emissions and energy efficiency so as to encompass more countries 
being party to international cooperation arenas such as UN, IEA and G8 (European 
Commission, 2006b: 17). Additionally, nuclear safety and security standards, 
combination of sustainable and affordable energy policies with development goals 
especially in Africa (European Commission, 2002) and lastly, strategic 
partnerships with key countries such as Brazil on alternative energy sources 
notably biofuels also are issue areas that the European Union encourages 
cooperation.  
While the European Union, as a consumer, is in need of diversity of supply 
sources and transit routes and of greater predictability in the international oil and 
gas markets, the producer countries are in need of greater security of demand to 
guarantee the revenues of their investments. This necessity of the deepening of 
mutual trust between consumer, transit and producer countries can be assured 
through long term legally binding agreements that can also assure the convenient 
environment for capital-intensive investments in the extraction and transportation 
of resources (European Commission, 2008: 7).  
 However, before the assurance of international “mutual trust”, as a first 
step for an effective external energy policy, the Commission indicates the 
importance of the progress in the integration of internal market and deepening of 
internal energy policies, since this internal coherence between member states 
would be reflected to international arena as Europe speaking “with the same 
voice” and increase EU’s credibility (European Commission, 2006b: 14). The 
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Commission approves “the legitimate right of individual Member States to pursue 
their own external relations for ensuring security of energy supplies and to choose 
their internal energy mix” (European Commission, 2006a: 1), however, it does not 
give up emphasizing that only collective, EU-level policies can assure external 
energy security for the whole Europe. In that respect, “An External Policy to Serve 
Europe’s Energy Interests” launched by the Commission, discusses how the 
energy security could be inserted into Europe’s wider external relations including 
CFSP. The conclusion is that again the “fully developed internal policy is a pre-
condition for delivering the EU’s external energy interests (European Commission, 
2006a: 1). 
The Commission also proposes several objectives so as to guide and shape 
Europe’s external energy policy. Promotion of improved governance and 
transparency, improvement of production and transportation infrastructures, better 
relations with third countries to promote necessary environment for European 
companies to invest in energy activities, promotion of energy efficiency, 
diversification of suppliers and energy products, encouragement of joint stock 
holding with energy partners are all among targets for secure access to sustainable 
and competitive energy now and in the future (European Commission, 2006a: 2). 
 In the study of external energy policies of Europe as part of its common 
Energy Policy, it is possible to classify these polices under three major strategies. 
The first one is the extension of internal energy policies and internal energy market 
to the international arena, which is also based on the integration of energy into 
broader external relations, which would eventually end up with a pan-European 
Energy Community. Dialogue with third parties constitutes the second one. 
Policies under this group refer to the international agreements and energy 
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partnerships with energy supplier and transit countries as well as consumer 
countries with growing dependence on energy imports due to increasing 
consumption. Finally, diversification is the last major strategy as it basically 
indicates the strengthening of existing infrastructures and construction of new ones 
for alternative energy supplies. It can be argued that, while international dialogues 
appeal to the political dimension of diversification in producer and transit 
countries, adequate infrastructures complete the material side of it. Below, these 
policies will be studied with further clarifications. 
As the Green Paper 2006 (European Commission, 2006b: 16) puts forward, 
as part of its external energy policy, “the EU has for some time been engaged in 
widening its energy market to include its neighbors and to bring them 
progressively closer to the EU’s internal market”. With this strategy, the Union 
targets to achieve supply security, economic growth, increased investments and 
predictable oil and gas markets through the acceptance of “common regulatory 
space” in other words “common trade, transit and environment rules” between the 
Member States and EU neighboring countries, which would lead to a “pan-
European Energy Community”. In that respect, European Neighborhood Policy, 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Association Agreements with 
strategic energy partners are some of the major tools of EU (European 
Commission, 2006b: 16). 
 The extension of EU’s own internal market to its neighbors and partners is 
the strategy that the policy makers are trying to pursue with the argument that only 
well functioning international market can assure affordable oil and gas supplies 
and encourage new investments (European Commission, 2006a: 2). As previous 
section on “market vs. geopolitics” indicated, the extension of EU’s internal 
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market refers to the extension of common trade, transit and environment rules 
through bilateral and multilateral agreements. This also means “reciprocal 
liberalization of trading conditions and investment in upstream and downstream 
markets and… grant of access to pipelines by countries situated along transit and 
transport chains” (European Commission, 2007: 19). Consequently, it is possible 
to observe that the principle of extension of shared trade rules and norms 
constitutes one of the basic elements of EU’s energy security strategy as it 
definitely shapes EU’s dialogue efforts with producer countries. 
  Referring to shared principles and norms, then, international agreements 
further increase EU’s coherence with the rest of the world. In that respect 
deepening the dialogue and relations with major energy producers, transit 
countries, neighbors and with other major consumers such as China, USA and 
India is another central external energy policy both for EU’s energy security and 
for global energy security.  
 Commission’s communication to the European Council and European 
Parliament “An Energy Policy for Europe” and Second Strategic Energy Review 
clearly indicate that in addition to international agreements such as Energy Charter 
Treaty or multilateral initiatives under WTO or World Bank, the Union concludes 
also Memoranda of Understanding on energy with several countries so as to 
maximize geographical diversification of energy supplies and transits. The 
agreements especially with producer countries emphasize energy interdependence 
and note that successful provisions rely on the equilibrium between demand 
security for producers and supply security for consumers. Encouragement of 
upstream investment, development of conditions for market access, for reciprocal 
market liberalization and policy developments, transit agreements for 
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uninterrupted flows of energy even during times of political tension and dispute 
settlement mechanisms, all constitute instruments of supply security policies 
achieved through successful dialogues with international partners (European 
Commission, 2007: 24 and 2008: 8).  
Concerning the dialogue with the third parties European Neighbourhood 
Policy as well is a significant tool for EU in that most of its neighbors are either 
producers or transit countries. Hence, energy is a strategic component of ENP. In 
the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, the Commission (2004: 17) 
indicates that “Enhancing our strategic energy partnership with neighbouring 
countries is a major element of the European Neighbourhood Policy”. Hence, in 
order to increase energy cooperation with EU neighbouring countries which are 
key players in the energy supply security as suppliers (such as Southern Caucasus 
countries, Algeria, Egypt and Libya) or as transit countries (Ukraine, Belarus, 
Morocco and Tunisia), ENP is a way to institutionalize external energy dialogues. 
In this context, energy cooperation covers a multitude of issues such as 
improvement of energy networks, legal and regulatory convergence of energy 
markets and energy policies, promotion of energy efficiency, encouragement of 
new technologies concerning renewable resources and mutual business 
opportunities. To achieve concrete progress in the energy cooperation the EU 
launches Action Plans2 which “build on existing bilateral or regional initiatives, 
such as the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, the Tacis-funded Inogate programme 
dealing with the Caspian basin (oil and gas pipeline systems)” or Euro-
Mediterranean partnership (European Commission, 2004: 17-18). 
                                                
2
 For every country included in the ENP (Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, 
Israel, Jordon, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Tunisia and 
Ukraine) an Action Plan is prepared. Each of Action Plans make reference to energy, convergence 
of energy policies and energy networks. 
 74 
Similarly, Energy Community Treaty acts as a regional instrument for an 
integrated energy market with the Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia an the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) and the extension of 
treaty to other neighbours such as Moldova, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine wait on 
the agenda of policy makers (European Commission, 2007: 24; European Council, 
2006).  
 Promotion of necessary infrastructure to the Union’s energy needs, together 
with broader diversification efforts, is another policy for external energy security 
identified within EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan. Strengthening of 
existing infrastructure and investment in new ones is crucially important for both 
internal and external dimensions of energy security as the material access to oil 
and gas depend merely on the pipelines (European Commission, 2008: 6). Then, 
the extension of Trans-European Energy Networks and further promotion of new 
investments especially for the transportation of oil and gas to Europe is included to 
the process of developing previously mentioned pan-European Energy Community. 
This requires efficient usage of financial instruments through European Investment 
Bank (EIB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
Neighbourhood Investment Fund, twinning programs and loan subsidies for the 
encouragement and realization of strategically significant energy projects 
(European Commission, 2006b: 16; European Commission, 2007:25).  
 Second Strategic Energy Review offers suggestions concerning some of 
these significant energy projects which would contribute to the efforts of supply 
security. The construction of pipelines and the development of legal commitments 
concerning gas supplies with countries such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq, 
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the development of a southern gas corridor carrying gas from Caspian and Middle 
East regions are among examples. These projects also include transit gas pipelines 
and urge the EU to engage in dialogues and agreements with transit countries, 
notably Turkey. Another illustration for the infrastructure projects is the 
Commission’s emphasis on the completion of the “Mediterranean energy ring” 
which will not only diversify the Union’s energy sources away from Iraq, Middle 
East or Sub-Saharan Africa through the connection of Europe with Southern 
Mediterranean, but also will “develop the region’s vast solar and wind energy 
potential” by realizing projects “adopted by the December 2007 Euromed Energy 
Ministerial meeting and the Mediterranean Solar Plan adopted in Paris in July 
2008” (European Commission, 2008: 5).  
 These new infrastructure projects and dialogues at the international level 
overall contribute to the diversification of energy sources, geographical origins and 
transit routes of imported oil and gas and enhance the Union’s energy security. 
Still, the success of external energy policies highly depends on the attitudes and 
perceptions of the Union’s energy trade partners. The following section touches 
upon the European Union’s relations with its major energy partners.  
 
 
3.2. Relations With Major Energy Producers 
   
 In European Union’s energy mix oil, natural gas and coal constitute the top 
three energy sources. The EU’s internal energy policies concerning the usage of 
nuclear power and the increase of renewable resources within the energy mix 
would no doubt change the relative percentages of different sources. Especially, 
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the 20/20 Package offered with “An Energy Policy for Europe” which sets the 
target of 20% renewable resources within the EU’s overall energy mix by 2020, 
generates hope about a decrease in the dependency to oil and natural gas.  
Nevertheless, current policies and national preferences of separate Member States 
indicate that a radical change in favor of alternative energy resources is not 
feasible in the near future. 
The Figure below illustrates the difference between the years 1991 and 
2006, in the share of different fuels within the Union’s energy consumption 
(Eurostat, 2009c: 21). 
 
  
Figure 2: Gross Inland Consumption Shares by Type of Fuel, in EU-27 
 The Figure indicates that throughout the years, oil remains as the major 
energy source of the Union. However, despite slight changes in the hydro, biomass 
and nuclear types of energy, the significant variations occur concerning the 
consumption of coal and natural gas, with the coal representing a decrease of 8% 
and natural gas representing an increase of 6%. Especially, the differences namely 
 77 
the increase in the percentage of natural gas and the unaffected leadership of oil 
consumption with 37% represent significant implications. By the same data 
offered by Eurostat (2009b: 11), it is interesting to find out that the share of the net 
energy imports within the Gross Inland Consumption being 46% in 1991 jumps to 
55% in 2006. In line with this information, statistics indicate that in 2006, the 
Union’s import dependency for natural gas and oil are respectively 60.8% and 
83.7% (Directorate General for Energy and Transport, 2009: 30). This dependency 
is projected to rise to 84% for natural gas and 93% for oil in the year 2030 
(European Commission, 2007: 26). 
 The Union’s relatively high consumption of natural gas and oil, the 
significant share of net imports within the consumed energy, and consequently 
high import dependency in oil and natural gas to external resources, locate the 
relations with energy exporting states at the center of common European Energy 
Policy. With its limited oil and gas production and increasing need to consume, 
EU naturally seeks to increase cooperation and favorable trade terms with energy 
producers. 
  The European Union is not equally dependent on every external energy 
supplier. In line with the volume of trade, for oil and natural gas different producer 
countries outstand as EU’s major trade partners in energy. The identification of 
these major partners represents a critical reference point for the development of an 
external energy policy, since the decisions of these producers over their own 
energy policies or their domestic political and economic dynamics have a direct 
effect on the flow of oil and gas to Europe.  
 Concerning the oil imports, the table below demonstrates both the amount 
and origin of imported oil starting from 2000 to 2006. Russia, Norway, Libya, 
 78 
Saudi Arabia and Iran outstand as the five major oil exporters to EU. While Russia, 
with a share of 33.5% is separated from other exporters, relatively smaller 
percentages of Kazahkhstan, Nigeria and other Middle Eastern partners indicate 
examples of the EU’s effort for diversification of energy suppliers. Still, regarding 
the data below, one cannot refer to a strict diversification policy, because while the 
dependence to a single producer that is Russia rises due to Russian oil imports 
steadily increasing from 112.4 to 189.0 million tones, alternative sources coming 
from other major partners namely, Norway and Saudi Arabia represent a constant 
decrease.  
 
Table 1: Crude Oil Imports into the European Union 
 
 Source: Directorate General for Energy and Transport, 2009: 31 
 
The graph below further helps to the configuration of relative weights of oil 
exporters in the Union’s oil import profile. Extending the time period from 2006 to 
2007, Figure 3 demonstrates the reduction in the crude oil imports from Saudi 
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Arabia (-39%) and from Norway ( -27 %). While minor increases emerge in total 
oil import, the 65% rise in the share of Russia highlights the country’s critical 
position for European Energy Policy. The case of Libya requires attention too, in 
that with the increase of imports by 22%, starting in 2006, it overshadows Saudi 
Arabia in exporting oil to Europe. 
 
Figure 3: Imports of Crude Oil by Country of Origin 
Source: Eurostat, 2009b: 33 
 
 For the natural gas imports as well, Russia and Norway are the major trade 
partners of the EU with their shares in the imports being 42% and 24.2% 
respectively. 18.2% of gas imports come from Algeria which outstands as the 
Union’s third major oil exporter. Although its share within the overall imports is 
small (2.7%), imports from Libya display a considerable escalation in 2005. 
Similarly, by the year 2005, Egypt (2.7%) gets involved into natural gas trade with 
EU. In that respect, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and Qatar with its little but constantly 
increasing amounts of natural gas exports to EU, represent EU’s search for 
alternative natural gas suppliers.  
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Table 2: Natural Gas Imports into the European Union 
 
Source: Directorate General for Energy and Transport, 2009: 31 
 
Figure 4 better illustrates the inclusion of alternative partners into EU’s 
natural gas imports. With the figure it is possible to observe the rise in natural gas 
of Nigeria, Libya and other countries which include Egypt and Qatar, within the 
energy mixture of Europe. Additionally it should also be noted that, unlike oil 
imports continuing at consistent amounts, for natural gas it is possible to observe 
an upward trend. This further underlines growing tendency towards natural gas 
consumption.  
 
Figure 4: Imports of Natural Gas by Country of Origin 
Source: Eurostat, 2009b: 33 
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 In the light of different import amounts of oil and gas, and in the light of 
differing dependencies with regards to producer states, the EU shapes it external 
energy supply security strategies. In return, trade agreements, partnerships or 
dialogues for the enhancement of cooperation in energy security determine future 
profile of energy security.  
  
 
3.2.1. Norway 
  
 Norway is the second major natural gas and oil supplier to the European 
Union. It is not only a significant energy partner for Europe, but also within the 
world trade for oil and gas too it has a considerable contribution, since Norway is 
the “third largest exporter of natural gas and the sixth largest exporter of oil” 
(Energy Information Administration, 2009a: 1). June 1971 is the beginning of the 
production in the Norwegian continental shelf, and since then twenty billion 
barrels of oil have been extracted from the area (Market Observatory for Energy, 
2009a: 2).  
Norway differs from other energy suppliers to the Union because it is a 
member of European Economic Area. The legislation concerning EU’s internal 
energy market and related policy arrangements about competition law, 
environmental regulations, consumer rights and new technologies are already 
implemented by Norway (European Union Press Releases, 2009a). This leads to an 
intense trade partnership between Norway and the EU. Among trade items energy 
leaves other products such as agricultural products, machinery, chemicals, textiles 
and clothing way behind and within the imports of EU from Norway which values 
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92.036 millions of euro in 2008, 56.204 accounts for mineral fuels giving a share 
of 61.1% of total imports to energy products (Directorate General for Trade, 
2009e). This creates a mutual dependence on the trade of energy products. Not 
only the EU needs Norway as a reliable oil and gas supplier but also Norway needs 
the EU since EU Members namely, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, 
Netherlands account for the majority of Norway’s natural gas exports in 2008 
(Energy Information Administration, 2009a: 5).  
 This high volume of trade in energy is the result of a bilateral energy 
dialogue between Norway and the EU which dates back to 2002. On 6 July 2005, 
by the Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the Norwegian Minister of 
Petroleum and Energy Thorhild Widvey this dialogue is agreed to be further 
strengthened. The coordination of energy policies, cooperation in the research and 
development of new technologies and collaboration in the relations with other 
energy exporting countries constitute the agenda of the EU-Norway Energy 
Dialogue (European Union Press Releases, 2009a).  Accordingly, EU- Norway 
partnership is not limited to oil and gas trade. Norway “shares European Union 
objectives on climate change and sustainable development and it is particularly 
committed to the deployment of cost efficient carbon capture and storage 
technologies” (Market Observatory for Energy, 2009a: 2). 
 Norway and EU act together to further develop their partnership. The 
Commission as well emphasizes the potential of Norway in the maximization of 
Europe’s energy security and suggests the promotion of common exploration 
projects in the Norwegian continental shelf and the promotion of alternative 
energy production such as offshore wind in the North Sea (European Commission, 
2008: 7).  
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3.2.2. Africa 
  
 Concerning EU’s dialogue with Africa, energy is incorporated within the 
development and governance issues. Poverty reduction projects and improvement 
of energy delivery systems to rural areas attracts the Union’s interests and to this 
end, initiatives and aid funds are offered, The EU Initiative for Poverty Eradication 
and Sustainable Development launched in 2002 being one example (Youngs, 
2007b: 4).  
 In the region, the EU policy makers associate the Union’s energy interests 
with broader political and security considerations. Still, due to high instability in 
the region, EU’s efforts remain insufficient in the implementation of development 
projects. To illustrate despite being the fourth major natural gas supplier of the EU, 
Nigeria remained as the Africa’s “most under-funded state” since corruption and 
lack of transparency hindered investment efforts. Instead of rule of law, oil 
contracts and government positions were used as political means to “buy off” 
militants (Youngs, 2007b: 14).  
 Nevertheless, Africa, more specifically North Africa has a significant 
potential not only in hydrocarbons but also in renewable energy sources. Despite 
the inconvenient conditions for investments, secure extraction and transportation 
of resources, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria outstand as important suppliers 
after Russia and Norway, especially in natural gas imports. Projects such as the 
Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline offer opportunities for alternatives routes to Europe. 
Hence, the intensification of the dialogue with these suppliers is crucially 
important for the diversification strategies of the Union. Accordingly, as the 
Commission indicates in the Second Strategic Energy Review, “the Africa-EU 
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Energy Partnership with the African Union together with the African Regional 
Economic Communities will be instrumental in developing a deeper energy 
dialogue and concrete initiatives” (European Commission, 2008: 9).  
Being a feasible alternative source of oil and gas supplies, Africa plays a 
non negligible role in the future of Europe’s energy security. Aware of this 
potential, as part of its external energy policy, the European Union offers several 
instruments to Africa, through bilateral cooperation, the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument, the European Development Fund and the European 
Investment Bank (European Commission, 2008: 9). 
 
 
3.2.3. Middle East 
  
 Middle East is the world’s important energy producing region and world’s 
richest proven oil and natural gas reserves belong to the region. Naturally, seeking 
ways to guarantee its energy security, EU aims to institutionalize its energy 
relations with the region, especially with the Persian Gulf countries some such as 
Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates being member of 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Bahgat, 2006: 974). 
Nevertheless this dialogue is not only the effort of an international consumer to 
secure its supplies, rather it “is the recognition of the fact that producer and 
consumer countries have common interests in encouraging regular supply at 
affordable prices” (European Commission, 2008: 9). 
 As the data between the years 2000-2007 indicated, Middle Eastern 
producers cannot be defined as Europe’s major oil and natural gas suppliers, with 
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comparison to Russia or Norway. To illustrate, mineral fuels imported from Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia account for only 2% and 4% among the total of EU imports. 
However, the fact that imported mineral fuels correspond to 84.9% for imports 
from Saudi Arabia and 99.9% for imports from Iraq, indicate the significance of 
energy products in trade relations with these countries (Directorate Genaral for 
Trade 2009c and 2009g). Consequently, as Bahgat (2006: 975) points out as well, 
despite the Union’s intense energy dialogues with Russia or Caspian region, 
Middle East remains as a “critical player in energy policy” especially due to its 
rich resources, geographical advantages and its potential to stabilize world market 
prices in line with its oil supply capacity (Bahgat, 2006: 974). This urges EU to 
further develop its dialogue with Iraq and the Gulf Cooperation Council in the 
context of its energy security strategies (European Commission, 2008: 9). 
  Nevertheless, the EU’s basic challenge of external energy policy emerges 
for the GCC countries as well: energy dialogue divorced from politics. The energy 
dialogue with GCC countries does not include the region’s security and political 
dynamics. Ironically, according to the European diplomats, despite the Union’s 
emphasis for rule of law and democracy, authoritarian Gulf states and their internal 
politics do not create concerns for European supply security, as long as stability 
prevails and the country is “well run”. However, the Gulf countries’ internal 
political dynamics directly affect future energy security considerations since 
potential regime failures would lead to uncertainty about oil supplies. For example, 
in Saudi Arabia, unpredictable decision making of the royal family, lack of 
accountability concerning the flow of oil revenues into the royal budget and 
consequent public unrest due to popular anger bring energy related consequences, 
the reduction of market opening and the reluctance concerning liberalization with 
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the fear of further political instability, being the cases in point. Hence, for GCC 
countries as well internal social and political trends require to be incorporated into 
the energy dialogue (Youngs, 2007b: 11-12).  
Concerning the region, EU’s effort to achieve international cooperation in 
energy is not limited to the dialogue with the GCC. The Euro-Mediterranean 
Energy Partnership is another platform for EU to pursue its goals of energy 
security and sustainability. The partnership consists of EU Member States and 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordon, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) and its 
origins date back to 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs (Directorate General for Energy and Transport, 2008). The 
Barcelona Declaration adopted at the conference offered three main spheres of 
partnership (political and security dialogue, economic and financial partnership 
and social, cultural and human partnership) with the target of creating a common, 
secure area of peace and stability, a free trade area with economic opportunities 
where intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding would prevail between 
religions and people (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership refers to energy under the Economic 
and Financial Partnership and concentrates on harmonization of energy markets in 
the Euromed region, promotion of sustainable development and on infrastructure 
extension, investment financing, as well as research and development programs 
(Final Statement of Marseille Meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, 2008: 9). Accordingly, the priorities of EUROMED Energy 
Partnership evolve around these principles and aim to: 
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• “Accelerate reform in the countries on the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean with a view to the 
gradual integration of the Euromed electricity and 
gas markets 
• Increase security and safety of energy supplies, 
infrastructure and oil shipping 
• Strengthen energy interconnections (both South-
South and North-South)” (Directorate General for 
Energy and Transport, 2008: 5).  
 
In 17 December 2007, at the Euromed Energy Ministerial Conference, in line with 
the identified objectives, the participants of the Partnership decided on an Energy 
Action Plan covering the period between the years 2008-2013. The process is still 
ongoing.   
 
 
3.2.4. Caspian Region 
 
 Caspian region refers to five Caspian littoral states namely, Azerbaijan, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia. Due to its critical position in EU’s 
energy security, the relations with Russia will be separately examined in the 
following section. However, researches indicate that, in total the proven oil 
reserves of these five countries reach to 259 billion barrels and gas reserves are 
approximately 2,888.6 trillion cubic feet (Amineh and Houweling, 2007: 366). 
   The critical point about the region is the legal status of the Caspian Sea. 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the determination of official sea 
boundary between the states emerged as a question. No agreement has been 
reached between the littoral states concerning the debate on whether the subject 
matter is a “lake or sea”. This identification is necessary because, if the Caspian is 
a sea, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
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(UNCLOS), bordering countries will be able to claim “12 miles from the shore as 
their territorial waters and beyond that a 200-mile exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ)” and this will cause an “uneven distribution of oil and natural gas resources 
in the basin”. Consequently without a concrete decision, a “de facto regime” is 
emerging in the area with international oil and gas companies engaging in 
agreements with littoral countries. Apart from the legal status of the potential 
reserves, the fact that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are landlocked 
states, the construction of oil and natural gas transit routes create a further 
challenge for the region (Bahgat, 2006: 972).  
  The institutionalization of the European Union’s energy relations with this 
group of countries dates back to 1995, to the INOGATE, Interstate Oil and Gas 
Transport to Europe program.  INOGATE targets the promotion of “European 
investment in Caspian Sea/Central Asian states in return for their cooperation in 
supplying energy to the EU member states”. In February 2001, the INOGATE 
Umbrella Agreement came into force in order to systematize institutional and legal 
settings of the circumstances necessary for “the development of interstate oil and 
gas transportation systems” and for the encouragement of “the investment 
necessary for their construction and operation” (Bahgat, 2006: 971).  In 2004 Baku 
Initiative was launched in order to develop “regional energy markets and network 
interconnections in the Caspian and Central Asia”. The initiative was in fact a 
bargaining which traded European funding and investments in return for 
guaranteed energy supplies to Europe. Similarly, the Black Sea initiative in 2006 
as well addressed the region and proposed “sub regional energy markets in the 
Caspian Basin, Caucasus and Central Asia through a EU-Black Sea-Caspian Sea 
Common Energy House”. With these initiatives, the Union planned to create a 
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region which operated on the basis of Europe’s internal market principles (Youngs, 
2007b: 3-4).  
 Additionally, the Union concluded Memorandum of Understanding with 
Azerbaijan in 2006, with Kazakhstan in 2006 and with Turkmenistan in 2008 for 
the encouragement of cooperation in the field of energy. The European Union 
intents to cooperate with these Central Asian countries for the development of 
Caspian Sea- Black Sea- EU energy transport corridor. In that respect, MoUs refer 
to the supply-demand correlations and to the common energy security challenges 
for the EU and these countries which can be addressed through diversification of 
export routes. In that respect “the deepening of energy market reforms, the 
development and modernization of energy infrastructures, energy efficiency, 
energy savings, the use of renewable energy sources” and environment friendly 
technologies to combat climate change constitute the key concerns addressed in 
MoUs. Consequently, new investments in the region emerge as a necessity and the 
creation of “attractive, stable equitable and transparent” conditions with related 
legal and financial arrangements are mutually accepted preconditions to boost 
investment (European Union, 2006a; 2006b; 2008).  
 The success of the dialogue with these states depends on the future supply, 
demand and investment trends in the region. Still, energy outstands as the main 
item among the imports from the region. According to 2008 data, mineral fuels 
stand for 99% among the imports from Azerbaijan (Directorate General for Trade, 
2009a), 60.5% for imports from Turkmenistan (Directorate General for Trade, 
2009i), 86.2% for imports from Kazakhstan (Directorate General for Trade 2009d) 
and 88.2% for imports from Iran (Directorate General for Trade 2009b). 
Nevertheless, mineral fuels imported from the region represent very small shares 
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among total imports of EU from the world market. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Iran correspond to only 2.3%, 0.3%, 3.4 % and 2.8% of EU’s total 
imports, respectively. Compared with the region’s oil and gas reserves, these 
results indicate that the potential of these countries is not being efficiently used, 
yet.  
 As Youngs (2007b: 12-13) points out as well, it should be noted that, 
unlike agreements under the European Neighbourhood Policy, bilateral energy 
agreements, especially the ones with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan “delink” energy 
from democracy and human rights clauses. EU programs, which focus on 
governance, security and trafficking issues, being limited; broader EU policies 
addressing the Region’s political and security requirements are needed for better 
results in the context of future energy security.  
 
 
3.2.5. Russia 
 
 According to 2008 data, Russia accounts for 12.3 % of world’s total oil 
production with 485 Mt, being second major oil producer after Saudi Arabia. For 
natural gas, Russia is the world’s number one gas producer with 657 bcm which 
equals to 20.9% of world’s total natural gas production (International Energy 
Agency, 2009: 11, 13). Besides, for European Union, Russia represents largest 
amounts of oil and natural gas supplies. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, in 2006, 
imports from Russia cover 33.5% of total oil imports and 42% of total natural gas 
imports. The EU’s efforts for diversification do not seem capable of changing 
Russia’s special energy supplier status for Europe. As Solana (2006: 3) pointed out 
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as well, “Russia will be the mainstay of (EU) energy imports”. This distinguishes 
Russia from other energy partners and urges the Union to develop a special 
partnership with it, as part of EU energy security strategy. 
 It is also worth noting that, apart from EU’s high dependency, another 
related feature that distinguishes Russia from other suppliers is it catalyzing effect 
on European Energy Policy. In January 2006, Russia and Ukraine involved into a 
gas dispute due to Gazprom’s intention to increase gas prices and apply “market 
rules” to former Soviet countries, which previously enjoyed subsidized prices. 
This price crisis between the supplier and transit country, led to a decrease of 14-
40 % in Gazprom’s deliveries to Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Romania, France, 
Poland and Italy. For European officials this did not only damaged Russia’s 
reliability as an energy supplier but also raised doubts about Russia intentions of 
using energy supplies as a political weapon (Bahgat, 2006: 961-962; BBC News, 
2006). Diverging views on whether Russia’s motivations are purely economic or 
political are subject of a deeper discussion about the issue. However, what is for 
sure is that this crisis definitely accelerated the EU’s efforts for creating a 
European Energy Policy which would lead Europe to energy security. As Lynch 
(2006: 5) pointed out: “Crises are salutary moments. They reveal distinct trends 
that were difficult to highlight beforehand”. Consequently, January 2006 remained 
as a milestone in the evolution of European Energy Policy, where the Union 
acknowledged its vulnerability.  
 When Russia’s internal energy sector is examined the most outstanding 
feature is state’s control over resources. Russia’s oil exports are under the 
jurisdiction of Transneft which is Russia’s state owned pipeline monopoly. 
Concerning the oil exports to European countries, Druzhba Pipeline, the Baltic 
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Pipeline System (BPS) and Adria Pipeline link the two regions. Druzhba pipeline 
consists of two sections: “one running through Belarus, Poland and Germany; the 
other through Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary” 
(Bahgat, 2006: 969). BPS which became operational in 2001 carries oil from 
“Russia’s West Siberian and Timan-Pechora oil provinces” to Primosk in the 
Russian Gulf of Finland. Adria pipeline, situated between Croatia and Hungary 
was finished in 1974 with the initial aim to bring Middle Eastern oil to Yugoslavia 
and Hungary through Croatia. Nevertheless, the flow of the pipeline was reversed 
due to its interconnection with Russian system with increasing production. This 
gave Russia a “new export outlet on the Adriatic Sea” (Energy Information 
Administration, 2008b: 5-6). 
 Concerning the natural gas sector, again a state run monopoly, Gazprom 
accounts for almost 90% of Russian natural gas production and controls the 
country’s gas exports. Russia has an increasing trend for natural gas exports to 
European Union, Turkey, Japan and some Asian countries. For the westward 
exports, Yamal-Europe pipeline (from Russia to Poland and Germany via Belarus) 
and the Blue Stream (from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea) are among the 
significant export routes (Bahgat, 2006: 970). Moreover, a new pipeline, namely 
Nord Stream is under way and planned to deliver gas by the year 2011. The 
pipeline will connect Russian Baltic Sea coast with the German Baltic Sea shore 
and will transport gas to energy markets of Germany, Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and the Czech Republic (Nord Stream, 
2008: 1-3).  
 The institutionalization of EU-Russia relationship concerning energy can 
be identified by three main legal grounds: European Energy Charter, EU-Russia 
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Energy Dialogue and “Four Common Spaces”. However, the initial move which 
transformed this relationship into a “partnership” is the ten year bilateral treaty 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which came into force in 1997 
(Kausch, 2007: 2). The Agreement made legal arrangements concerning “political 
dialogue, trade and cooperation in economic matters, justice and home affairs and 
bilateral cooperation” (Hadfield, 2008: 233). Article 65 of the Agreement directly 
addresses energy and offers cooperation in issues such as supply security, 
infrastructure, energy efficiency and formulation of energy policy (European 
Commission, 1997).  
 Concerning the external dimension of European Energy Policy, The Energy 
Charter is one of the major platforms for the Union to institutionalize its energy 
relations with third parties. However, Russia’s non-ratification of the treaty 
renders its provisions inapplicable for energy trade with the country. On 20 August 
2009, Russian Federation officially declared that it does not intend to become a 
contracting party to the ETC (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2009). The ECT 
regulates energy transit matters and it would allow European importers to buy oil 
and gas from independent suppliers (other than Russia’s state owned monopoly 
Gazprom) such as Novatek, Lukoil or Rosneft, which would gain access to 
pipelines if Russia had ratified the treaty (Geden et al., 2006: 17).  
 Due to Russia’s non-ratification of Energy Charter Treaty, the relationship 
between EU and Russia has to be conducted in another platform. EU-Russia 
Summits compensated this deficiency and helped to increase the coordination 
between the parties. On the sixth EU-Russia Summit realized in Paris on the 30th 
of October 2000, the parties agreed on engaging into an Energy Dialogue for better 
identification and arrangement of EU-Russia Energy Partnership. The main 
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objective of the dialogue is “to enhance the energy security of the European 
continent by binding Russia and the EU into a closer relationship” through the 
emphasis of the strong mutual dependency. Accordingly, areas of common 
interests in the energy sector are identified within the context of energy dialogue 
and with the targeted partnership developments are expected to be achieved 
concerning energy efficiency, energy savings, opening up of energy markets, 
improvement of environmentally friendly technologies and most importantly 
enhancement and expansion of energy production, transportation and investment 
conditions in Russia. To these ends, EU-Russia Energy Dialogue constitutes a 
forum for the participation of several actors such as Russian government 
representatives, the Commission, EU members, EIB, EBRD and EU/ Russian 
energy companies (European Union Press Releases, 2009b).  
 Despite the Energy Dialogue and high volume of energy trade which 
renders the two parties highly interdependent, Russia outstands as a challenging 
international partner for EU. To illustrate, in addition to its firm stance against 
ECT, unlike EU’s other neighbours, Russia rejected also becoming a part of 
European Neighbourhood Policy. EU’s efforts to incorporate Russia into the ENP, 
was conceived “as a step that made Russia feel once again like a mere object of the 
CFSP, whereas it saw its role as that of a proper strategic partner” (Spetschinsky, 
2007: 157 quoted in Hadfield, 2008: 245). This signaled the reality that the EU’s 
strategy of treating Russia like “just another state” would remain fruitless due to 
Russia’s expectations of special treatment. After ENP was rejected by Russia, in 
order to supplement PCA, in May 2003, EU and Russia decided to set a 
framework for cooperation. As the name suggested the new framework “Four 
Common Spaces” focused on four main areas: economy, foreign and security 
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policy, justice and home affairs, and culture, information and education” (Kausch, 
2007: 2, 9), energy being included under the economy section.  
 Unfortunately, PCA, Energy Dialogue or Four Common Spaces did not 
succeed in totally eliminating energy related tensions between EU and Russia. 
Moreover, the two Ukraine-Russian supply crises in 2006 and 20093 contributed to 
EU’s concerns for energy security.  
As a consequence, in line with the vital importance of uninterrupted energy 
supplies and with the need to minimize negative consequences of potential supply 
crises, during the EU-Russia Summit held in Khabarovsk on 21-22 May 2009 the 
participants discussed ways to deal with crises (European Union Press Releases, 
2009c). On 16 November 2009, Coordinators of EU-Russia Energy dialogue 
signed a Memorandum on an Early Warning Mechanism. The Memorandum 
targets the “early evaluation of potential risks and problems related to the supply 
and demand of natural gas, oil and electricity”. Moreover, the parties also agreed 
on preventing and rapidly reacting concerning the threat of emergency situation 
which was further clarified as “a situation with a significant disruption/ physical 
interruption of supply of natural gas, oil and electricity from the Russian 
Federation to the Territory of the European Union, including supplies transiting 
through third countries” (European Union, 2009: 1). The President of the European 
Commission, Barroso interpreted the Memorandum as a “clear evidence of the 
goodwill of both sides to work together in a trustworthy and mutually beneficial 
manner, building ways to prevent and solve problems even before they happen” 
(European Union Press Releases, 2009d).  
                                                
3
 Due to a commercial disagreement between Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz, between 6 and 20 
January 2009, Russia’s gas supplies to Europe via Ukraine were interrupted. EU Members were 
deprived of 20% of their natural gas supplies (European Commission, 2009).  
 96 
Unfortunately, the case with Russia is more complicated than just simple 
management of energy dependency and energy cooperation, since “the fact that 
Russia is investing heavily in future leverage and not enough in future production” 
creates a deeper challenge for energy supply security (Solana, 2006: 3). Experts 
argue that Ukranian gas disputes distorted EU’s attention from the deeper problem. 
As Kausch (2007: 2) argued: “Europe’s major problem is much less Russia’s 
willingness to supply energy than its future ability to do so due to lack of 
investment in opening up new fields, transport links and general infrastructure”. 
There is growing concern that Russia risks to fail covering both domestic 
consumption and rising export commitments with its current capacity, because of 
decaying infrastructure, rapidly declining oil fields and lack of development of 
new gas fields (Bahgat, 2006: 970; Grant and Barysch, 2003: 2).  Besides, the 
Russian pipeline export capacity as well, remains limited to meet the increased 
production of the country as well as to meet the growing demand of importers. 
 Accordingly, for natural gas, in order to be capable of supplying necessary 
amounts, Gazprom 4  needs to invest in the development of new fields to 
compensate for declining production in its “Big Three” (Yamburg, Urengoy and 
Medvezh’ye) which offers at least 60% of Russia’s total production (Goldthau, 
2008: 689). According to International Energy Agency (2003, quoted in Bahgat, 
2006: 969), Russia’s oil industry is in need of an investment of $328 billion and its 
natural gas sector requires $330 billion for the time period between 2001 and 2030. 
To cover the necessary investments, Russia needs the capacity to attract European 
                                                
4
 Gazprom’s projected production for 2020 is 580-590 bcm. To meet the demand, this amount has 
to be complemented with the increase in non-Gazprom production with an amount of 140-150 bcm 
in 2020. Nevertheless, since only Gazprom has the access to export pipelines, producing only for 
domestic market does not offer enough profit and incentives for independent gas producers, which 
are discouraged to invest more and increase their production (Goldthau, 2008: 689). 
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oil and gas companies and Europe, to cover its oil and gas demands, needs for 
secure pipeline systems and uninterrupted energy supplies of Russia. Consequently, 
the relationship between EU and Russia can be defined as a “simple bargain: 
Europe’s investment in return for Russia’s oil and gas” (Bahgat, 2006: 969). Still, 
there is a mismatch between EU’s market liberalization and Russia’s monopolist, 
“controller state” point of view. Despite the need for heavy investments, Russia’s 
hostility to foreign direct investment is outstanding. Russia applies a quota on 
foreign shareholder value which strictly limits the control of assets by foreign 
investors (Kausch, 2007: 5).  
To conclude, EU-Russia energy relationship is made up of both cooperative 
achievements and discouraging hurdles. The interdependence between the Union 
and Russia is may be the unique point where the two sides are in agreement. 
Benford (2006: 45) argues that: “Gazprom’s need for revenue from European gas 
exports constitute the single most important factor in guaranteeing European 
energy security”. As indicated by the Commission (2008: 8) too, what remains for 
the Union to do as part of its external energy policy is then, to emphasize this 
interdependence and to deepen legally binding procedures which lead the way 
towards joint energy projects with Russia.  
 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
The majority of the Union’s energy consumption is covered by imported oil 
and natural gas. Moreover, this import dependency is projected to further increase 
in coming decades, rendering the EU more vulnerable to external dynamics which 
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affect energy supplies. Accordingly, this chapter analyzed the external dimension 
of European Energy Policy. It discussed EU’s major policies in order to deal with 
external supply challenges and achieve the objective of supply security. The 
chapter emphasized that external dimension of energy security cannot be attained 
through unilateral efforts and it is highly affected by energy policies of oil and gas 
supplier countries. Consequently, special focus was dedicated to EU’s energy 
relations with its major energy suppliers.  
In the overall evaluation of EU’s external energy policy, market 
liberalization and extension of EU’s internal market principles to supplier and 
transit states emerge as crucial policy options to reach the “trinity” of 
sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply. However, as the case with 
Russia indicated as well, these efforts are not always welcomed by energy 
supplying states and EU’s efforts for market liberalization are not always counter 
balanced by reciprocal policies. As response to these “uncooperative” suppliers, 
the most feasible solution for EU is to increase its ability to diversify its suppliers 
and energy transit routes, which could both decrease the dependency on single 
supplier and by-pass problematic regions through alternative transit pipelines.  
Russia, being the number one oil and gas supplier to the EU and leading 
actor of two major gas crises in 2006 and 2009, is the biggest source of anxiety for 
Europe’s energy security consideration. Nevertheless, both exporter and importers 
operate in an international energy market where competition and uncertainty 
(about supply and demand security) prevails the environment. It is true that this 
urges the EU to search for other suppliers and energy suppliers, notably Russia, to 
seek new markets (Hadfield, 2008: 243).  What is important to acknowledge is the 
fact that, the EU’s potential as an energy market lowers the incentives of major 
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suppliers to de-link themselves from European energy consumers (Spanjer, 2007: 
2891). In that respect, minimizing transit risks and establishment of alternative 
transit routes require special interest both for the part of EU and for suppliers 
which want to protect and increase their share in the European markets.  
To sum up, diversification of suppliers does not only refer to increased 
cooperation with suppliers and investment in extraction and production activities. 
Just like perfect circulation of blood vessels is the crucial component of health, 
uninterrupted transmission of oil and natural gas is the vital element of energy 
security. Consequently, transit countries turn out to be as important as suppliers, in 
the efforts to create an effective energy policy. Taking these remarks into account, 
one clear conclusion is that Europe stands as a large market in need of new oil and 
gas supplies; Russia, Central Asian and Caspian Countries, as well as potential 
suppliers in the North Africa and Middle East stand as exporters which have the 
potential to diversify Europe’s energy profile. The picture is clear yet incomplete, 
until there is clear reference to the “bridge” that will link the “demand and supply”. 
At the map, in the middle of these “blocks”, Turkey winks at European policy 
makers as a potential solution for European energy security concerns. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
TURKEY’S ROLE AS A TRANS-EUROPEAN ENERGY 
CORRIDOR 
 
 
 
Diversification of supply sources stands at the core of European policies 
offered to manage the potential vulnerabilities due to the EU’s high reliance on oil 
and gas imports. Nonetheless, despite efforts for greater diversification, Caspian 
Region, Middle East, North Africa and Russia remain as the major oil and gas 
suppliers for the European Union. This fact highlights the significance of 
diversification of transit routes to bypass problematic regions and renders 
alternative transit routes more attractive assigning a strategic importance to the 
transit countries. In this context, with its strategic location situated between 
European energy markets and major energy producers, Turkey offers an 
advantageous energy corridor for Europe (Nies, 2004; Tekin and Walterova, 2007). 
Particularly, concerning EU-Russian energy relations, in order to import non-
Russian energy supplies, Turkey’s potential value as a relatively secure and 
independent route is acknowledged by the Union (Tekin & Walterova 2007). This 
 101 
chapter analyses the geostrategic role of Turkey as an energy transit corridor for 
alternative energy supplies to Europe. 
Turkey’s potential to become an important energy import route for Europe 
which would increase the Union’s energy security through diversified pipeline 
systems originates in its “ability and willingness to develop major transit systems” 
for both oil and natural gas coming from various regions such as Caspian, Central 
Asia, The Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean.  To be more specific Turkey is situated 
near regions which possess 71.8% and 72.7% of world’s proven gas and oil 
reserves, respectively (Roberts, 2004: 18). Moreover, according to the report of 
Energy Information Administration (2009b: 6) for natural gas, Turkey’s transit 
potential reaches 3.359 Tcf5. Thus, Turkey’s special location “from which the EU 
can play a larger role in ensuring energy security not only in relation to Persian 
Gulf, but also vis-à-vis the Caspian Basin and indirectly Russia” (Tekin and 
Williams, 2009b: 422) offers a feasible opportunity for supply security in the 
context of European Energy Policy. 
 
 
4.1 Turkey’s Existing and Planned Pipeline Systems 
 
Its geographical position in the middle of large European markets on the 
one side and a variety of suppliers on the other side, provide Turkey the function 
of a “natural corridor” which can be developed to operate as an energy bridge. 
Accordingly, becoming a pipeline-based transit country is an active strategy of 
                                                
5
 1.659 Tcf from Russia, 1.024 Tcf from Iran, 254 Tcf from Saudi Arabia, 113 Tcf from Iraq, 109 
Tcf from Kazakhstan, 102 Tcf from Turkmenistan, 56 Tcf from Caspian Sea and 42 Tcf from 
Egypt.  
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Turkey as indicated by Roberts (2004:19) too: “with the EU already in receipt of 
large volumes of gas from the three main sources—Russia, the North Sea and 
North Africa—Turkey’s goal is to become Europe’s fourth main artery.” 
Nevertheless, this position cannot be attained unless necessary infrastructure 
capable of transferring required amount of gas and oil (needed for both the 
country’s domestic consumption and for the export to European markets) is 
established. Accordingly, the following section describes the existing and planned 
pipeline systems in Turkey. 
 
 
4.1.1. Existing Pipeline System 
 
The East-West corridor and North-South corridor constitute Turkey’s two 
major corridors of energy transport system6. The East-West corridor originates 
from the Caspian, Iranian and Iraqi energy producing areas and passing via Turkey 
it transfers oil and gas to locations in Europe. It specifically aims to transport 
energy resources from these diverse suppliers to consumers in the Western markets, 
through the activation of alternative routes which bypass Russia (İpek, 2006: 2-3). 
An essential component of the East-West corridor is the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Pipeline, which connects Azerbaijan through Georgia to the 
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in Turkey. With its length of 1.768 kilometers, in 
June 2006 the pipeline became operational to transfer crude oil extracted from 
offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea to the world market (British Petroleum). 
BTC Pipeline is the first pipeline which transports oil from Caspian to the 
                                                
6
 Turkey’s existing pipeline system is illustrated by a map which can be found on page 170, 
Appendix A. 
 103 
Mediterranean coast without going through Russian soil or without passing 
through the Turkish Straits. Concerning the dynamics of the region, security 
overweighed as a key aspect in the design of the project and as a precaution to 
potential sabotage activities, entire pipeline was buried (Energy Information 
Administration, 2009b: 3). While Russia opposed the project, it was politically 
supported both by the United States and the European Union. The BTC Pipeline, 
did not only demonstrate Turkey’s determination to become an energy bridge but 
also it represented a strategic step for the East-West energy corridor as it 
connected land-locked Azerbaijan to Western energy markets through Georgia, 
enhancing the political and economic confidence of these countries (İpek, 2006: 2-
3). 
An additional route in the East-West energy corridor is the Kirkuk-
Ceyhan Oil Pipeline transporting oil from Iraq to the Ceyhan (Yumurtalık) 
Marine Terminal. The first phase which became operational in May 1977, extends 
986 kilometer long and was Iraq’s largest crude oil export pipeline with an annual 
capacity of 35 Million tons. This capacity was enhanced to reach the total of 70.9 
million tons per year, through the construction of an additional, parallel line in 
1987. After the Kuwait war in 1990 the pipeline’s operation was suspended 
(BOTAŞ, 2008). Since the year 2003, the pipeline has been used only sporadically 
due to sabotage attacks which gained momentum with the Iraq War (Energy 
Information Administration, 2006: 3). The functioning of the pipeline will be 
automatically affected by the future political stability in the region. The extraction 
activities as well as supplies are projected to gradually increase as the violence in 
Iraq decreases (Energy Information Administration, 2009b: 3). 
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In the East-West energy transit system, these oil pipelines are accompanied 
by three gas pipelines. The South Caucasus Natural Gas Pipeline (SCP) or 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Pipeline is one of them. It is owned by the South 
Caucasus Pipeline Company led by a consortium of BP, Statoil and other 
companies including Gazprom.  It extends parallel to the BTC pipeline until it 
transmits gas from the Shah Deniz gas field of Azerbaijan, situated in the south of 
the Caspian Sea, into Turkey’s national gas grid in eastern town of Erzurum.  The 
initial capacity of the pipeline is 8.8 bcm of gas per year, but the total capacity 
could reach 20 bcm per year after 2012, thus becoming the most noteworthy route 
of export from gas rich Caspian region (Alekperov, 2004: 120).  The gas delivery 
commenced by the end of 2006. Currently the pipeline provides gas for Georgia 
and Turkey, but in the long run the aim is to connect it with the European markets 
too, through the planned Nabucco project.    
The second gas pipeline is Iran-Turkey natural gas pipeline, which has 
been in operation since 2001. The pipeline delivers gas from Iran’s north-western 
city of Tabriz to Turkey’s capital Ankara. The flow of gas supplies from the 
pipeline has been subject to several disruptions due to disputes between the two 
parties or due to unilateral decision by Iran especially in winter, in line with Iran’s 
own demand increases (Energy Information Administration, 2009b: 7).  Through 
this pipeline the Iranian gas is envisioned to become a supply source for the 
planned Nabucco project. However, the improvement of Iran-West relations is 
considered as a precondition for such a possibility.   
In the East-West corridor is Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector is the 
third natural gas pipeline. The agreement for the construction of the first phase of 
the project was signed in 2003 between Turkey and Greece and the pipeline was 
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brought into being between 2005 and 2007, and inaugurated in 2007. The pipeline 
is 300 km long, 209 of which being situated in the Turkish territory and its current 
capacity is 7 billion bcm of gas per year (BOTAŞ, 2008). As the second phase 
connects Greece and Italy by 2012, the capacity will be expanded to 11 billion. 
The Turkey- Greece- Italy Interconnector has been envisioned as an essential part 
of the Southern European Gas Ring Project, which was designed for bringing 
natural gas originating from Caspian Basin, Russia, Middle East and Southern 
Mediterranean countries into the European energy markets (BOTAŞ, 2008). The 
pipeline represented an important stepping stone for the plans to deliver gas from 
the Caspian area via Turkey to Europe.   
In the East-West direction, these pipelines are instrumental for energy 
transits. However, Turkey also has important energy routes in the North-South 
corridor. Concerning natural gas, one of them is The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline. 
This pipeline with a length of 750 miles, carries natural gas from Russia to Turkey, 
reaching to the port of Samsun and extending to Ankara. 246 miles of the project 
passes underneath the Black Sea. With an estimated cost of $3.2 billion, Russia’s 
Gazprom, Italy’s Eni and Botaş conducted the project and in November 2005, the 
accomplishment of Blue Stream Pipeline was celebrated. Although the original 
aim of Blue Stream is to serve to the Turkish domestic needs, the project can be 
extended and can offer a “ready-to-use gas transmission corridor” for new projects. 
In that context Blue Stream 2 is under consideration as an additional transit route 
to Middle East, Israel and other countries (Energy Information Administration, 
2006: 7; Gazprom, 2009).  
In the North-South corridor, there is also an oil pipeline project in the 
construction phase: Trans Anatolian Pipeline or Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline.  The 
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project is based on the construction of an oil transportation line from the Black Sea 
Turkish Coast near Samsun to the Mediterranean oil terminal in Ceyhan. The 
project is carried out by Italian Eni and Turkish Çalık Enerji, which acquired 
license for contruction in 2006, from the Turkish Government. This is a 550 km-
long pipeline with an estimated capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day. The 
fundamental reason which led to the construction of this pipeline is to by-pass the 
straits. Since the oil tankers’ traffic in the straits constitutes serious environmental 
threat, there is growing concern on the part of Turkish officials. Accordingly, this 
project is considered as a solution which could decrease the traffic in the straits 
(International Energy Agency, 2006).  
The aforementioned pipelines constitute North-South and East-West energy 
pipeline system of Turkey. Turkey’s ambitious purpose of becoming Europe’s 
forth energy artery is directly related to the functioning of these pipelines with 
necessary capacities. Nevertheless, the increase of oil and gas outputs passing 
through Turkey towards Europe can be achieved only through the reinforcement of 
existing pipeline system with several projects designed with the purpose of 
bringing natural gas to Turkey and transporting it from Turkey (Roberts, 2004: 23). 
The following section will focus on new pipeline projects which will be 
instrumental in strengthening Turkey’s position as an energy bridge, linking the 
EU to diversified energy supplies.  
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4.1.2 Projects in the Planning Stages 
 
The projects in the planning stages consist of Trans Caspian Pipelines, 
Arab Gas Pipeline, and Nabucco. The first two projects are designed to connect 
energy producing countries with the Turkish pipeline grid whereas Nabucco is 
planned to link Turkey’s energy transit system with the European energy markets 
for consumer countries. 
 
 
4.1.2.1. Trans Caspian Pipeline Projects 
 
Trans Caspian Pipeline Projects can be both evaluated as an oil or natural 
gas pipeline. The Projects are supposed to link Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan to 
Azerbaijan passing underneath the Caspian Sea. From there, a potential oil 
pipeline is planned to be linked to the Baku- Tbilisi- Ceyhan Pipeline in order to 
reach the Mediterranean Coast. On the other hand, a natural gas pipeline, in the 
context of these projects, is considered for transporting gas through the South 
Caucasus Gas Pipeline into Erzurum in Turkey, by passing Russia and Iran and for 
reaching European markets via the Nabucco pipeline which will be examined in 
the following sections (Fishelson, 2007). In October 1998, between Turkey and 
Turkmenistan, a Framework Agreement was signed in order to implement the 
Turkmenistan- Turkey- Europe Natural Gas Pipeline Project. Consequently, 30 
bcm of Turkmen gas would be supplied through this pipeline: 16 bcm for Turkey 
and the remaining amount for Europe. One year later in May 1999, this projected 
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capacity of 16 bcm/year supply of natural gas for Turkey has been guaranteed for 
30 years by Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Agreement (BOTAŞ, 2008).  
Nevertheless, the progress concerning the project stopped due to the lack of 
political and economic reforms in Turkmenistan which resulted in the financial 
withdrawal of Western firms (İpek, 2006: 4). To illustrate, while in 1990s Shell 
and BP were active firms in Turkmenistan, due to the protectionist government 
regulations, they have lost their enthusiasm to increase their investments. 
Accordingly, the need for initial investment for the Trans Caspian Pipeline 
Projects stands as a major handicap. Additionally, because of the unresolved legal 
status of the Caspian Sea also the project has never gained momentum (Fishelson, 
2007).  
 
 
4.1.2.2. Arab Gas Pipeline Project 
 
The Arab Gas Pipeline connecting El Arish in Egypt and Kilis in Turkey is 
another planned project. Originally the pipeline constitutes an export route 
between Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The opening of the first phase of the pipeline 
dates back to 2003, linking Egypt to Aqaba in Jordan. An additional part with a 
length of 393 kilometer traversing Jordan and reaching near the Syrian border 
constitutes the second phase (MEED, 2005). The third phase of the project, 
completed in 2008, refers to Jordan- Syria section which extends for 324 
kilometers. With these already constructed parts, Egypt projects to export between 
32.2 and 77.3 bcf of natural gas by the year 2013 (Energy Information 
Administration, 2008a:5).  
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The Arab Gas Pipeline gained a significant European interest when Energy 
Ministers of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Deputy Trade Minister of 
Romania signed an agreement in March 2006. Accordingly, the parties decided to 
extend the Arab Gas Pipeline to Turkey in order to linking it with the Nabucco 
project, which would allow transporting Egyptian natural gas to European markets 
(Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, 2006). The project gained impetus when in 
2008 another agreement between Turkey and Syria was signed for the construction 
of the final stage of Arab Gas Pipeline which would connect Aleppo in Syria and 
Kilis in Turkey with an extension of 63 kilometers (Euro- Arab Mashreq Gas 
Cooperation Centre, 2007: 1). The agreement built on the previous one of 2006 
and indicated that by the year 2011, Arab Gas Pipeline would be connected to the 
Turkish natural gas grid, and would export gas to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania 
and Hungary (Energy Information Administration, 2008a: 5; Çimen, 2009: 12).  
It should also be noted that in 2004, Iraq has been accepted to join the 
project with Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in order to export Iraqi natural gas 
to Europe via Arab Gas Pipeline (Gulf Oil and Gas, 2004). With the inclusion of 
Iraq and Turkey, the potential of the project in contributing to European energy 
security was acknowledged by the European Commission as well. On May 2008, 
the Commission released a press declaration indicating its support to the project 
(ABHaber, 2008). Nevertheless, Egypt’s eagerness to develop LNG systems and 
its interest to export its gas as LNG will be instrumental in the future success of 
the project concerning gas supplies to Europe (Ramsay, 2006: 8).  
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4.1.2.3. Nabucco 
 
Nabucco project differs from other planned pipelines. Trans Caspian 
Pipeline and Arab Gas Pipeline Projects are designed to link Turkey to producers 
in Caspian and Middle Eastern regions. Nevertheless, unless these projects are 
somehow connected to European natural gas grid, they would remain insignificant 
in the context of European energy supply security. In that respect, Nabucco is the 
crucial project that creates this connection and strengthens Turkey’s position as an 
energy corridor for Europe7. As Aras and İşeri (2009: 3) highlight as well, once 
completed Nabucco will become a vital component of the East-West energy 
corridor and it will be instrumental in diversifying supplies to Europe away from 
Russia to alternative producers.  
The project refers to the construction of a new pipeline which will connect 
Caspian region, Middle East and Egypt via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary to Austria and from there to other central European gas markets8. The 
pipeline starts from the Georgia- Turkey and/ or Iran- Turkey borders and 
terminates in Baumgarten, reaching to 3.300 km in total9. Market studies indicate 
that the maximum transport capacity of the pipeline will reach 31 bcm/year by the 
year 2020, which is a competitive amount for the project to be preferred for 
covering increasing European gas demand (Nabucco Gas Pipeline International 
GmbH, 2010b: 2, 4). By officials, Nabucco is identified as “unique” for Europe’s 
supply security since it is argued that “no other project” can deliver a gas transport 
                                                
7
 The map on page 172 (Appendix A) demonstrates international gas pipeline projects and it clearly 
indicates how Nabucco operates as the key linkage between energy producers and European 
markets. 
8
 Please see the map “Nabucco Pipeline” on page 171, Appendix A. 
9
 Separate sections of the pipeline are as the following: Turkey 2000km, Bulgaria 400 km, Romania 
460 km, Hungary 390 km and Austria 46 km.  
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volume of 31 bcm by combining diverse resources in the Middle East and Caspian 
region, into the heart of European markets (Nabucco Gas Pipeline International 
GmbH, 2010a: 5). With this capacity, Nabucco pipeline will be capable to supply 
5 to 10% of the Union’s projected gas consumption in 2020 (Aras and İşeri, 2009: 
6).  
The project is conducted by Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH and 
is scheduled to become operational in 2014 with an estimated cost of 7.9 billion 
euros (Aras and İşeri, 2009: 2). The shareholders, each holding 16.67% share, are 
OMV (Austria), MOL (Hungary), Transgaz (Romania), Bulgargaz (Bulgaria), 
BOTAŞ (Turkey) and RWE (Germany) which joined the project in February 2008. 
Therefore, Nabucco project operates on the basis of “multicultural cooperation” 
firstly between these six countries but more importantly with upstream countries 
holding large energy reserves (Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, 2010b: 
1, 8). This has a potential to lead to further dialogue with Caspian and Middle 
Eastern countries which could spill over towards greater stability in their relations 
with the EU.  
The main strategic goals of Nabucco Project are officially declared as the 
following: 
• Opening a new gas supply corridor for Europe and 
for the countries involved in the project, for very 
cost effective gas resources.  
• Raising the transit role of the participating countries 
along the route. 
• Contribution to the security of supply for all partner 
countries, and also for Europe as a whole. 
• Strengthening the role of the gas pipeline grids of 
all Nabucco partners in connection with the 
European gas network (Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
International GmbH, 2010b: 3). 
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In line with these objectives it is possible to conclude that, Nabucco can 
potentially lead to positive effects both for Europe and for supplier countries. For 
Europe, the project will not only increase supply security and strengthen 
competition but also being an alternative transit route, it will mitigate risks related 
to existing transit pipelines and it will increase the interconnectivity of energy 
markets in south east Europe. On the other hand, for suppliers in the Central Asia 
and Middle East, Nabucco will serve to create a broader export portfolio in 
addition to enhanced business activities with Europe and exchange of know-how 
in the gas production and supply chain (Mitschek, 2009).  
 On July 13th 2009, in Ankara an Intergovernmental Agreement was signed 
by Turkey, Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in order to identify legal and 
political framework of gas transits between Turkey and EU members (Nabucco 
Gas Pipeline International GmbH, 2010b: 7). At the ceremony, European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso described Nabucco as "a truly 
European project that will provide energy security to Turkey, to Southeast Europe, 
and to Central Europe" (Lobjakas, 2009).  
 Although the project is evaluated with many positive aspects, sometimes it 
is also criticized with skepticism. To illustrate, the major cause of skepticism is 
based on unclear gas supplies for Nabucco. The unresolved legal status of the 
Caspian Seabed obscures the developments concerning the Trans Caspian Pipeline 
which consequently limits supply capacities of Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan, 
hence decreasing also sufficient supplies for Nabucco. Additionally, Russian plans 
for the construction of South Stream as well leads to question marks since two 
projects in the same region would create an excessive pipeline capacity (Milov, 
2007).  
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Since Nabucco is the major project which transforms Turkey’s “natural 
corridor” position into an active “energy bridge” for Europe, factors affecting 
Nabucco’s success will be automatically instrumental in Turkey’s position. The 
next section will be focusing on these supply-side factors, as well as other 
elements which have the potential to influence Turkey’s role as an energy transit 
corridor, from the perspective of the European Union.  
 
 
4.2. Major Factors Effective on Turkey’s Energy Bridge Position 
 
Existing and planned pipelines will serve to interconnect Turkey with both 
producer countries in an array of regions and with consumer countries in Europe. 
While this offers Turkey a geostrategic advantage, both the EU’s and Turkey’s 
ability to benefit from this energy bridge position, in the context of EU energy 
security, highly depends on the success and amounts of gas and oil transmissions 
into European markets. This section focuses on factors which have a potential to 
affect the success of Turkey’s oil and gas transits. Firstly, supply side factors will 
be clarified since with regards to the producer states in the Caspian region and the 
Middle East there exist an array of problems. Secondly, the challenge coming from 
LNG trade, which can influence producers export preferences, will be explained. 
Thirdly, the issue of Bosphorus will be mentioned and lastly, the Russian question 
will be analysed.  
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4.2.1. Supply Side Hurdles 
 
Supply side hurdles are, as the name suggests, problems originating from 
major producers which supply gas and/or oil to Turkey to be transported to various 
markets beyond Turkey. These problems are merely related with Turkey’s 
international pipelines in the planning or construction phases. Since both Trans-
Caspian and Arab Gas Pipeline projects are projected to be linked to Nabucco at 
some point, it is possible to argue that supply side hurdles are highly relevant to 
Nabucco. When Nabucco project is accomplished, it will be an important 
undertaking that brings gas from the borders of Turkey to the heart of Europe, 
bypassing Russia. The project is also highly supported in Europe as an alternative 
conduit to Russia. However, “Who will supply gas to Nabucco?” is a question 
which still requires an answer and which leads to controversial debates. Therefore, 
since Nabucco is considered as the major project of Turkey which will serve to 
European energy security through offering diversity, its supply problems require a 
closer look.  
One of the major challenges ahead Turkey coming from the supply side is 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea.  As in the previous chapter the part concerning 
the EU’s exernal energy relations with the Caspian region already mentioned, Iran 
and Russia share the legal position that the Caspian Sea is an inland lake rather 
than a sea, allowing only joint control by the littoral states while their position is 
challenged by the joint Azeri, Turkmen and Kazakh view that the Caspian is a sea, 
requiring the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea. 
Since no resolution of the issue has been in sight, efforts of the energy rich 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to build Trans-Caspian energy routes 
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are effectively prevented. The endurance of the problem ensures Russia and Iran 
leverage in their strategies of obstructing cross-Caspian energy transit projects. 
This reduces the likelihood of a compromise between the parties, which could 
bring potential resolution of the issue. 
Ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus also constitute supply-side concerns since 
pipelines coming from the Caspian region can be subject to sabotages in the transit 
states (Winrow, 2005: 89). Ongoing and frozen conflicts in the area have a 
potential to delay the construction of energy transit projects via Turkey. The 
conflicts of the region include, but not limited to, the Chechen bid for 
independence from Russia, multiple ethnic conflicts within Georgia, Ngorno-
Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and conflicts between Russia 
and Georgia, which complicate the stability and security in the region. This 
situation influences the strategic calculations of the Caspian states regarding 
extraction activities and export routes of their resources. Additionally, the insecure 
environment causes reluctance among energy companies to invest significant sums 
of money in the area (International Energy Agency, 2008:46-51). 
Another hurdle from the supply side arises out of the increasing Asian 
(mainly Chinese) demand for energy resources from the Caspian Sea. In the recent 
decade, the rapid economic growth in Asia led to a significant rise in demand for 
energy resources coming especially from the Caspian Sea. India, Japan, South 
Korea and China are growing energy importers in Asia. Among these countries, 
specifically China has become a critical energy actor in the Caspian region and 
Central Asia for two basic reasons. Firstly, the country has a direct access to the 
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region10. Secondly, for Caspian energy producers, China stands for a vital energy 
market with a huge capacity of consumption that rivals the Russian and European 
ones. In 2007, China concluded an agreement with Turkmenistan to import 30 bcm 
of gas per year for a period of 30 years. The agreement was complemented by 
another deal among China, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to build the 
necessary gas pipeline for the transit of the contracted amount of gas. In 
accordance with the agreed volumes of gas, studies indicate that Turkmen gas is 
able to satisfy most of China’s gas import needs by 2020 (International Energy 
Agency, 2008: 21-22). However, due to future uncertainties concerning energy 
supply security, just like the EU, it is normal to expect China to increase its efforts 
for the diversification of suppliers. This intensifies the rivalry over the resources of 
the Caspian region, which will potentially give the producer states of the area a 
bargaining leverage with the consumers. 
Another factor which will affect the diversity and amount of natural gas 
transported via Turkey is Iran-Western relations. Iran possesses the world’s second 
largest proved natural gas reserves after Russia and ranks the 5th in gas production. 
However, despite its large reserves, Iran is only 29th in gas export (CIA, 2009b). 
With this potential, Iranian natural gas is evaluated as a considerable alternative 
source for Nabucco. However, increase in the Iranian gas production is a 
prerequisite. Iran targets to produce 500 bcm gas per year by 2017. Yet such a goal 
is an optimistic one since it entails almost the doubling of the existing average 
growth rate in the gas sector, which necessitates investment amounts that domestic 
                                                
10
 China is increasingly becoming a competitor for European gas not only coming from the Caspian 
Region but also coming from Russia, as well. As Russia’s current production resources are 
decreasing, studies indicate that its future production will materialize in Western Siberia. It is 
suggested that this gives China an advantage over Europe, since its location is better placed for 
Russian exports from these new production areas (Spanjer, 2007: 2896-2897).  
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and foreign investors are not likely to provide (International Energy Agency, 2008: 
26) 
Iran poses as a risky country for investors and this risk mainly emerges out 
of Iran’s tense relationship with the West. Dating back to the 1996 Iran-Libya 
Sanctions, which later became Iran Sanctions Act in 2006, the USA imposes 
sanctions on foreign and domestic firms which invest more than $ 20 million in 
Iranian petroleum resources, which would contribute to the development of the 
country’s energy sector. Additionally, Iran’s refusal to conform with the 
international law concerning nuclear programs also leads to international pressures. 
In this context some restrictions over the country’s financial transactions are 
implemented by the UN Security Council. Overall, increasing tension in Iran’s 
external relations results in a decrease of Western companies’ investments. For 
example, due to increasing political risks in the country, foreign firms which have 
investments in the South Pars region, such as Total, Stateoil Hydro, Shell, and 
Repsol have affirmed in 2008 that they would not invest further (International 
Energy Agency, 2008: 27). Concerning the supply of Iranian gas via Turkey into 
Europe, there is strict opposition from the USA. However, as the state of affairs 
changes, the inclusion of Iran into the Nabucco project will be under consideration, 
as the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan affirmed: “when conditions 
allow” (EurActiv, 2010).  
The last factor which will affect supplies is the future of Iraqi energy. 
Iraq’s natural gas has the potential of becoming another additional source for 
Nabucco. Iraq holds the world’s 4th largest proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, 
Canada and Iran. The country also has the 11th largest proven natural gas reserves 
in the world, which reaches to an amount of 3.17 trillion cubic meters. Iraq’s gas 
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reserves rank higher than those of Kazakhstan (14th), Norway (16th), Egypt (18th), 
Azarbaijan (19th), Uzbekistan (20th), Kuwait (21st) and Canada (22th). Despite this 
potential, Iraq ranks only, by 2009, 58th in production, and 168th in export (CIA, 
2009a). 
Nevertheless, there are concrete efforts in the country to utilise its natural 
gas reserves. To illustrate, in 2009, The United Arab Emirate’s Crescent and its 
affiliate Dana Gas reached an agreement with two Nabucco shareholders MOL (of 
Hungary) and OMV (of Austria), in order to materialize a project of $ 8 billion 
which is designed for developing gas fields in northern Iraq and exporting gas to 
Europe via Nabucco. However, although Baghdad expresses its willingness to 
cooperate with Nabucco project, Iraq’s internal disputes over the control of oil and 
gas reserves and over the control of the money generated from the exports lead to 
uncertainty (Reuters, 2009).  
The international agreement concerning the construction of Nabucco 
pipeline is a significant achievement for Turkey determined to become an energy 
bridge. However, these supply-side factors require attention since they will be 
instrumental in assuring necessary amounts of natural gas which will render 
Nabucco meaningful. Consequently, as Necdet Pamir (Euractiv, 2009d) affirmed 
as well, supplementary agreements with supplier states concerning their 
commitments in the purchase of natural gas is a necessity in order to minimize the 
risks arising from uncertainties.  
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4.2.2. The LNG Challenge 
 
 It should be noted that Turkey’s role as an oil-transit country is important 
rather than vital for global importers because of oil’s greater fungibility (Roberts 
2004, p.19). By contrast, concerning exports for natural gas, Turkey’s “crossroad” 
position in pipeline systems is fundamental for securing alternative supplies. 
However, the LNG factor may threaten this position in the long run. 
Pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) are the two methods used for the 
transportation of natural gas from suppliers to several markets over the world. Due 
to Turkey’s geographical position, in the energy relationship with the EU, 
pipelines are more relevant than LNG. Nevertheless, the significance of Turkish 
pipelines connected to the EU markets is projected to be influenced by the EU’s 
ability and willingness to import LNG (Roberts, 2004: 21).  
 Once initial investments in liquefaction plants and in purpose-built tankers 
are realized, gas converted to liquid becomes available for sea transport and for 
distances of 3.000 km and more, LNG outstands as a competitive alternative to the 
pipeline transportation. To the disadvantage of Turkey, LNG projects overweight 
the agenda of some suppliers such as Egypt and Qatar, compared to the plans for 
extension of pipelines to Turkey. Supplier’s choice between LNG and pipelines 
via Turkey is significant in that the region (more specifically states at the border of 
Persian Gulf) hold 35% of world’s proven natural gas reserves. This is an amount 
that could strengthen Turkey’s position in the energy market if producers do not 
shift to LNG projects that bypass Turkey (Roberts, 2004: 23).  
Roberts (2004:23) argues that the success of projects such as Nabucco that 
connect Turkey to European markets, Turkey’s potential as a new “artery” for 
 120 
larger markets and increasing possibility of uninterrupted, secure connection of 
this highly fragile region to Turkey will be effective in urging the producers to 
prefer Turkey as a transit route, alternative to their LNG exports.  
 
 
4.2.3. The Bosphorus Issue 
 
Both for Turkey, determined to become an energy corridor and for the 
European Union, determined to achieve supply security through sustainable 
policies the Bosphorus requires special attention.  
In 2005, 3.1 billion barrels per day passed through the straits and it was 
reported that half of the passing oil tankers lacked modern standards of oil 
transportation. With the dissolution of USSR and with Russia’s increasing Black 
Sea exports, the traffic in the straits increased as well, resulting in a growth by a 60 
million tones of hazardous cargo passing through the Bosphorus (Nies, 2008: 87; 
Roberts, 2004: 42). To be more specific, throughout the years, number of tankers 
passing through the Bosphorus demonstrated a steady increase. While in 1996 
4248 tankers used the Bosphorus as a transit destination, this number reached to 
10054, 9303 and 9567 for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively 
(Undersecretariat for Maritime Affairs, 2010). Since the right of free passage for 
trade through the Bosphorus, without any restrictions, is guaranteed by the 
Montreux Convention11 (İnan, 2004: 164), Turkey becomes directly subject to the 
                                                
11
 Article 2 paragraph 1 of the Montreux Convention signed in 1936, specifically indicates the 
passage of merchant vessels which “enjoy complete freedom of transit” (İnan, 2004: 164). Further 
analysis of the regime of the straits and an evaluation of the Convention’s provisions can be found 
in the article “The Turkish Straits” by Yüksel İnan. 
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risks of a potential incident12 in the straits (Nies, 2008: 87). As Roberts (2004: 42) 
points out as well, “the prospect of an environmental disaster in the Turkish 
straits” renders the issue more than just an energy transit problem, and adds an 
environment dimension too, which is obviously related to European Energy Policy 
which highlights environmental sustainability as one of three inseparable energy 
security objectives.  
 Nevertheless, energy transit projects planned to bypass the Bosphorus 
remain uncompetitive compared with the free passage through the straits. As 
mentioned earlier Turkey for its part, plans to reduce the oil traffic in the straits up 
to 50% through the Samsun Ceyhan oil pipeline which will transport Russian oil to 
the Mediterranean (Nies, 2008: 90). However, for the part of the EU the issue 
requires more strategic calculations since the Union will have to determine 
“whether it can risk an environmental disaster in wither the Turkish Straits or the 
Aegean” or “whether its own energy security is better served by the maintenance 
of the existing concentration of oil tanker shipping through the straits” (Roberts, 
2004: 45).   
 
 
4.2.4. The Russian Question 
 
Another factor effective on Turkey’s position as a transit country is 
Russia’s attitude towards Turkey and producers in the Caspian region. As Russia 
borders the EU, it has its own direct pipeline route delivering exports into the EU 
                                                
12
 The accidents of Independenta in 1979 and Nassia in 1994 are the major examples for the threats 
faced by the passage of oil tankers. For more information please see “Tarihe Geçen Deniz Kazaları 
ve Önlemler” by Jale Nur Ece.  
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markets. Consequently, it is suggested that Russia is not particularly interested in 
considering Turkey as a transit country for its own natural gas. Therefore, Turkey 
is evaluated as a competitor with Russia in transporting Caspian exports to Europe 
(Roberts, 2004: 21; Tekin and Walterova, 2007: 89), as some argue that the EU 
considers Turkey as an alternative transit route to get access to the Caspian sources, 
bypassing Russia. This triggers the rivalry between Turkey and Russia in the field 
of energy transport and leads Russia to calculate Turkey’s role in its regional 
geopolitical considerations (Tekin and Walterova, 2007: 90). 
The EU affirms that Nabucco and other pipelines transiting Turkey are 
“intended to complement, rather than compete with, Russian pipeline supplies” 
(Roberts, 2004: 21). However, when Turkey’s special geographic position situated 
close to gas producers other than Russia is combined by the willingness of the 
ten13 producers holding 35.5 % of the world’s total reserves, Turkey emerges as 
the perfect piece of the puzzle needed for Europe to diversify its energy supplies 
away from Russia (Roberts, 2004: 21-22). This creates some challenges ahead for 
Turkey concerning Russia. Turkey’s “competitor” status with Russia, causes a 
disadvantaged position due to Turkey’s high natural gas dependency on Russia 
which in turn, weakens its competitiveness (Tekin and Walterova, 2007: 89; Tekin 
and Williams, 2009b: 425). Additionally, this situation urges Russia to promote 
alternative projects which could diminish Nabucco’s significance, namely the 
South Stream, and to approach potential gas suppliers for Nabucco in the Caspian 
with competitive prices.  
For the EU, it would be unrealistic to argue that imports from diversified 
sources via Turkey can totally substitute the gas imported from Russia, rather, it is 
                                                
13
 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Iraq, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia and 
Syria. 
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true that the amounts transported via pipelines passing through Turkey can only 
complement it. Yet, this complementary but alternative route would still lead to a 
competitive market environment causing Gazprom to replace its monopoly with 
more commercial strategies (Roberts, 2004: 39-40), which is in fact, considered as 
the main geostrategic concern causing Russian opposition to projects like Nabucco: 
the fear of loosing control over the energy resources of the region.  
It is supposed that, Caspian states’ hands are empowered by planned 
projects which will create alternative transit routes for the Caspian oil and gas 
exports headed to Europe and China. This view suggests that this allows Caspian 
producers to negotiate better deals with Russia (International Energy Agency, 
2008:44). From another perspective this “price factor” is also considered as a 
deliberate Russian policy to make Nabucco less attractive for the Caspian 
producers by offering higher prices for the region’s gas resources in recent years. 
To illustrate, in March 2008, Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 
decided that the gas trade among them would materialize on the basis of the 
‘European-level prices,’ which is calculated to be what Europe pays for Russian 
gas minus the transportation costs and a Gazprom margin (International Energy 
Agency, 2008:44). Similarly, in 2009 another agreement was signed between 
Russian Gazprom and Azeri SOCAR concerning long-term gas supplies of 
Caspian gas to Russia at market prices. Experts argue that these gas purchases of 
Russia undermine Nabucco project, as these Caspian countries, especially 
Azerbaijan, are the most likely gas suppliers to Nabucco (Euractiv, 2009c).  
 Apart from Russia’s concrete attempts to “gather” Caspian gas, what leads 
to greater concerns for Turkey’s position and for the success of Nabucco is 
Russia’s efforts to construct a new pipeline headed to European markets. In the 
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mid-2007, Gazprom revealed its decision to construct an offshore pipeline, namely 
the South Stream, in the Black Sea, with Italian ENI. The South Stream project, 
with a length of 900 kilometers, starts from Russia Beregovaya compression 
station and reaches to Varna in Bulgaria. The pipeline continues with two braches: 
the southern branch is headed to southern Italy via Greece, and the northern branch 
is linked to northern Italy via Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and/ or Austria (Nies, 
2008: 77).  
It is important to note that concerning the EU members almost the same 
countries, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria, are involved in both Nabucco 
and South Stream projects14. Experts, such as Necdet Pamir, affirm that these two 
projects are “rivals” and indicate that once one of them is constructed, due to both 
financial and supply/demand dynamics the other would be postponed for 15 years 
or would be totally cancelled (Euractiv, 2009d). Consequently, according to Nies 
(2008: 79-80), this situation destabilizes the credibility of both the Union and 
Nabucco project: “If a project is declared to be Community priority yet the 
participants join with the opposing camp, the credibility of the aforementioned 
common project is lost, which hurts Europe’s energy policy”.  
Being world’s number one gas producer on the one side, and being a top 
ranked gas consumer on the other side, Russia and the EU are highly 
interdependent and they have to “determine how they can best serve each other’s 
requirements” (Roberts, 2004: 31). Therefore both Russian efforts to construct a 
new pipeline and EU’s interest in this potential new route make sense. The real 
question is where does Turkey fit into this equation?  
                                                
14
 Please see the map “Nabucco vs. South Stream” on page 171, Appendix A. 
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First of all, it is possible to argue that the EU-Russia and Turkey triangle is 
made up of a strong economic interdependence, indicating that rather than rivalry, 
cooperation would be the real solution in the relations within the scope of this 
triangle. The table below indicates trade partnerships of Turkey, Russia and the 
EU and it deliberately represents only the ranking and percentages of the relevant 
three partners for the sake of emphasizing their significance in each other’s 
external trade. The EU countries, Russia and Turkey are each other’s high ranking 
trade partners. More than half of Russia’s exports are headed to the EU (Market 
Observatory for Energy, 2010) and 68.1% of these imports account for mineral 
fuels and related materials (Directorate General for Trade, 2009f). For Turkey the 
EU and Russia constitute the first two trade partners, except in exports where 
Russia comes after United Arab Emirates. Again, just like the EU for Turkey too, 
the main items imported from Russia outstand as natural gas and crude oil (Dış 
Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 2009: 7). Consequently, cooperation in the energy sector is to 
the advantage of the three parties. 
Table 3: The EU- Turkey- Russia Trade Relations 
MAJOR TRADE PARTNERS 2008 
EU RUSSIA TURKEY 
3 Russia  9.7% 1 EU 27 51.5 % 1 EU 2715 41.7% 
7 Turkey 3.5% 4 Turkey 4.5% 2 Russia 11.4% 
MAJOR IMPORT PARTNERS 2008 
EU RUSSIA TURKEY 
3 Russia 11.2% 1 EU 27 45.4% 1 EU 27 37.4% 
7 Turkey 3.0% 9 Turkey 2.2% 2 Russia 15.7% 
MAJOR EXPORT PARTNERS 2008 
EU RUSSIA TURKEY 
2 Russia 8.0% 1 EU 27 55.2% 1 EU 27 48.3% 
5 Turkey 4.1% 2 Turkey 5.9% 3 Russia 4.9% 
Sources: Directorate General for Trade, 2009f and 2009h 
                                                
15
 When the EU countries are evaluated separately, Russia takes the first rank. In that case, among 
the first 30 trade partners for Turkey 13 of them are member of the EU. These countries are: 
Germany, Italy, France, UK, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, 
Sweden and Austria (Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 2008).  
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Secondly, there are diverging views about whether Nabucco and South 
Stream are in competition or whether they can be merged (Nies, 2008: 71) and the 
answer of these questions requires further technical evaluations of both projects. 
However, recent developments indicate that Turkey’s total exclusion from the so 
called “rival” project is out of question since both Nabucco and South Stream will 
pass through Turkish territory (Ibrahimov, 2009). During the visit of Russian 
Prime Minister Putin, on 6 August 2009, a series of agreements and protocols on 
natural gas, oil and nuclear power were signed between Turkey and Russia 
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). One of these agreements, 
concerned Turkey’s acceptance of feasibility studies for the South Stream pipeline 
projected to pass through Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea (Adamowski, 
2009; Ibrahimov, 2009). With this agreement, while Putin emphasized Turkey’s 
position as an important transit country (Euractiv, 2009g), Turkey demonstrated 
once again its determination to become a key country in Eurasian gas trade16 
(Ibrahimov, 2009) and highlighted that the South Stream is not a rival for Nabucco. 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu affirmed: “South Stream creates a 
North-South energy corridor, similar to the East-West corridor of Nabucco and the 
two pipelines are not substitutes for each other” (Adamowski, 2009). The 
agreement also received support from the EU. Martin Selmayr from the European 
Commission evaluated The South Stream and Turkey’s signature for the relevant 
feasibility research as supplementary for the European energy security (Euractiv, 
2009f). 
                                                
16
 According to Zeyno Baran, Nabucco is not only significant for diversification of supplies to 
Europe, but is also instrumental for Central Asian and Caspian countries to get out of Russian 
influence in the energy sector. She argues that with this signature Turkey demonstrated that it was 
only interested in becoming an energy bridge and that it was “indifferent” towards these countries 
(Euractiv, 2009e).   
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Thirdly, it should be noted that Russia also can consider cooperating with 
Turkey as a conduit in order to transfer its gas to new markets (apart from Europe) 
beyond Turkey. In that respect the Blue Stream pipeline would be illustrative since 
it can serve to export Russian gas into the Middle East, to be more specific to 
Israel, via Turkey (Roberts, 2004: 22). Similarly, although the Nabucco Project’s 
official website clearly identifies the Caspian Region, the Middle East as well as 
Egypt as potential gas suppliers, it also specifies that it does not rule out Russia as 
a potential supply source. The Nabucco Pipeline Company is “open for Russian 
gas as ‘add on’ to other sources.” And “Nabucco will treat all sources equally” 
(Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, 2010b). 
To sum up, the “Russian factor” over energy transitions via Turkey is 
dependent on Russia’s future moves concerning its natural gas deals with Caspian 
producers and on the future of South Stream Project. Nevertheless, high economic 
interdependence between Russia, the EU and Turkey, especially in the field of 
energy and Turkey’s strategic position which requires its inclusion even to the 
“rival” South Stream Project will be instrumental in future dynamics related to 
Russia.  
 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The Managing Director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, 
Reinhard Mitschek (2009) indicated in one of his speeches that in order to realize 
an energy hub there are some prerequisites, “a broad portfolio of suppliers” and 
“high number of domestic and international buyers” are the first two them. In line 
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with this clarification, he argued that “Turkey’s position is favourable to establish 
an energy hub” if “a gas pipeline like Nabucco with huge transport capacity to 
connect Turkey and South East Europe” is constructed.  
This chapter analyzed why Turkey is “favourable” for undertaking the role 
of an energy bridge for Europe. To this end it firstly identified Turkey’s role as an 
energy corridor through the discussion of Turkey’s existing energy pipeline system 
as well as the projects in their planning or early construction phases. A special 
focus was dedicated to Nabucco, which has the potential to become Europe’s 
fourth main energy artery, in order to examine strategic and technical dimensions 
of Turkey’s energy bridge role for Europe’s energy needs today and in the future. 
Then the chapter focused on major factors which have the potential of weakening 
or strengthening Turkey’s position in this context and it concentrated on several 
challenges emanating from Russia, the LNG trade, the Bosphorus and hurdles 
arising from the suppliers. These factors are significant for strategic calculations 
concerning Turkey, since, as Roberts (2004: 23) indicates too, the precondition for 
Turkey to become the EU’s “fourth artery” lies in the completion and success of 
international projects passing through Turkish territory, Nabucco being the most 
significant one. 
After these analyses, it is possible to conclude that Turkey is a crucial 
partner of Europe in assuring European energy security through energy transport 
from the producers in Turkey’s vicinity to Europe. This suggestion can be 
basically based on two main assumptions. Firstly, Turkish territory offers a 
relatively cost effective destination for the transmission of oil and natural gas from 
the East to the West. Secondly, Turkey will be influential in diversifying supplies 
to Europe in line with the objectives of European Energy Policy, once and if it 
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becomes a transit corridor capable of supplying necessary amounts of energy 
sources (Tekin & Walterova, 2007: 92).  
In this respect, Turkey’s role within the external dimension of European 
Energy Policy cannot be underestimated. Turkey’s willingness and capacity as a 
transit country can progressively increase when its conditions allow deepening 
energy trade with problematic suppliers in the Caspian and Middle East Regions 
(Nies, 2008: 93). At this point one key question emerges: Will the energy factor be 
effective on Turkish accession into the European Union? While Jose Manuel 
Barroso (Euractiv, 2009a) and Egemen Bağış (Euractiv, 2009b) affirmed that 
Nabucco will start a new phase in the Turkey-EU accession process, the real 
answer of the question seems more complicated as it only depends on the EU’s 
“internal” perception about the candidates and enlargement in general. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
TURKEY’S ENERGY ROLE AND ITS POTENTIAL 
MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
 
Turkey’s geopolitical importance has been “upgraded” as new challenges 
emerged for the EU due to its raising concerns about the energy security (Rada and 
Rada, 2008: 18). Turkey’s proximity to producer regions with significant oil and 
gas reserves rendered current as well as planned pipelines passing through Turkish 
territory, the major access route for supplies coming from diverse regions, 
especially from the Middle East (Güney, 2005: 307).   
This strategic role of Turkey in the energy supply security opened up new 
debates which fundamentally based their arguments on the view that Turkey’s 
energy bridge position strengthened by the Nabucco project will start a new phase 
in the EU accession process of Turkey. Yet the Turkish candidacy is a sui generis 
case and its accession process has been subject to several rises and falls which 
make such predictions difficult to achieve.  
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In principle the EU enlargement, conceived as an automatic process, based 
on rule following is subject to a routine application procedure and candidates are 
assessed with their appropriateness to the Copenhagen membership criteria. 
Nevertheless, throughout the history EU enlargements revealed that some 
applicants are prioritized over others, which means that some intervening factors 
other than the criteria, such as norms, identities, ideologies or geopolitics are 
influential. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to question whether Turkey’s 
energy role can really be a factor which will accelerate the accession process.  
 
 
5.1. Energy Security and Turkish Membership 
 
Turkey is a natural corridor which offers the perfect opportunity to transfer 
gas to Europe from diverse suppliers such as Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Qatar, 
Turkmenistan and Russia, which renders the country’s role in energy imports 
“vital” in the European Energy Policy which foresees supply diversification as a 
sine qua non (Balcer, 2009: 27). Especially for natural gas supply diversification, 
as indicated in the Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan (European 
Commission, 2008) too, the EU is in need of developing a southern corridor which 
would link its energy markets with the producers in the Middle East and Central 
Asia and also in need of linking Europe with the Southern Mediterranean gas 
interconnections, which is difficult to achieve without the Turkish collaboration 
(Balcer, 2009: 28). In that respect it is anticipated that “Turkey’s importance will 
rise in parallel with Europe’s energy hunger” (Rada and Rada, 2008: 21). 
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Accordingly, cooperation becomes inevitable between the EU, in need of 
alternative routes and sources, and Turkey willing to become an energy bridge for 
Europe. This EU- Turkey energy cooperation can be identified with two main 
aspects. The first one consists of joint material, concrete efforts to assure energy 
security, which are joint pipeline projects such as Nabucco, which have been 
already studied in the previous chapter. The second aspect refers to institutional 
dimension (Balcer, 2009: 27). In order to intensify and facilitate energy 
cooperation with Turkey, the EU has been insisting on Turkey to join the Energy 
Community Treaty. Although Turkey engaged in negotiations concerning the 
Energy Community Treaty in the autumn 2009 following the governmental 
agreement launching Nabucco project concluded in July, Turkish politicians firmly 
affirmed their position indicating that Turkey would align its energy regulations 
and policies with the Union, only if the energy chapter is opened to negotiations 
(Barysch, 2010: 10). Yet, from the perspective of the European Union, the 
institutionalization of Turkey-EU energy cooperation does not directly imply a full 
EU membership for Turkey (Font, 2006: 204).  
The EU official documents put emphasis on the significance of Turkey in 
achieving energy security objectives put forward by the European Energy Policy. 
Partnership Documents and Progress Reports concerning Turkey point to Turkey’s 
role for the EU in the diversification of suppliers and well as transit routes of oil 
and gas. Moreover, they refer to projects such as Nabucco as being “priority 
projects of common interest”. However, when it comes to the membership of 
Turkey, they use “a guarded language in linking energy security issues to the 
Turkish accession process” (Tekin and Williams, 2009a: 351).  
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The EU’s “guarded language” gives way to negative arguments concerning 
Turkish membership and energy linkage. There are also those who argue that 
Turkish membership will not enhance the Union’s security of supply, rather it will 
increase the overall import dependency since Turkey’s own import dependency 
(%74.4 for 2007) is higher than the EU average (%53.1 for 2007). Accordingly, 
Hoogeveen and Perlot point to the view that on the basis of long-term partnership 
between the EU and Turkey, Turkey would transit oil and gas to Europe in any 
case, without becoming a member, since the amount to be transported is already 
contracted and that refusing to export it would be non-economical for Turkey 
(Hoogeveen and Perlot, 2007: 496). However, it should be noted that a total 
suspension of membership negotiations with Turkey would lead to severe 
consequences in EU-Turkey relationship. The EU needs a “stable, peaceful and 
prosperous Turkey to foster stability in the region” mainly because of its worries 
over the future supply and transit of energy to meet European energy demands. 
Therefore, “most people believe that the best way to achieve this is to keep Turkey 
engaged in the process” (Akçakoca, 2006: 13). 
Consequently, unlike the guarded language of official documents, the 
researchers, diplomats or ministers of EU members who argue that Turkey should 
become a member, do not hesitate to link Turkey’s position for the European 
energy security with its membership process. As an example Tekin and Williams 
(2009a: 351) refer to a conference in İstanbul, in June 2007, which focused on 
“common challenges and opportunities for the EU and Turkey in the energy field”. 
During the conference Turkish and Commission leaders repeatedly mentioned the 
necessity of cooperation and the advantages of Turkey’s geographic situation for 
increasing European energy security. 
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These arguments highlight that geostrategic importance of Turkey for 
European Union firstly arises from its location which borders the Middle East, the 
Black Sea and the Caucasus, the gate to the Central Asia. As already mentioned, 
situated between Europe and these regions, a stable, friendly and democratic 
Turkey aligned with the EU’s external interests and policies is evaluated as an 
asset for the EU in its relations with third parties in a range of issues, energy 
security being on the top of the list (Hughes, 2006: 38). Secondly, the arguments 
go on to suggest that this asset for the EU also originates from Turkey’s military 
capabilities and cultural17 features which would offer leverage to Europe in dealing 
with the problems arising in the Caucasus and the Middle East. As the EU is 
highly dependent on the energy coming from these fragile regions, their potential 
instabilities would affect the EU’s energy supply security. As a result, arguments 
in favor of Turkish membership point to the fact that “Turkish membership would 
enhance European Security” (Rada and Rada, 2008: 32). 
Consequently, the supporters of the view that energy will be a factor in the 
Turkish membership argue that as long as Turkey is recognized as a “secure and 
independent” transit route for energy supplies headed to Europe, this role will 
contribute to Turkey’s accession process (Tekin and Williams, 2009a: 352). 
Turkey is already referred as a significant energy crossroads. Laçiner (2004: 114-
115) believes that this feature of Turkey will be fortified with its membership to 
the EU. His arguments indicate that in the 21st century, Turkey will play a vital 
role in transferring secure and steady energy flows required to meet Europe’s 
energy demand and that Turkish Membership will render energy security 
                                                
17
 Sedat Laçiner (2004, 115) argues that Turkey’s similarity in terms of culture, religion and race, 
with the energy producing countries in the Central Asia and Middle East, will offer leverage to the 
EU in its relations with suppliers. 
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multiplied and stable. Accordingly, Turkey is considered as the “actual, physical 
piece needed to complete the pan-European energy map”, especially after the 
memberships of Bulgaria and Romania which opened new doors towards Central 
European energy markets. Hence, Turkey’s incorporation into the European Union 
is argued to be the main factor in creating a “geo-energy” space in favor of 
European energy Security (Mane-Estrada, 2006: 3783). 
Similarly, the advantages of Turkey in the energy security issues have also 
been indicated in the EU Council’s internal debates by those who support Turkish 
membership (Tekin and Williams, 2009a: 350). The Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Sweden, Carl Bildt and the previous foreign minister of Italy, Massimo D’Alema 
indicated in their joint article Turkey’s advantageous features for Europe and they 
affirmed: “Let us not forget that Turkey is a key actor in the realm of energy 
security. Given the uncertain state of energy markets, and the stakes involved, it is 
our shared interest to incorporate Turkey in a functioning integrated system”, 
pointing to the full membership (Bildt and D’Alema, 2007). Likewise, at a High 
Level Conference about European Energy Policy, taken place in Istanbul, 
highlighting the benefits of cooperation between Turkey and the EU on energy 
strategy, Olli Rehn, the Commissioner for Enlargement said: “The EU and Turkey 
share essential strategic interests e.g. in security, economy and dialogue of 
civilizations. That is one of the reasons why the EU decided to open negotiations 
for membership with Turkey” (Joint Press Release, 2007).  
These arguments function in favor of Turkey in the debates concerning its 
membership. However, based on my personal perception of Turkish membership, 
this thesis suggests that together with instrumental “for and against” arguments 
about Turkey, European public opinion is also a factor identified as highly relevant 
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to the long Turkish accession process. The reason for this is the fact that some 
researchers such as Barysh (2007: 2) clearly indicate: “Turkey is unlikely to join 
the EU as long as a majority of EU citizens and many politicians remain opposed”. 
Accordingly, this research argues that the analysis of Turkey’s energy role and its 
affect on the accession process would remain incomplete unless European public 
opinion is included in the study. Therefore, the following sections will offer a 
snapshot concerning the EU public opinion, Turkey’s energy role and its potential 
membership. 
 
 
5.2. European Public Opinion 
 
In the EU enlargement, both the acceptance of candidacy and the “wait and 
see” policy are related to member’s interests which are threatened/strengthened 
with Turkey’s reluctance or willingness in complying with the accession 
preconditions determined by the EU. Accordingly, the situation of Turkey has 
been subject to changing interests and concerns of the member states. For example, 
by some, the acceptance of Turkish candidacy in 1999 was directly linked to the 
strategic and military interest of the EU and to the military capabilities of Turkey, 
since the “headline goal18” and candidacy offered at the same year was considered 
as a purposeful “coincidence”. Now the popular puzzle for the decision-makers is 
whether energy security can be the new factor which will carry Turkey one step 
closer to the membership. Although future developments will present the real 
                                                
18
 In December 1999, Helsinki European Council indicated the “headline goal”: “by 2003, the EU 
should be able to deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, military forces of up to 
50.000-60.000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks” (Smith, 2003, p: 239).  
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answer to this puzzle, EU public opinion will offer clues for coming up with a 
conclusion. 
 
 
5.2.1. Why Public Opinion Matters? 
 
The significance of EU public opinion is directly related with the 
“Absorption Capacity”. The Turkish membership is a controversial and 
challenging case for Europe. Unlike the previous enlargements of the EU, the 
debates concerning the Turkish accession go further than the country’s 
appropriateness to Copenhagen criteria, and refer to the “absorption capacity” as 
an additional criterion for membership. Some argue that the absorption capacity 
operates as an excuse for the EU to reject the candidates which are not welcomed 
by the EU citizens even when they fulfill Copenhagen criteria19 . Its different 
components, public opinion and identity being the most challenging ones, slow 
down the accession process especially for Turkey, being a highly debatable 
candidate. 
The concept stands for negative perceptions about the enlargement. That’s 
why it is commonly associated with “enlargement fatigue” and “EU’s final 
frontiers” (Emerson, Aydın, Clerck-Sachsse and Noutcheva, 2006: 1). With the 
famous Copenhagen Membership Criteria, a reference to the absorption capacity 
was included in the official document: “The Union’s capacity to absorb new 
members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an 
                                                
19
 This is exactly the case for Turkey. When the Europeans are asked: “Once Turkey complies with 
all the conditions set by the European Union would you be in favor or against Turkish Membership 
to the EU?”, 45% answered that they were opposed (Eurobarometer 69, 2008: 29). 
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important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate 
countries” (European Council, 1993: 13). Later, in 2006 this open-ended clause 
has been declared as an official criterion by the European Parliament (Emerson, 
Aydın, Clerck-Sachsse and Noutcheva, 2006: 4).  
While different components of the concept touches upon the EU’s capacity 
to absorb new members in several aspects concerning goods and service market, 
labor market, the budget, the institutions, strategic security and society; the public 
opinion in EU member states outstands as one of the most challenging and 
determining factor of absorption capacity (Emerson, Aydın, Clerck-Sachsse and 
Noutcheva, 2006: 9). Public opinion emerges as an interesting aspect since it is 
both a result of the absorption capacity (as negative arguments about budget, labor, 
security or functioning of the Union affect the opinion of citizens) and a part of it 
since while all other arguments may indicate positive outcomes, public opinion 
may still remain negative.  
The public opinion matters in shaping the position of EU decision-makers’ 
position about Turkish membership. Therefore this thesis argues that a complete 
analysis of the link between EU energy security and Turkish membership should 
definitely include European public opinion in this issue. To be more specific, a 
strong argument indicating that Turkey’s energy bridge position will accelerate the 
accession process, must be based on (in addition to justifications referring to 
Turkey’s geostrategic position and how it will enhance European energy security) 
public opinion too. 
In that respect, if energy will be a factor in Turkey’s acceptance to the 
Union, one would expect a parallelism between European’s concerns about their 
energy dependency and their support for Turkish Membership. It would be 
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misleading to suppose that there is a direct cause and effect relationship between 
energy dependency and support for Turkey, since several intervening factors are 
valid for Turkey (such as its population, religion, culture, democracy or economy). 
Rather, unlike the conventional literature which states arguments in favor of 
Turkish energy role and membership and conclude the research with the result that 
Turkey should be a member, this study tries to go one step further and questions if 
it can be the case.  
 
 
5.2.2. What The Public Opinion Says? 
 
The following table brings together the EU’s energy dependency, the EU 
public opinion concerning energy issues and concerning Turkish membership. In 
the table below the Union’s energy dependency20 and the support of EU citizens 
for Turkish membership are indicated on a yearly basis as far as the Eurobarometer 
and Eurostat data allows. The table demonstrates that there is a constant increase 
in the total energy dependence of the EU. On the other hand, for public support of 
Turkish accession it is not possible to observe a similar trend parallel to the energy 
dependency, despite the fact that increasing energy dependency also increased 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance for EU energy security. Despite the belief that 
candidates’ potential benefits results in increased EU public support, those who 
were in favor of Turkish membership remained at the constant percentage floating 
between 30-35%. 
                                                
20
 Eurostat defines energy dependency as “the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in 
order to meet its energy needs. The indicator is calculated as net imports divided by the sum of 
gross inland energy consumption plus bunkers” (Eurostat, 2009a). 
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Table 4: Public Support for Turkey and EU Energy Dependency  
    
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
IN FAVOUR 
(%) 30 34 32 NA NA 35 28 NA 31 SUPPORT FOR TURKISH 
MEMBERSHIP AGAINST (%) 47 46 49 NA NA 52 59 NA 55 
ENERGY 
DEPENDENCY 
EU TOTAL 
(%) 46,8 47,5 47,6 49 50,3 52,6 53,8 53,1 NA 
Sources: Eurobarometer 53, 56, 58, 63, 66, 69 and Eurostat     
  
To get more idea concerning the issue, the table on Appendix B21 offers 
more detailed information and presents several factors which would be helpful in 
evaluating the significance of energy factor on public opinion and consequently on 
the support for membership. 
 The first column of the table indicates the EU members’ energy 
dependency, in which the average EU percentage is 53.1%. It’s worth noting that 
16 members are already above the EU average, Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus 
being the top three. The second column represents the EU citizens’ view 
concerning common European Energy Policy. The column stands for the 
percentage of citizens who answered as “European Level” when they were asked 
about the most appropriate level of decision making in order to respond to new 
energy challenges. This is a significant factor since support for European level 
decision making in the energy issues, implicitly means a support for the majority 
of policies already identified by European Energy Policy, diversification being the 
most important one for the case of Turkey. The European average in favor of EU 
level policy making is 39%. The highest support comes from Italy (55%), 
Denmark (52%), Netherlands (55%) and Belgium (50%). Nevertheless, making a 
general argument about the relationship between this element and energy 
dependency is not possible since the data is not consistent with each other: while 
                                                
21
 Please see pages 173-174: Public Opinion Overview 
 141 
the energy dependence of Denmark (-25.4%) and of Netherlands (38.6 %) are 
relatively low, those of Italy (85.3 %) and Belgium (77.2%) are quite high. The 
last included element concerning energy is the citizens’ view about the likelihood 
of gas disruptions, as future threats. This is taken into consideration with the 
possibility that the more EU public fears of a potential gas supply disruption, the 
more they could be inclined to be positive towards Turkey which would increase 
supply security through secure and stable supply routes. Here, the EU average is 
47% and Poland (78%), Latvia (67%) and Lithuania (67%) are the top three 
countries which think that gas disruptions are likely threats in the future. 
 Other elements directly refer to Turkish membership. The two following 
columns indicate whether Turkish membership is considered in the interest of the 
EU or Turkey. If Turkey’s energy role is a strong argument, it is sensible to expect 
that it will contribute to the increase in the percentages saying that the membership 
is in the interest of the Union. Nevertheless, it is not the case. 52% of European 
believes that it will be on the advantage of Turkey, as opposed to only 7% who 
answered “in the advantage of the EU” 22 . The table also includes data on 
percentages which represent citizens in favor and against Turkish membership. Net 
support stands for supporters minus opponents and the countries in the table are 
ranked in accordance with their net support.  
                                                
22
 Studies indicate that the way enlargement and the candidate country are presented to the public 
through the media or through the leaders highly affect citizens’ perceptions. EU society tends to 
support or oppose enlargement depending on the representation of potential benefits and risks of 
enlargement.  Therefore, biased information remains as a big obstacle to engage in “frank” debates 
on enlargement (Emerson, Aydın, De Clerck-Sachsse and Noutcheva, 2006, p: 8). Eurobarometer 
surveys too indicate that EU citizens get “one-way” information about the candidates. For example 
a large majority of EU citizens indicate that they are more informed about “the problems that could 
be caused by the EU enlargement”, while they know little about the benefits of it. Similarly, they 
know much more about “How future member states would benefit from European Union 
accession” while their knowledge about “How the European Union would benefit from European 
Union accession of future member states” is limited (Special Eurobarometer 255, 2006). 
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 Questions and answer options do not directly include statements 
concerning Turkey and European energy security. However, today, energy supply 
security has become an important component of security considerations. The 
European Security Strategy clearly mentions the Union’s import dependence as 
“special concern for Europe” and identifies it as one of the important threats for 
the future of the EU (European Security Strategy, 2003: 3). Moreover, the EU’s 
capacity to assure its strategic security is described among the components of the 
absorption capacity and in this context Turkey-EU partnership in energy supply 
security and energy transits is argued to influence the Union’s capacity to absorb 
Turkey (Emerson, et al., 2006: 20). Accordingly, the option saying that “Turkey’s 
accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region” (Eurobarometer 
66, 2007: 225) is the closest argument to Turkey’s energy role23. While 33% of EU 
citizens agree that Turkish accession will enhance the region’s security, security 
argument remains as the 7th statement after respect for human rights (85%), 
improvement of economy (77%), immigration (66%), cultural differences (61%), 
geography (56%) and history (40%) as the figure below illustrates clearly.  
                                                
23
 At this point, as a weakness, it must be stated that how the EU public opinion defines the concept 
of “security” and whether or not they include energy security in it, is not clarified by the relevant 
Eurobarometer. Hence the assumption comes from the relevant literature and European Security 
Strategy. 
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Figure 5: Arguments about Turkey 
Source: Eurobarometer 66, 2007: 225 
 
As a result, what the overall public opinion says concerning the 
relationship between Turkey’s energy role and its membership? The first and may 
be the most significant remark is that unlike popular clichés about Turkey related 
to population, cultural differences or immigration, the energy factor is not even 
included in the surveys, unlike those who argue that Turkey’s energy transit 
country position is an important factor/advantage for Europe to offer full 
membership, would expect.  
 Secondly, despite the absence of a general parallelism, it is interesting to 
find out that in countries where net support for Turkey is very low, the energy 
dependency is above the average or the vice versa. To illustrate, Denmark is the 
country least dependent on energy imports (-25%) and its net support for Turkey is 
among the high percentages (19%). On the contrary, in Austria and in 
Luxembourg net support has the lowest percentages with -63% and -32 
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respectively, while their energy dependency is as high as 69.1% and 97.5%. In fact, 
the position of Austria is ironic since it is the gate to Central European gas markets, 
for the Nabucco project which is depicted as the very reason for Turkey to become 
an energy bridge. When it comes to other Nabucco partners, for Germany a similar 
position to Austria emerges with -28% net support and high energy dependency 
from the EU average. However, the positive support coming from Bulgaria (6%), 
Hungary (18%) and Romania (49%, the highest support), increase the chance of 
energy being a factor to support Turkish membership in these countries.  
Lastly, with regards to Turkish membership and strengthened security, 
Turkey is the only country where the highest majority of the public argues that the 
security will be enhanced with its membership (64%). Yet, still, among the EU 
members there is a positive relationship between the net support for Turkey and 
agreement for strengthened security: in countries where net support is high, such 
as in Romania (49%), Sweden (46%) or the Netherlands (36%) agreement with the 
security clause is also high (45%, 59% and 37 % respectively). In line with the 
argument, in Austria and Luxembourg, as examples, both factors stand at the 
lowest ranks. 
 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
 
The Eastern Enlargement revealed that factors other than accession criteria 
highly determine the candidates’ roads towards the membership. In deed for the 
case of Eastern European countries, security considerations and kinship based duty 
on the basis of same European identity are argued to operating as the real causes of 
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their membership despite their fragile structure concerning the Copenhagen 
Criteria. With such an example, it is normal to expect that for Turkish membership 
as well, some special criteria will be influential over arguments in favor or against 
the candidate. Nevertheless, since the Association Agreement signed in Ankara in 
1963, despite its acceptance of candidacy for full membership with the Helsinki 
Summit of December 1999, Turkey still waits at the door. 
The Eurobarometer surveys put forward the public opinion concerning 
Turkey which indicated that the majority of EU citizens do not consider Turkey as 
part of the European Union even if Turkey fulfills every criterion and reform 
required by the Union. In line with that, Turkey’s long candidacy period clearly 
means that even though a candidate offers several advantages to the EU, it cannot 
achieve membership unless the support of EU citizens demonstrates a positive 
trend. One of the reasons for this is that citizen’s hostility towards Turkey 
discourages the EU politicians to speak in favor of Turkey leading to the “lack of 
positive political leadership (Barysch, 2007: 1). 
With such a background, this chapter questioned the arguments indicating 
that Turkey’s position as an energy bridge for the European Union will have a 
positive effect on Turkey’s accession to the EU. While Turkey’s geostrategic 
position and willingness to become a transit country which will enhance Europe’s 
energy security supported this claim, the analysis of Eurobarometer surveys did 
not encounter such a perception of EU citizens. In other words, there is no clear 
evidence that energy is perceived as an advantage important enough to create 
public support for Turkish membership. 
For today and the near future, is it possible to argue that the understanding 
of “security” has changed. If it is so, then the energy security would be among the 
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major security considerations for countries and citizens now and in the future. In 
the context of energy security, the more supply disruption threats increase, the 
more the lives of citizens, the industry and economy of European members will be 
affected. Given that Turkey stands as an energy corridor ready to ease the 
European problems concerning the diversification of supplies, this geostrategic 
position is considered to potentially offer Turkey a bargaining power for full 
membership. Yet, would this be an element which could change public opinion in 
favor of Turkey? As the public opinion analysis offered in this chapter revealed, 
the possibility is low.  
The major reason for this is that, Turkey already acts as a positive and 
cooperative partner in the area of energy security. As long as the country finds 
accurate financial support and international partners required for the investments 
on necessary infrastructure projects to transfer energy to Europe, Turkey is 
already willing to become Europe’s energy bridge towards the Middle East and 
Central Asia. It is true that Turkey demonstrates a guarded position towards the 
Energy Community Treaty and suggests the view that further institutionalization 
of EU-Turkey energy cooperation should be in the context of “Energy Chapter”, 
in the accession process. Nevertheless, it does not attempt to use membership as a 
precondition for undertaking the role of energy bridge for Europe, which would 
be economically irrational and which would further increase negative sentiments 
for Turkey among the EU citizens.  
Given these circumstances, as a remark concerning whether EU energy 
security and Turkey’s role in this context are determining factors for Turkish 
membership or not, it is possible to conclude that the feature of “energy bridge” 
would not offer any leverage for Turkey, on its own. This factor is an important 
 147 
yet insufficient element. If Turkey would only rely on this factor to promote its 
membership, it would not be surprising to see that no progress is achieved in 
favor of membership. The underlying causes for this could be that transit roads 
are already contracted, such as Nabucco and that Turkey is already a partner in 
energy supplies. Accordingly, with reference to membership Europeans can easily 
think “why should we offer more?” and may support options other than full 
membership such as keeping the status quo or special partnership. Consequently, 
unless Turkey can use energy security as a factor to “win the hearts and minds” of 
EU citizens and can modify public opinion in its favor, the accession process 
would not be effected by the goodwill of Turkey in offering secure and stable 
energy supplies to Europe. 
Since, an aggressive policy of Turkey requiring full membership in 
exchange of uninterrupted supplies to Europe would be illogical and would 
irreversibly damage the bilateral relation between Turkey and the EU, the most 
feasible option for Turkey would be to “improve Turkey’s image” in Europe by 
adding the energy security factor in it, instead of “selling Turkish membership 
outright”. Perceptions and prejudices are not easy to change but it is a fact that 
Europeans cannot indicate surely why they oppose Turkish membership. This is 
an advantage for Turkey because the lack of strict reasons for opposition, offers it 
a chance to create a change in its perception by highlighting its potential 
contributions to the EU concerning economic growth, young population, foreign 
policy or energy security (Barysch, 2007: 5). 
To conclude, for the present there is no evidence that Turkey’s energy role 
will create a positive step towards full membership. There no evidence that the 
benefits of Turkey in the context of EU energy security is reflected to the 
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European public opinion for Turkey, either. It is even uncertain whether the EU 
citizens are fully informed by this strategic position of Turkey. However, it is for 
sure that the energy role is an asset for Turkey which could contribute to promote 
its image in Europe. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that energy would 
operate as a factor when Turkey will engage more in managing its “brand” as an 
irreplaceable EU member.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Energy security has become the rising concern for especially the European 
Union countries, due to their heavy reliance on external supplies coming from 
particular exporting countries. In 2030, the overall imports of oil and gas of the 
Union is projected to increase to 84% and 93%, respectively (European 
Commission, 2007). However, the EU’s chance for self-sufficiency is limited and 
until now, the efforts to create a common policy have been fruitless due to 
different preferences of the member states. Still, throughout the years, the 
European Commission identified the basic objectives and basic policies to be 
pursued. In that respect, security of supply that is uninterrupted, affordable and 
sustainable availability of energy (European Commission, 2000) is the 
fundamental cause for the evolution of European Energy Policy.  
 Concerns for supply security gives a special emphasis on the EU’s external 
relations with major producer states and the external dimension of European 
Energy Policy becomes of crucial importance to assure current and future oil and 
gas availability. Nevertheless, different social, economic and political features of 
 150 
exporters prevent the EU to pursue a uniform external energy policy. In this 
context, one significant remark is that externally, European Energy Policy 
demonstrates an “uncertain” trend between liberal market principles on the one 
hand, and political interaction on the other hand. In view of that, this thesis reaches 
to the conclusion that geopolitics is an integral part of energy security and it 
supports that the Union has to create its sui generis strategy which combines 
market principles and geopolitical considerations, by pursuing the goal of 
economic and political alignment or at least rapprochement with strategically 
important countries for its energy security. 
Accordingly, one dimension of the EU’s external energy policies includes 
market liberalization and the extension of its internal market principles to producer 
and transit countries. With this, the Union targets to base the supplies on 
uninterrupted economic deals and aims to create investment opportunities for 
extraction and transit infrastructures. These policies are successful only when they 
are reciprocated by the producers. However, the EU’s suppliers are not always 
willing to enforce European-like energy policies, Russia being one example. In 
this case, diversification of suppliers and transit routes emerge as the most feasible 
option for the Union in order to overcome its weakness because of being 
dependent on one major supplier and because relying on insecure supply paths.  
Given that the location of proved world energy reserves offers an 
obligatory dependence on certain regions, especially Middle East and Caspian 
Region, for diversification policies of the Union, transit countries, with secure and 
friendly regimes, end up as the major assets to reach to a variety of alternative 
sources. This thesis argues that this is the point where Turkey’s geostrategic 
importance comes to the surface. 
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With its large portfolio of suppliers, Turkey’s location is favorable to 
transport large capacities of oil and natural gas to Europe. In that respect the 
Nabucco project offers the necessary infrastructure to link Turkish pipeline system 
to European markets. It is possible to argue that the plans to connect Arab Gas 
Pipeline and Trans Caspian Pipeline to Nabucco will strengthen Turkey’s position 
of energy crossroads. Nevertheless, the challenges which will affect the success of 
Turkey’s international pipeline projects require to be acknowledged both by 
Turkey and the European Union in order to generate necessary strategies to cope 
with them. In addressing challenges especially coming from major suppliers and 
other consumers such as China, the significance of international cooperation, 
dialogue and diplomacy have to be appreciated and mutual trust between the EU, 
producing countries and Turkey have to be established for investment friendly 
environment and uninterrupted supplies.  
In line with the literature, it is revealed that Russia and its South Stream 
project is generally perceived as a rival to Nabucco, thus the Russian policies to 
contain its influence over the Caspian resources are considered as damaging 
Turkey’s energy role. To some extend, it is true that Russia, with new price 
policies towards the Caspian producers and its long term gas purchases from 
potential suppliers of Nabucco, modified its policies in order to compete with the 
increasing geopolitical role of Turkey. Nevertheless, as Russia is Europe’s major 
gas supplier, supplies passing via Turkey towards Europe would not substitute, but 
would only complement Russian gas and oil. Given Turkey’s own energy 
dependency on Russia, for Europe totally by-passing Russia would be a fruitless 
effort. On the other side, strong economic interdependence between the EU, 
Turkey and Russia prevents Russia to enjoy a complete leverage in its relations 
 152 
with Europe, either. Thus, cooperation emerges once again as the key to energy 
relations. In that respect, although criticized by some experts Turkey’s acceptance 
of feasibility studies for the South Stream Project in its territorial waters in the 
Black Sea represent a significant step. This thesis concludes that this is a strategic 
move in favor of Turkey which emphasized its good will, willingness and 
determination in becoming a key transit country. 
In accordance with Turkey’s willingness and capability to become a major 
transit for the EU, strong arguments have been raised indicating that this feature of 
Turkey will start a new phase in the accession process and will offer a leverage for 
Turkey in favor of its membership. With the analysis of Turkey’s capacity, 
strengths and weaknesses as a transit country, this thesis acknowledges Turkey’s 
vital importance for Europe in energy security. Nevertheless, based on the 
assumption that the public opinion is a determinant factor in the evaluation of 
Turkish candidacy, this study argues that Turkey’s role in the context of European 
energy security can be identified as being a determining factor for the full 
membership when the argument is tested by positive or negative public opinion. 
As a result of a public opinion analysis, despite the appreciation of 
Turkey’s advantages for European energy security by ministers, commissioners, 
and academicians, this research did not encounter such a perception of EU citizens. 
Accordingly, there is no clear evidence that energy factor causes a public support 
for Turkish membership. Moreover, it is even questionable whether this strategic 
role of Turkey is fully acknowledged by the EU citizens. 
For the sake of objectivity towards the candidates, in the part of the 
European Union, unbiased debates are important during the accession process. 
This requires equal representation of both advantages and weaknesses of the 
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candidate countries. Therefore, if the EU defines Turkey as a major transit country 
and as a major partner for its energy security, than this advantage should be stated 
in the debates concerning Turkish membership. Just like there are separate clauses 
and questions concerning immigration, demography, human rights, religion, 
multiculturalism and cultural differences of Turkey, Turkey’s energy bridge 
position as well has to be inserted in Eurobarometer surveys. Although whether 
this would increase public support for Turkey or not cannot be known beforehand, 
such a move would at least inform EU citizen of one more advantage of Turkey. 
To conclude, this thesis argues that energy factor is an important but 
insufficient element to bring membership for Turkey on its own. The reason is that, 
ironically, the analysis of public opinion does not offer positive outcomes in most 
of the countries where energy dependency, concerns for supply disruptions are 
high, while support for Turkish membership and agreement with the argument that 
Turkey will enhance security in the region is low. However, as the circumstances 
change and European Energy Policy evolves, optimistically it can be expected that 
negative perceptions of Turkey can leave the scene to the advantages of this “old” 
candidate. The more EU citizens become sensitive to energy security threats, the 
more its special role as an energy bridge might help Turkey to strengthen its image 
in the European public.  
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Turkey’s Existing Pipeline System 
Source: BOTAŞ24 
                                                
24
 For an enlarged version of the map please visit http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp.  
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PUBLIC OPINION OVERVIEW 
COUNTRY 
Energy 
Dependency 
(%) 
Energy 
Policy at 
the EU 
Level (%) 
Future 
Threats:Gas 
Supply 
Disruptions 
Accession 
in the 
Interest of 
the EU (%) 
Accession 
in the 
Interest of 
Turkey (%) 
In Favour of 
Turkish 
Membership 
(%)1 
Against 
Turkish 
Membership 
(%) 
Net 
Support 
(%) 
Strengthened 
Security (%) 
Austria 69,1 31 38 8 42 16 79 -63 18 
Luxembourg 97,5 41 41 5 62 32 64 -32 19 
Germany 58,9 40 28 5 68 35 63 -28 22 
France 50,4 39 53 6 56 35 60 -25 30 
Slovakia 69 34 52 12 48 35 55 -20 31 
Latvia 61,5 34 67 12 50 41 48 -7 37 
Greece 67,3 49 48 6 57 47 53 -6 41 
Italy 85,3 55 65 8 46 40 46 -6 42 
Czech Republic 25,1 36 31 9 51 43 49 -5 33 
Finland 53,8 15 34 4 73 47 50 -3 33 
United Kingdom 20,1 23 62 7 55 42 45 -3 31 
Cyprus 95,9 35 21 2 51 48 49 -1 30 
The EU 53,1 39 47 7 52 45 45 0 33 
Belgium 77,2 50 38 4 66 49 49 0 34 
Malta 100 20 51 10 39 38 35 3 26 
Ireland 88,3 28 48 10 46 39 35 4 31 
Estonia 29,9 21 56 5 53 48 43 5 41 
Lithuania 62,3 34 67 11 39 45 40 5 34 
 
A
PPEN
D
IX
 B
 
                                                
1
 The remaining percentage from the total of “in favor” and “against” views stands for those who answered as “Don’t Know” which is not included in this table. 
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COUNTRY 
Energy 
Dependency 
(%) 
Energy 
Policy at 
the EU 
Level (%) 
Future 
Threats:Gas 
Supply 
Disruptions 
Accession 
in the 
Interest of 
the EU (%) 
Accession 
in the 
Interest of 
Turkey (%) 
In Favour of 
Turkish 
Membership 
(%) 
Against 
Turkish 
Membership 
(%) 
Net 
Support 
(%) 
Strengthened 
Security (%) 
Bulgaria 51,9 21 NA 12 33 45 39 6 43 
Hungary 61,4 31 55 9 48 53 35 18 36 
Denmark -25,4 52 20 4 56 59 40 19 39 
Slovenia 52,5 40 46 11 44 57 38 19 33 
Portugal 82 40 46 9 43 51 31 20 40 
Poland 25,5 31 78 9 44 57 29 28 42 
Spain 79,5 41 29 6 26 55 25 30 30 
Netherlands 38,6 55 27 6 56 67 31 36 37 
Sweden 36,1 24 17 5 50 71 25 46 59 
Romania 32 25 NA 18 18 64 15 49 45 
          
Turkey 74,4 13 NA 34 13 55 32 23 64 
Sources: Eurostat, Eurobarometer 255, Eurobarometer 258, Eurobarometer 262, Eurobarometer 66, Eurobarometer 69  
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